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REAL PROPERTY
William R. Van Wagner*
Holly H. Gotelli**
Mark M. Sloan***
HIS Article surveys developments in the area of Real Property, with
discussion of related topics, from October 1, 1991 to September 30,
1992.1 During the Survey period, Texas courts continued the trend
of the last several years to enforce unambiguous contracts as written. The
overriding contractual interpretation principle of the day is to enforce the
intent of the parties as evidenced by the four corners of their contractual
agreements. 2 The Survey cases further indicate that Texas courts (at least at
the appellate level) and federal courts applying Texas and federal law will
closely scrutinize lender liability claims and defenses that were so common
during the 1980s3 and, in some cases, chastise and admonish both borrowers
asserting and trial courts upholding what appear to be dubious claims.
4
These decisions lead to the inescapable viewpoint that mortgage lenders'
confidence in the enforceability of their clear contractual agreements should
be as great as their wariness and fear of the wave of successful lender liability
cases that occurred during the 1980s. Lenders are not invincible, however,
as evidenced by several decisions that have imposed liability on or subjected
a lender to the risk of liability where the lender has acted egregiously. 5 Nev-
* Shareholder, Thompson & Knight, P.C.; B.B.A., Western Michigan University, 1970;
J.D., cum laude, Southern Methodist University, 1980.
** Associate, Thompson & Knight, P.C.; B.A., Texas Tech University, 1987; J.D., Texas
Tech University, 1990.
*** Associate, Thompson & Knight, P.C., B.B.A., University of Iowa, 1985; J.D., cum
laude, Southern Methodist University, 1990.
1. The sheer volume of cases has not permitted the authors to include all cases that affect
the legal practice of all real estate practitioners. We have, however, addressed those cases that
are most applicable to the "average" real estate practice. We have intentionally omitted zon-
ing cases as they are more properly addressed in either a local government or administrative
article. In addition, we have intentionally limited the scope of some sections. For example, we
have not addressed all cases dealing with promissory notes, guaranties or cases arising under
FIRREA, since many cases involving notes, guaranties and FIRREA have little effect on the
real estate practitioner. Finally, we have made a conscious decision not to report on some real
estate cases that reflect unremarkable fact situations and neither create new law nor provide
new or otherwise worthy instruction on the application of existing law. Without making these
decisions, we would have been deemed to have presumptuously decided that our writing and
reporting ability is of such a magnitude that all readers would have the stamina and courage to
traipse through the resulting forest.
2. See infra notes 154-66, 450, 486 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fossi et al., Real Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw.
L.J. 2055 (1992).
4. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 302-22.
5. See, e.g., Matthews v. AmWest Say. Ass'n, 825 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
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ertheless, even egregious conduct may go unsanctioned if either the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) becomes the receiver for or acquires the assets of the lender commit-
ting the egregious acts. In such cases, the debtor may be doomed by the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine6 and/or its statutory companion (Section
1823(e)) 7 created by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and En-
forcement Act of 19898 (commonly known as FIRREA), the federal holder
in due course doctrine9, the federal anti-punitive damages doctrine, 10 or dis-
missal under prudential grounds.'" These strategic defenses can seem im-
penetrable to even the most damaged, inventive and adventuresome debtors
and withstand, in most cases, the most potent nuclear lobs that could be
thrown at a private lending institution. 12
Aside from lender related matters, the Survey cases touched upon most
areas of the real estate legal practice. Most courts made a valiant effort to
enforce contracts as intended by the parties and, as to non-contractual mat-
ters, the courts generally applied sound reasoning. Although the authors
disagree with several results and the reasoning in several cases,13 the Survey
cases generally apply the law appropriately and honor precedent.
I. MORTGAGES
A. FORECLOSURE AND DEFICIENCY
During the Survey period, the Texas courts addressed several cases involv-
ing deficiencies. Although the Texas legislature has enacted a deficiency col-
lection statute14 that would control the resolution of certain issues in several
1992, writ denied) (lender who successfully argued that a claim for breach of oral contract was
barred by statute of frauds was surprised by the court's holding that the debtor could recover
the loss of the benefit of its bargain under its fraud claim, even though that measure of dam-
ages was the same as that which would have been recoverable under the barred claim for
breach of oral contract); LaCoure v. LaCoure, 820 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ
denied) (mortgagee held liable for infliction of emotional distress resulting from wrongful fore-
closure where it was shown that mortgagee foreclosed on the basis of a deed of trust and note
that was backdated at the direction of the mortgagee and following foreclosure, mortgagee
caused ex-daughter-in-law and child to be evicted on the belief that male friends were staying
over); Fairfield Fin. Group, Inc. v. Gawerc, 814 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1991, no writ) (facts that mortgagee [i] over a ten month period, accepted payments at a time
and in an amount different from written agreement; [ii] did not deny oral agreement regarding
revised payment schedule; [iii] foreclosed on the basis that payments continued at a time and in
an amount different from written agreement without giving the debtor a reasonable opportu-
nity to redeem, established prima facie case that debtor would probably succeed in a wrongful
foreclosure action against the mortgagee).
6. The D'oench, Duhme doctrine was enunciated by the Supreme Court in D'oench,
Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942) and has been interpreted and
expanded by its progeny. See generally infra notes 86-153 and accompanying text.
7. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1989).
8. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
9. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985).
10. See infra notes 82, 85 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 77.
13. See, e.g., infra notes 102, 129-30, 158, 347 and accompanying text.
14. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1993) (allowing any person
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of the cases decided during the Survey period, these cases are instructive in
different respects. For example, in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Westridge Court
Joint Venture'5 the RTC, as receiver of a failed savings association, appealed
from the trial court's judgment that it was not entitled to a deficiency judg-
ment against the guarantors of a loan made by the failed savings associa-
tion16 The debtor apparently did not challenge the validity of the
foreclosure sale, but argued (and the trial court agreed) that the RTC was
not entitled to a deficiency judgment because the savings association had bid
a grossly inadequate price at the foreclosure sale 17 and had breached a fidu-
ciary duty and duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to the debtor and
guarantors by failing to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure
sale. 18
On appeal, the Houston court of appeals (First District) concluded that
the mortgagee only owed the guarantor the duty to conduct the foreclosure
sale properly 19 and that this duty was fulfilled because the foreclosure sale
was valid. 20 The validity of the sale, according to the court, was established
because the defendant had not raised, as required by Texas law, a fact issue
that would indicate that an irregularity occurred in the foreclosure sale pro-
cess that resulted in a grossly inadequate sale price. 21
Attempting to find a backdoor to avoid the deficiency claim, the guaran-
tors argued that the foreclosure sale was an unconscionable transaction
under Section 17.45(5) of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act 22
against whom a deficiency judgment is sought to request the court to determine the fair market
value of the property at the time of the foreclosure and, if the court determines that the prop-
erty was purchased for less than its fair market value, the deficiency amount will be offset by
the amount by which the fair market value, less the secured indebtedness not extinguished by
the foreclosure, exceeds the sale price).
15. 815 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
16. Id. at 328. It is not clear when the RTC succeeded to the rights of the failed South-
west Savings Association. Because no federal common law or statutory defenses were argued,
this fact is not particularly relevant.
17. Id. at 330. The trial court determined that the fair market value of the property at the
time of the foreclosure sale was at least $1,500,000, that the savings and loan had bid $957,600
and that the disparity resulted in a grossly inadequate bid price. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 332.
20. Id. The court's reasoning that the sale was valid and therefore proper may not be
correct. Specifically, as stated in Savings Ass'n of Houston v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581, 587
(Tex. 1975), an invalid foreclosure sale depends upon an irregularity in the foreclosure sale
that causes or results in a gross insufficiency in the sale price. Accordingly, a mortgagee may
logically argue that if it takes some action that chills the bidding process without resulting in a
gross insufficiency in the sale price, the action should not invalidate the foreclosure sale. On
the other hand, the debtor could logically argue that the chilling effect, although not affecting
the validity of the sale, should constitute a defense to a deficiency action by the mortgagee. See
infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, even assuming that the Westridge
court erred in concluding that the sale was valid and therefore proper, the error should not be
reversible because chilling was not argued by the guarantors.
21. Westridge, 815 S.W.2d at 330, 331 (relying on Savings Ass'n of Houston v. Musick,
531 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Tex. 1975)); see also Thompson v. Chrysler First Business Credit, 840
S.W.2d 25, 32 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ) (a guarantor may not avoid a summary
judgment on a deficiency claim by alleging inadequacy of consideration if there has been no
irregularity in the foreclosure sale).
22. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993).
1993] 1709
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(DTPA). Section 17.45(5) defines an unconscionable action to include a
transaction that, to a person's detriment, results in a gross disparity between
the value received and the consideration paid. 23 The trial court determined
that the guarantors were not "consumers" under the DTPA and therefore
were not entitled to pursue a DTPA action. 24 Reaching the right result for
the wrong reason, 25 the Houston court upheld the trial court's determination
that the guarantors did not have standing to assert a claim under the
DTPA.
26
McDonald v. Foster Mortgage Corp.2 7 involved a defaulting mortgagor
who went on the attack, only to be rebuffed and overrun by the RTC. In
McDonald, the mortgagor had admittedly defaulted on the payment of a
note secured by her residence. Apparently the mortgagor then located a
potential purchaser who was interested in purchasing the residence for a
price that would have eliminated any deficiency. 28 Subsequently, the mortga-
gee foreclosed on the residence and attempted to convince the mortgagor to
pay a deficiency. Apparently perturbed by the mortgagee's request for pay-
ment of the deficiency, the mortgagor filed suit alleging that the mortgagee's
refusal to accept or approve the proposed purchase breached a duty of good
faith and fair dealing and resulted in a wrongful foreclosure. The RTC
counterclaimed for the deficiency amount. 29 The trial court granted the
23. Id. § 17.45(5).
24. Westridge, 815 S.W.2d at 332.
25. The Houston court declined to decide whether the guarantors were consumers with
regard to the loan transaction and instead, relying on Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579,
581-83 (Tex. 1985), held that because the guarantors were not the purchasers at the foreclosure
sale, they could not complain of the disparity between the value received and the consideration
paid. Westridge, 815 S.W.2d at 332.
The Houston court, however, erred in its reading of Chastain. The Chastain court did not
hold or infer that only a purchaser (whether or not a consumer) had the right to complain of
the disparity between the value received and the consideration paid. Rather, the Chastain
court specifically concluded that before examining the unconscionability issue, it had to first
determine if the purchasers were consumers, for if they were not, the purchasers had no stand-
ing under the DTPA. Chastain, 700 S.W.2d at 580-81.
26. Westridge, 815 S.W.2d at 332. In at least two other Survey period cases, borrowers
attempted to argue that the lender had acted unconscionably under the DTPA. In Federal
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500, 508 (5th Cir. 1992), the borrower argued that the
mortgagee had purchased the property at its foreclosure sale for grossly inadequate considera-
tion and that this conduct was unconscionable under the DTPA. The Fifth Circuit held that
the borrower had no standing to assert this argument because the borrower was not a con-
sumer under the DTPA. Id. at 508. In Affiliated Capital Corp. v. Commercial Fed. Bank, 834
S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ), the borrower attempted to prepay its note in
order to avoid foreclosure of the lender's lien securing the note. The lender refused prepay-
ment under a clause that prohibited prepayment and thereafter foreclosed its lien. The bor-
rower argued that the lender's actions in preventing prepayment deprived the borrower of its
investment in property and subsequent foreclosure resulted in a gross disparity covered by
§ 17.50(a)(3) of the DTPA. Consistent with Kraij, the court first concluded that the borrower
was unable to allege a gross disparity DTPA claim with respect to the foreclosure because the
borrower had not purchased the property from the bank. Id. at 528-29. The court went on to
recognize, however, that a borrower could maintain a gross disparity claim under the DTPA if
the borrower could show that it was prevented from using borrowed funds despite paying the
costs of borrowing or that it had "sustained a similar inequity in its bargain." Id. at 529.
27. 834 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
28. See id. at 575. The case does not reflect that the RTC admitted this fact.
29. Shortly after the mortgagor filed the suit, the mortgagee failed and the Federal Say-
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RTC summary judgment on all issues and the mortgagor appealed.30
Relying on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corp. v. Coleman,31 the court summarily rejected the mortgagor's as-
sertion that a mortgagee owes a mortgagor an obligation of good faith and
fair dealing. 32 Adding salt to the wound, the court concluded that even if the
mortgagor was damaged by wrongful foreclosure, she could not maintain
that action against the RTC because of the doctrine of prudential moot-
ness, 33 which generally stands for the principle that if a party against whom
judgment is sought has no assets and never will have any assets to satisfy the
judgment sought, then dismissal is justified. 34
With respect to the deficiency claim asserted by the RTC, the homeowner
filed a general denial and then took the position that, as an element of its
deficiency action, the RTC had the burden to show that the foreclosure sale
was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. The court disagreed,
stating that commercial reasonableness is a defense that must be pled by the
debtor and only after being pled, does the lender have the burden to prove
commercial reasonableness. 35 Although not expressly so stating, the court's
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was appointed receiver of the mortgagee.
Thereafter, under FIRREA, the RTC succeeded as receiver.
30. McDonald, 834 S.W.2d at 575.
31. 725 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1990).
32. McDonald, 834 S.W.2d at 576. Because the mortgagor argued no other grounds for
wrongful foreclosure, the court apparently determined that it was unnecessary to conclude
whether the foreclosure was wrongful. In a somewhat curious effort to bootstrap its holding
that the mortgagee breached no duty of good faith and fair dealing and although the case does
not reflect that the mortgagor ever argued fraud or breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the
mortgagee, the court pointed out that as a matter of law the RTC is protected from fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty suits under the D'oench, Duhme doctrine. Id. Unfortunately this
dicta is an overly broad statement of the protection afforded the RTC and FDIC by D'oench,
Duhme. See infra notes 86-153 and accompanying text.
33. Id. (relying on 281-300 J.V. v. Onion, 938 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 933 (1992)).
34. Id.; Sunbelt Say., FSB v. Birch, 796 F. Supp. 991, 994 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Triland
Holdings & Co. v. Sunbelt Serv. Corp., 884 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1989). Although dismissal on
prudential grounds appears to be a strong argument in any case in which a judgment is sought
against a failed institution whose secured obligations and deposit balances exceed its assets, the
cases do not reflect that the argument has been made on a regular basis as has D'Oench,
Duhme and other federal statutory or common law defenses. Perhaps this is due to the repug-
nancy of the prudential mootness theory as it applies to the FDIC, as aptly described by a
district court in the Fifth Circuit:
D'Oench, Duhme... already provide[s] the FDIC with an extraordinary arsenal
to overcome defenses against enforcement of obligations to the FDIC and to
defeat on the merits claims against it. No matter how dire the circumstances in
which the FDIC finds itself, little need exists to give it another magic weapon
with which to conquer all foes. To do so by acceding to the mootness theory
may ease the FDIC's heavy burden, but at the same time would create bad law.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Texas Country Living, 756 F. Supp. 984, 992 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
Nevertheless, with the two existing rulings by the Fifth Circuit, prudential mootness should
become an FDIC argument in avoiding judgments.
35. McDonald, 834 S.W.2d at 576. In support of its conclusion, the court cited to several
cases decided under Article 9 of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code. The Dallas court of
appeals has expressly held that because Article 9 does not apply to liens under real property
mortgages, the commercial reasonableness standard under Article 9 does not apply to deficien-
cies resulting from a foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. Huddleston v. Texas Commerce
Bank - Dallas, N.A., 756 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
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statements regarding commercial reasonableness could be interpreted to
mean that a mortgagee seeking a deficiency action is under an obligation to
prove the reasonableness of the foreclosure sale if commercial reasonableness
is pled as a defense by the defendant. This is not the settled law in Texas
with respect to real estate foreclosures and several courts have expressly so
stated.36
In recent years, several Texas cases have specifically held that if a mortga-
gee acts in a manner that chills the bidding at a foreclosure sale, the mortga-
gor is entitled to either bring a damages action based on wrongful
foreclosure37 or utilize the chilling of the bid process as a defense to a defi-
ciency action brought by the mortgagee. 38 One Survey case, Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Summers & Miller Gleneagles J. ,39 addresses the burden
that a defendant relying on a chilling argument bears in order to avoid a
summary judgment motion by the mortgagee. 4° In Gleneagles, the lender
foreclosed the lien of one deed of trust that covered two separate tracts and
then sued for a deficiency. The defendants asserted that the lender was not
entitled to a deficiency because the foreclosure notice did not correctly de-
scribe the two tracts of land, 4' thereby discouraging "prospective purchasers
who would have otherwise participated in the sale."'42 The RTC moved for
summary judgment.
The debtor argued that it was the jury's province to determine if an irregu-
larity in the foreclosure sale resulted in a chilling of the bid process. The
court disagreed and concluded that the debtor must present some evidence
that would create a fact issue as to whether the irregularity caused a chilling
of the bid process.43 The sole evidence presented to the court was an affida-
vit by one of the venturers of the debtor opining that the bid price was mate-
rially less than the fair market value of the property at the time of the
foreclosure. The court logically concluded that the venturer's opinion in no
way supported the debtor's chilling argument.44 Because the debtor failed to
present any evidence that the error in the property descriptions resulted in a
grossly inadequate sales price or otherwise chilled the bidding process, the
36. Thompson v. Chrysler First Business Credit Corp., 840 S.W.2d 25, 33 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1992, no writ); Pentad J.V. v. First Nat'l Bank, 797 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Tex. App.-Austin
1990, writ denied); Huddleston, 756 S.W.2d at 347.
37. Charter Nat'l Bank - Houston v. Stevens, 781 S.W.2d 368, 374 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
38. Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Reetz, 888 F.2d 1497, 1503 (5th Cir. 1989); Charter
Nat'l Bank, 781 S.W.2d at 371.
39. 791 F. Supp. 653 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
40. Id. at 654.
41. Apparently each property description contained a "save and except" clause and the
clauses were inadvertently transposed, resulting in one tract being described to contain more
land than was actually included in the tract and the other tract being described to contain less
land than was actually included in the tract.
42. Gleneagles, 791 F. Supp. at 654.
43. Id. at 655. The court's conclusion is arguably contrary to Charter Nat'l Bank,
wherein the court stated that whether the irregularity in fact caused a chilling of the bid price
was an issue to be decided by the jury. Charter Nat'l Bank, 781 S.W.2d at 374.
44. Gleneagles, 791 F. Supp. at 655.
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court granted the RTC's motion for summary judgment. 4 5
B. WRAPAROUND MORTGAGES
In the 1989 decision of Summers v. Consolidated Capital Trust,4 6 the
Texas Supreme Court adopted the "outstanding balance" method of apply-
ing proceeds from a foreclosure sale involving a wraparound note and
thereby rejected the "true balance" approach.4 7 Under the outstanding bal-
ance method, the proceeds from a foreclosure sale are credited against the
entire outstanding balance due under the wraparound note, while under the
true balance approach, the proceeds from a foreclosure sale are credited
against the difference between the wraparound note and the balance of the
underlying note(s).48 Although there can be little disagreement over the
holding in Summers, the facts presented in Beach v. Resolution Trust Corp. 49
raise a scenario that probably was not contemplated by the Summers court.
In Beach, the debtor defaulted under a $298,000 wraparound note, which
included as part of its balance an existing note executed by the debtor in
favor of a third party. 50 The lender foreclosed its lien and, as highest bidder,
purchased the mortgaged property at the foreclosure sale for $220,000. At
the time of the foreclosure, the balance of the wraparound note was approxi-
mately $257,000, approximately $111,000 of which was the balance of the
underlying note executed by the debtor in favor of the third party. The
debtor argued that because the lender had not paid any of the proceeds to
the holder of the underlying note, 51 the deficiency should be measured by the
true balance approach. The trial court disagreed and the debtor appealed. 52
The majority of the Houston court of appeals (First District) summarily
45. Id. at 653-54 (relying on Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Reetz, 888 F.2d 1497 (5th
Cir. 1989); Charter Nat'I Bank, 781 S.W.2d at 368).
46. 783 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1989).
47. Id. at 583.
48. Id.
49. 821 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). In the court's opin-
ion, the primary issue was whether the RTC could assert D'Oench, Duhme defenses for the
first time on appeal. The most pertinent cases addressing this issue are discussed, infra, in
notes 90-105. In addition, one of the debtors assigned to the lender, as additional security for
the lender's loan, a note payable to one of the debtors, and the lender was seeking a deficiency
following foreclosure upon the note assigned to the lender. The collection of the deficiency on
the assigned note is controlled by Article 9 of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code.
50. Apparently, the debtor had personal liability for payment of the underlying note, but
this was not specifically argued by the debtor. See Beach, 821 S.W.2d at 243 n.l.
51. The lender apparently argued that it owned or held the underlying note, but the RTC
conceded in oral argument that the lender neither held nor owned the underlying note and had
foreclosed the mortgaged property subject to the second lien securing the underlying note. See
id. at 243 n. 1.
On the face of the case, there is no evidence that the lender took subject to the underlying
note and lien other than the statement made by the RTC counsel during oral argument. One
wonders why the holder of a first lien would take subject to a second lien that would be extin-
guished through the foreclosure of the first lien, especially in light of the fact that the foreclos-
ing lender was not personally liable on the underlying debt. Perhaps, in this instance, the
debtor's concern regarding non-payment was real, especially if the prudential doctrine would
be applicable to any suit brought against the RTC for failure to pay.
52. Beach, 821 S.W.2d at 243.
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rejected the debtor's argument. 53 In a footnote, however, the court stated
that it had not considered certain factual differences between this case and
the Summers case because the debtor neither relied on these differences nor
contended that they called for a different result.54 Perhaps the most impor-
tant of these additional facts was that the debtor was liable for payment of
the underlying note and the RTC did not own or hold the underlying note.
As a result, the debtor was placed in the unenviable position of potentially
paying the underlying note twice if the RTC failed to satisfy the underlying
note. In a concurring opinion, Justice Mirabel acknowledged this concern,55
but concluded he was compelled to follow Summers and apply the outstand-
ing balance approach because, under Summers, the law implies a covenant
to apply the foreclosure proceeds to the entire indebtedness included in the
wraparound note.56 In retrospect, the debtor in the Beach case should have
emphasized the factual differences with the Summers case and argued that
the lender had breached its implied covenant to apply the sales proceeds
against the entire indebtedness of the wraparound note. Although these ar-
guments probably would not have caused the Beach court to deviate from
the holding in Summers, the debtor would have been in a good position to
argue that the RTC was not entitled to a deficiency because of its breach of
the implied covenant to satisfy the underlying debt to the extent of available
proceeds. 57
C. LENDER LIABILITY
As stated in the introductory paragraph of this Article, Texas courts
are clearly disallowing lender liability claims against mortgagees, except
in the most egregious circumstances. Accordingly, during the Survey
period, the Texas and federal courts, applying Texas law, consistently
rejected the argument that the mortgagee owes a duty of good faith or
a fiduciary duty to a mortgagor, 58 and closely scrutinized claims of
53. Id.
54. Id. at 243 n.I.
55. Id. at 245.
56. Id.
57. Judge Mirabel also stated that if the proceeds, together with any deficiency collected,
was not applied to the outstanding indebtedness, the debtor would have a cause of action
against the lender. Id. at 245-46. Moreover, an argument exists that the trustee under the
deed of trust could arguably have liability for proceeds received by it and not applied to the
entire indebtedness.
58. E.g., McDonald v. Foster Mortgage Corp., 834 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [lst Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (impossible for a mortgagee to breach implied duty of good
faith obligation allegedly owed to mortgagor because Texas courts hold that no such implied
duty of good faith arises out of lender/borrower or mortgagee/mortgagor relationship); Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Kingston Investors Corp., 819 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. App.-
Houston [Ist Dist.] 1991, no writ) (lender does not owe an implied duty of good faith to
borrower; therefore, lender did not have duty to disclose to borrower or guarantors financial
condition of participant in borrower's project who had committed to provide development
funds above the lender's commitment and who was another customer of the lender, even
though lender allegedly had knowledge that participant would be unable to honor its financial
commitment to borrower); Cockrell v. Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., 817 S.W.2d 106, 116 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (lender did not breach a duty of good faith because Texas law
does not recognize such an implied duty at law); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Westridge Court
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fraud,59 negligent misrepresentation,6° duress, 61 and usury.62 A number of
cases involving lender liability are worthy of more than footnote mention
and are discussed below.
Although Rosas v. U.S. Small Business Administration6 3 creates no new
law, it is illustrative of how today's courts will dismantle the throw in the
kitchen sink approach to a lender liability action. 4 In Rosas, the debtor ne-
gotiated a commitment for a twenty year permanent loan, subject to the
condition that the Small Business Administration (SBA) would provide an
eighty percent guarantee. Prior to the funding of the permanent loan, the
first lien loan was placed in default and the property was posted for foreclo-
sure. At the closing of the loan, the SBA agreed to guaranty only a fifteen
year loan and the lender accordingly prepared loan documents for a fifteen
year loan. The borrower apparently complained of the fifteen year maturity
and a representative of the lender allegedly agreed to modify its loan from a
fifteen year loan to a twenty year loan at some time in the future. The bor-
rower's agreement with the SBA, however, provided for a guaranty of a fif-
teen year loan instead of a twenty year loan. In addition, the lender advised
(and, in the borrower's mind threatened) the borrower that if it did not ac-
J.V., 815 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (with respect to
foreclosure sale, mortgagee owes but one duty to mortgagor; that is to conduct the foreclosure
sale properly); Rosas v. U.S. Small Business Admin., 964 F.2d 351, 357 (5th Cir. 1992) (Texas
courts do not recognize that a lender-borrower relationship creates a duty of good faith and
fair dealing); Hall v. Resolution Trust Corp., 958 F.2d 75, 79 (5th Cir. 1991) (Texas courts
have consistently refused to imply a duty of good faith and fair dealing in borrower-lender
relationship; therefore lender had the right to refuse substitute collateral offer that did not
conform with requirements of loan documents); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Claycomb, 945
F.2d 853, 859 n.17 (5th Cir. 1991) (borrower-lender relationship does not impose on lender
either a fiduciary duty or obligation of good faith); Sunbelt Say., FSB v. Birch, 796 F. Supp.
991 (lender does not owe duty of good faith to guarantor). But cf Affiliated Capital Corp. v.
Commercial Fed. Bank, 834 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ) (court did not
dispute allegation that lender owed borrower duty of good faith, but instead concluded that
lender had not breached such duty).
59. E.g., Rhima v. White, 829 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ de-
nied) (where seller did not expressly disclose to purchaser the existence of recorded deed of
trust and mortgagee had no dealings with purchaser until after the purchase, mortgagee was
not liable to purchaser for fraud); Kingston Investors Corp., 819 S.W.2d at 610 (borrowers are
required to clearly demonstrate that mortgagee's acts constitute trickery, artifice or device in
order to establish fraud in inducement claim against mortgagee). Rosas, 964 F.2d at 356
(where lender's representative made representation that he would restructure loan following
execution of note, lender would not be liable for fraudulently inducing borrower to execute
note unless borrower also showed that lender engaged in conduct calculated to deceive bor-
rower into believing that alleged oral agreements would be honored on note).
60. Rosas, 964 F.2d at 355 (where debtor executed promissory note which contained clear
and unambiguous terms, alleged negligent representation made by lender's representative was
barred by parol evidence rule).
61. Id. at 356-57 (alleged threat by lender providing refinancing of loan in default that if
borrower did not accept lender's terms, lender would not provide refinancing and holder of
first lien would foreclose was not duress since statements were within lender's legal rights and
therefore could not constitute duress).
62. See infra notes 235-41 and accompanying text. Although usury is a theory of lender
liability, it is more appropriate to include the discussion of usury under the promissory note
section.
63. 964 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1992).
64. The court also addressed several issues pertaining to the Small Business Administra-
tion (SBA), but which are not relevant to the subject matter of this article.
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cept the lender's terms the lender would not make the loan and the first lien
lender would foreclose its lien. As could be expected for a project already in
trouble, the borrower ultimately defaulted on the permanent loan. The
lender called on the SBA's guaranty and the SBA commenced foreclosure.
The borrower sued the permanent lender for negligent misrepresentation,
breach of duty of good faith, duress and breach of contract. The lender
moved for and was granted summary judgment and the borrower
appealed. 65
The court of appeals disposed of all matters in favor of the lender. As to
the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court concluded that the loan
documents were clear and unambiguous and that the statement regarding
the conversion of the fifteen year loan to a twenty year loan was inadmissible
under the parol evidence rule. 66 The borrower argued that the misrepresen-
tation resulted in fraudulent inducement and therefore was excepted from
the parol evidence rule. Disagreeing, the court stated that to establish fraud
in the inducement sufficiently to avoid the parol evidence rule, the com-
plaining party must show trickery, artifice or device, in addition to the
misrepresentation. 67
The borrower further argued that the lender placed the borrower under
duress to execute the loan documents since the lender "threatened" the bor-
rower with statements that (i) the lender would not make the loan if the
borrower didn't agree to the fifteen year term and other terms that had been
negotiated, and (ii) if the lender didn't make the permanent loan, the first
lien lender would continue with its foreclosure process. 68 The court summa-
rily dismissed the duress argument by stating that the statements made by
the lender were within the lender's legal rights and therefore could not possi-
bly constitute duress.69
On appeal, the borrower apparently recharacterized its breach of good
faith and fair dealing claim that was rejected by the trial court70 as a breach
of the implied promise by parties to an agreement to lend not to interfere or
hinder each other's performance under their agreement. The borrower ar-
gued that the lender had breached this implied covenant because the lender
65. Rosas, 964 F.2d at 354-55.
66. Id. at 355.
67. Id. at 356. Somewhat shaking its finger at the borrower, the court stated that the
borrower had executed the note with full knowledge of its contents and could not "now be
heard to complain" that it was deceived. Id. To continue the scolding, the court stated that a
contrary conclusion would permit a party to allege the existence of any collateral parol agree-
ment to contradict a writing, thereby destroying the parol evidence rule. Id.
68. Id. at 356-57.
69. Id. at 357. The court chastised the borrower, stating that instead of attempting to
address each element of a duress action, the borrower's argument focused only on the bor-
rower's precarious financial condition at the time of the closing of the loan. Id. Accordingly,
the court concluded that "there is no issue whatsoever, either legal or factual." Id.
70. The trial court rejected the good faith and fair dealing argument because Texas courts
do not recognize this duty within the lender-borrower relationship. Id. Recognizing the futil-
ity of appealing that decision, the borrower relied on the theory that in every contract there is
an implied covenant by each party not to interfere with or deter the other party's performance




had violated SBA guidelines pertaining to disbursement of loan proceeds.
The court concluded that the SBA's determination of the lender's compli-
ance with the SBA guidelines was dispositive of this issue. 7 1 Although there
was no direct testimony by the SBA as to the lender's compliance with the
applicable guidelines, the court concluded that the SBA must have deter-
mined that the lender had complied with the guidelines because the SBA
honored its guaranty. 72 Accordingly, the court rejected the borrower's
claim.73
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Claycomb74 reflects circumstances
under which a defaulted borrower who has been sued by his lender may still
wish that his lender would be his partner. In Claycomb, the lender made a
loan to the borrower where the borrower's liability for repayment of the loan
was limited to 50% of the balance outstanding from time to time. As part of
the consideration for the loan, the borrower assigned to the lender 50% of
the profits generated by the mortgaged property. The assignment of profits
expressly disclaimed the existence of a partnership between the borrower
and the lender, and further disclaimed any liability on the part of the lender
for the debts, liabilities or obligations of the borrower. The borrower de-
faulted under the loan documents, resulting in a foreclosure of the lender's
lien and a deficiency action against the borrower and guarantors. The bor-
rower and guarantors defended and brought counterclaims on a number of
grounds, including usury75 and the breach of a fiduciary obligation arising
out of a partnership allegedly existing between the borrower and the
lender.76 Such partnership, argued the borrower, was clearly evidenced by
the assignment to the lender of the 50% interest in profits and the 50%
limitation on the borrower's liability for repayment of the loan. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the lender and the borrower
and guarantors appealed, arguing that there was a material fact issue as to
the usury claim and the existence of a partnership between the lender and
borrower. 77
The Fifth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.78
As to the partnership claim, the court concluded that, under Texas law, one
of the essential elements of a partnership agreement is an agreement to share
71. Rosas, 964 F.2d at 357.
72. Id. The court found it incongruous that the lender could have managed the loan in an
inequitable manner and still complied with the SBA guidelines. Id.
73. Id.
74. 945 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom., SHWC, Inc. v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 112 S. Ct. 2301 (1992).
75. Id. The opinion does not set forth the facts upon which the borrower based the usury
claim.
76. Id.
77. Id. The FDIC cross-appealed and contended that it was unnecessary to reach the
state law issues, as the usury claim and partnership claim were barred by D'Oench, Duhme.
The court resolved the partnership issue on state law, and decided the usury issue on state law,
as well as the federal common law theory that institutions created to serve the public interest
are immune from punitive damages. Id. at 857-60.
78. Id. at 859-60.
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losses.7 9 Observing that the lender expressly disclaimed any liability for the
losses, the court found specious the borrower's argument that the 50% cap
on the borrower's liability constituted an agreement by the lender to share in
the borrower's losses.80 In view of Texas law, the lender's disclaimer as to
sharing losses of the borrower, and each of the lender's and the borrower's
disclaimer of the existence of a partnership, the court held there was no
breach of fiduciary duty and could be no legal defense based on the existence
of a partnership. 81
Considering the usury claim, the court observed that Texas courts recog-
nize the validity of usury savings clauses and that the objective intention of
the parties as expressed in the written documents should be given effect. 82
According to the court, the pertinent loan documents, each of which con-
tained a savings clause, evidenced the manifest intention of the parties to
structure the transaction to avoid usurious interest. 83 Accordingly, the
court held that the savings clauses used in the loan documents were sufficient
to defeat any claim or defense of usury under existing law.84 Although not
necessary to its holding, the court went on to hold that, because of the puni-
tive nature of usury under Texas law, the borrower's usury claim against the
FDIC was barred under the federal common law rule that a claim for puni-
tive damages cannot be asserted against an association created to serve the
public interest. 85
79. Id. at 858 (citing Ayco Dev. Corp. v. G.E.T. Serv. Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex.
1981); Coastal Plains Dev. Corp. v. Micrea, Inc., 572 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. 1978)). Each of
the Texas Supreme Court cases describe the essential elements of only a joint venture, not a
partnership. Several Texas cases (some of which predate the Texas Uniform Partnership Act,
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 6132b (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1993)), have held that the definition
of a partnership includes an obligation of the parties to bear some portion of the losses. E.g.,
Conrad v. Judson, 465 S.W.2d 819, 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972). However, even if sharing of losses is not an essential element to
the creation of a partnership, it should be an element that indicates whether the parties in-
tended to create a partnership. See Gutierrez v. Yancey, 650 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983, no writ).
80. Claycomb, 945 F.2d at 859.
81. Id. It is a little curious that the Fifth Circuit did not refer to their opinion in Federal
Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1163(1992), which was decided approximately three months prior to the Claycomb case. In Griffin,
a guarantor asserted a similar partnership/breach of fiduciary duty defense. The court recog-
nized that the Texas Uniform Partnership Act provides that interest on a loan, even though it
varies with the profits of the borrower's business, is not evidence to establish a partnership. Id.
at 699 (relying on TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 7(4)(d) (Vernon 1970 & Supp.
1993)). Because there was not an express agreement to share losses, there was a disclaimer as
to partnership and the profits assignment could not be used as evidence of a partnership, the
court held that no partnership relationship was established. Id. at 700.
82. Claycomb, 945 F.2d at 860.
83. Id. at 860-61.
84. Id. at 860. The curious matter about this case is that the facts establishing the usury
claim are not set forth in the opinion. As a result, the value of the usury holding as precedent
is uncertain.
85. Id. at 861. In support of its holding, the court pointed to several cases where the
doctrine prohibiting penal damages against public institutions had been applied to receivers for
federal courts. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Southwest Motor Coach Corp, 780 F.




D. D'OENCH, DUHME AND FEDERAL DEFENSES
During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit pronounced the "D'Oench,
Duhme decision and its progeny... [to be] a well known, though sometimes
misunderstood, federal common law doctrine"8 6 that "confers a powerful
litigation weapon by making.., usually untimely arguments available to the
FDIC."'87 Although the court recognizes that it has "been rather generous
in treating D'Oench Duhme, perhaps not without controversy," 88 the court
also recognizes that "the FDIC's special role is not all empowering." 8 9 Per-
haps the one issue that involves all of these Fifth Circuit observations is
whether the FDIC90 has the right to raise D'Oench, Duhme and Section
1823(e) for the first time on appeal. In Resolution Trust Corp. v. McCrory,9 1
the Fifth Circuit, through its holding and explanation of several of its prior
decisions, provided some clarification as to the current status of the law in
the Fifth Circuit: (i) the FDIC is prohibited from raising D'Oench, Duhme
and Section 1823(e) for the first time on appeal if the appeal is from a judg-
ment against the failed lender and voids the asset transferred to the FDIC92
and (ii) the FDIC may be permitted to raise D'Oench, Duhme and Section
1823(e) for the first time on appeal, if the appeal is from a judgment entered
in favor of the failed lender and the FDIC did not have the opportunity to
raise the doctrines at the trial level. 93
The cases decided during the Survey period under the D'Oench, Duhme
doctrine and its statutory companion, Section 1823(e), were, in more in-
stances than not, decided in favor of the federal agency or bridge bank as-
86. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Oaks Apartments J.V., 966 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1992).
87. In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 519 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 967 (1992).
88. Texas Refrigeration Supply, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 953 F.2d 975, 980 (5th
Cir. 1992).
89. Allied Elevator, Inc. v. East Texas State Bank, 965 F.2d 34, 38 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing
In re Still, 963 F.2d 75, 78 (5th Cir. 1992)).
90. For purposes of the discussion regarding D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e), any
reference to the FDIC shall be deemed to include the RTC and a bridge bank who is entitled to
rely on those doctrines.
91. 951 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 459 (1992).
92. Id. at 73-74 (citing Thurman v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 889 F.2d 1441, 1442 (5th
Cir. 1989); Olney Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Trinity Banc Say. Ass'n, 885 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir.
1989)).
93. Id. at 71 (relying on Union Fed. Bank v. Minyard, 919 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir. 1990);
Baumann v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 934 F.2d at 1506 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord, In re
5300 Memorial Investors, Ltd., 973 F.2d at 1160, 1163-64 (5th Cir. 1992). None of the Survey
cases expressly address the issue of whether the FDIC is entitled to raise D'Oench, Duhme and
Section 1823(e) for the first time on appeal where the appeal is from a judgment entered
against the failed lender in the trial court, but the judgment does not void the FDIC asset and
the FDIC did not have the opportunity to raise the defense at the trial level. However, this is
consistent with what appears to be the current law in the Fifth Circuit, a court should con-
clude that, under such facts, the FDIC should be permitted to raise D'Oench, Duhme and
Section 1823(e) for the first time on appeal. See Larsen v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 835
S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1992) (holding that FIRREA may offer the FDIC the opportunity to raise
D'Oench, Duhme or Section 1823(e) for the first time on appeal, unless the appeal is from a
judgment against the failed lender and voids the asset).
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serting the doctrine.94 Two of these cases, Resolution Trust Corp. v. Camp"
and Resolution Trust Corp. v. McCrory,96 demonstrate that if a particular
agreement is not barred on D'Oench, Duhme grounds, the FDIC may still
successfully avoid the agreement under Section 1823(e).
In Camp, the lenders filed suit against their borrowers seeking payment on
a promissory note. The borrowers asserted counterclaims and defended on
the basis that its performance of the promissory note was conditional on
resolution of another matter with the bank. In support of this claim, the
borrowers produced a letter sent to the president of one of the lenders that
arguably indicated that the borrower intended that its performance was con-
ditional. Through various transactions, the RTC became the receiver of one
of the lenders and a bridge bank acquired the assets of one of the other
lenders. The new group of lenders filed a motion for summary judgment,
which the district court granted. On appeal, the borrowers continued to
argue that their performance under the note was conditional based on the
letter sent to one of the lenders. The court noted that the record was void of
any evidence that the letter was in the bank's loan files and even if the letter
was in the bank's loan files, the court had serious questions as to whether the
letter would have put bank examiners on notice of conditional performance
under the note.97 However, even assuming that the letter was in the bank's
loan files and that the letter provided notice of conditional performance, the
court concluded that the letter -failed to meet the clear standards of Section
1823(e). 98 The borrowers did not argue that the letter used as their defense
satisfied Section 1823(e). Instead, the borrowers argued that the current ver-
sion of Section 1823(e) was not in effect when the letter was sent and the
provisions of FIRREA, including Section 1823(e), were not intended to be
94. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Mackie, 962 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1992) (D'Oench,
Duhme barred fraud claim and defense to action on a note maintained by FSLIC because
claims based on failed lender's oral commitment to make permanent loan); Texas Refrigera-
tion Supply, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 953 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1991) (D'Oench Duhme
barred breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, promissory estoppel, misrepre-
sentation, breach of good faith and deceptive trade practice claims against FDIC and bridge
bank because all claims based on failed lender's oral agreements); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Adam, 803 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (D'Oench, Duhme barred admission of alleged
conspiratorial agreement between bank and other third party defendants where that "agree-
ment" was not evidenced by a writing); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Toler, 791 F. Supp. 649
(N.D. Tex. 1991) (letter signed by failed lender allegedly agreeing to draw on letter of credit
instead of seeking judgment on note barred under D'Oench, Duhme as a defense to action on
the note maintained by RTC because letter was not part of failed lender's records regarding
loan transaction); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Southwest Motor Coach Corp., 780 F. Supp.
421 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (oral evidence contravening recitation of consideration in guaranty of
$1.00 and other valuable consideration would be barred by D'Oench, Duhme); Stiles v. Resolu-
tion Trust Corp., 831 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ filed) (in action on note main-
tained by RTC, borrower had burden to prove that defenses based on payment, release, accord
and satisfaction were not barred by D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e), and borrower failed
to meet that burden by not producing writing satisfying D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e)
[i.e., no written agreement in failed bank's records evidencing agreement to release, accord and
satisfaction or payment on note]).
95. 965 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1992).
96. 951 F.2d 68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 459 (1992).
97. Camp, 965 F.2d at 30.
98. Id. at 30-31.
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retroactive. 99 Although the court noted that the Seventh and Eighth Cir-
cuits have held FIRREA to be retroactive, 1 00 the court found it unnecessary
to apply Section 1823(e) retroactively because the Fifth Circuit had always
viewed Section 1823(e) as a codification of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
and both bar similar defenses.' 0' Since the letter failed under Section
1823(e), the letter would, according to the court, also fail under the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. 0 2
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. McCrory,10 3 the borrower's general partners
defended against the RTC's action on a note on the basis of a letter agree-
ment between the original lender of the loan evidenced by the note and the
general partners that provided that the general partners' liability would be
limited to their interest in the borrower. The letter agreement was not in the
lender's files, but a copy of the letter agreement was in the file of the outside
attorney who handled the closing of the loan for the original lender. The
court concluded that the outside attorney's file was not an official record of
the depository institution and therefore Section 1823(e) barred the borrower
from using the side agreement as a defense to the RTC's action on the
note. 04 The court further concluded that because Section 1823(e) provided
a clear resolution of the issue, it was not necessary to determine the "thorn-
ier question" of whether D'Oench, Duhme would produce the same result. ' 0 5
Notwithstanding the FDIC's and RTC's success under D'Oench, Duhme
and Section 1823(e), (i) several cases, including the next three cases dis-
cussed, illustrate that D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e) will not protect
the FDIC or RTC from all sins of failed institutions 10 6 and (ii) one case,
99. At the time the letter was written, Section 1823(e) applied to the FDIC only in its
corporate capacity. Id. at 31.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 30-31. The court's analysis is somewhat inconsistent with its conclusion be-
cause the court considered the letter in light of Section 1823(e) while assuming two facts that
arguably would have taken the letter out of D'oench, Duhme: (1) the letter was in the bank's
main files; and (2) the letter was clear enough to place the FDIC on notice of an agreement by
the bank to condition the borrower's performance of the note upon resolution of another mat-
ter. Moreover, in another Survey case, Resolution Trust Corp. v. McCrory, 951 F.2d 68, 72
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 459 (1992), the court recognized that Section 1823(e) and
D'Oench, Duhme may not necessarily produce the same result, and in Federal Say. & Loan
Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 698 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1163 (1992), the
court maintained that the common law doctrine of D'Oench, Duhme was not limited by Sec-
tion 1823(e) and that those two doctrines were not identical in scope and nature. See also
Jones v. Resolution Trust Corp., 828 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ)
(D'Oench, Duhme doctrine not preempted by Section 1823(e)).
103. McCrory, 951 F.2d 68.
104. Id. at 72. The court specifically declined to interpret the phrase "official record of
depository institution," as used in Section 1823(e)(4). Id.
105. Id. The court noted that the defendants and the RTC disagreed over the correctness
of the trial court's interpretation of D'Oench, Duhme, especially as to the existence of a scheme
or arrangement that is likely to mislead the federal regulators. Id. Presumably, this disagree-
ment represents the "thornier question" of whether D'Oench, Duhme would produce the same
result as Section 1823(e).
106. Eg., Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Mackie, 962 F.2d i144, 1150 (5th Cir. 1992)
(in action on note brought by FSLIC, D'Oench, Duhme does not bar defenses based on failed
lender's breach of loan agreement, so long as the defenses do not depend on any agreement not
within bank's integral loan transaction files).
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Resolution Trust Corp. v. 1601 Partners, Ltd.,10 7 holds that the FDIC and
RTC are not entitled to rely on D'Oench, Duhme to avoid contemporaneous
agreements relating to a loan made by a private nonfinancial institution that
is subsequently assigned to a federally insured financial institution. 10,
In Texas Refrigeration Supply v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,109 the
borrower sued the lender for, among other things, wrongful acceleration and
wrongful foreclosure. During the lawsuit the bank failed and the FDIC was
appointed receiver. The FDIC then entered into a purchase and assumption
agreement, pursuant to which the note was assigned to a bridge bank and the
FDIC retained all obligations pertaining to the loan, and the FDIC and the
bridge bank were substituted for the failed lender. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the FDIC and the bridge bank, holding that
the borrower's claims and defenses were based on oral agreements and there-
fore barred by D'Oench, Duhme." 0 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the
trial court applied D'Oench, Duhme too rigorously and held that wrongful
acceleration and wrongful foreclosure claims based on the failed institution's
breach of implied covenants that were part of the contract between the failed
bank and the borrower were not barred by either D'Oench, Duhme or Sec-
tion 1823(e). 111
In Allied Elevator, Inc. v. East Texas State Bank,'1 2 the bank made the
borrower a loan evidenced by a promissory note. The note was renewed five
times. Apparently, in connection with the fifth renewal of the note, the bank
and the borrower orally discussed whether the borrower wanted to acquire
credit life insurance that would satisfy the bank's loan to the borrower in the
event of the borrower's death. "13 The borrower decided to accept the credit
life insurance and, when executing the fifth renewal note, initialed a request
on the face of the note for the credit life insurance. Prior to the maturity of
the fifth renewal note, the borrower died, thereby making the borrower's
decision to acquire the credit life policy prudent, if not clairvoyant. After
the bank made demands on the estate to pay the fifth renewal note, the trust-
ees of the estate requested coverage under the credit life policy, but alas, the
107. 796 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
108. Id. at 240. The court in 1601 Partners reasoned that a contrary holding would allow
payees to abrogate personal defenses to enforcement of a note by assigning the note to a failing
financial institution, and thereby creating a windfall value. Id.
109. 953 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1992).
110. Id. at 978.
111. Id. at 981 (relying on Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 938 F.2d 591, 595
(5th Cir. 1991)). The court concluded that all other claims of the borrower were barred by
D'Oench, Duhme because they were based on oral promises. Id. The borrower made an inter-
esting argument against the bridge bank, claiming that under a particular provision of the
purchase assumption agreement, the bridge bank assumed the failed bank's lender liability
claims and waived D'Oench, Duhme defenses. The particular provision provided that the
bridge bank assumed the liabilities of the failed bank certified by the FDIC to be valid and
enforceable obligations. The court thought the borrower's argument interesting, but not valid,
pointing out that the assumed obligations were only those certified by the FDIC as valid and
enforceable and the FDIC never certified any valid obligations. Id. at 983.
112. 965 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1992).




policy had never been issued. Clearly chagrined and feeling mistreated by
the bank, the borrower's estate sued the bank claiming breach of contract for
failing to provide the credit life insurance. The FDIC (as receiver for the
bank, which had by this time joined many of its brethren in bank heaven)
filed a counterclaim for payment of the note. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment to the FDIC on all claims, apparently relying on the original
note or a renewal note other than the fifth renewal note, none of which con-
tained a request for the credit life policy.' 1 4
The trustees of the estate appealed to a higher authority for justice, with
its first point of error being that the trial court erred in relying on notes prior
to the fifth renewal note in establishing the borrower's indebtedness to the
failed bank. The trustees argued that the parties had intended that each
renewal note (including the fifth renewal note) was a novation of the prior
notes, as evidenced by the bank's past due notice, which referenced only the
fifth renewal note, and the stamp on the face of the original note and each of
the first four renewal notes to the effect "CANCELLED BY RE-
NEWAL."1 15 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the trustee's evidence was
sufficient to create a material issue of fact as to whether the parties intended
that the prior notes be extinguished and accordingly, remanded the case to
the district court. 1 6 The FDIC argued that remand was not necessary be-
cause D'Oench, Duhme barred the use of the failed bank's oral agreement to
provide the credit life insurance. Perhaps somewhat taken back by the
FDIC's assertion, the court informed the FDIC that the borrower's accept-
ance of the request for credit life insurance on the face of the fifth renewal
was a writing within the failed bank's lending files and therefore was not
barred by D'Oench Duhme. 117 Not embarrassed by making ridiculous argu-
ments, the FDIC then asserted that remand was not necessary because the
borrower and the bank orally agreed that the borrower did not want the
credit life insurance. The Fifth Circuit viewed the FDIC's argument as an
attempt to use D'Oench, Duhme to enforce the alleged oral side agreement, a
novel proposition for which the FDIC could not provide support to the
court. " 8 Perhaps savoring an opportunity to humble the FDIC, the court
observed that "contrary to the FDIC's belief, its special role is not all-
empowering.""19
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Oaks Apartments Joint Venture' 20 should be
read by every lawyer representing borrowers in loan transactions because the
114. Id. at 36.
115. Id. The borrower's argument was based on the settled law in Texas that a new note
will extinguish a prior note if the parties intended that the old note be extinguished. Chapman
v. Crichet, 95 S.W.2d 360, 363 (Tex. 1936). The trustee's success on this argument was crucial
to its case, since only the fifth renewal note included the request for credit life insurance.
116. Allied Elevator, 965 F.2d at 37. The court noted that if on remand the district court
determined that the FDIC could sue on the original note, the court was not considering
whether the estate could still rely on the credit life provision in the fifth renewal note as a
supplement to the original note. Id. at 39 n.3.
117. Id. at 38.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 966 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1992).
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facts and results teach that thoughtful and complete drafting will not only
achieve the borrower's intended results, but also may allow the borrower to
overcome D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823(e). In Oaks Apartments, the
lender made a loan to a venture composed of five venturers. The borrower
executed a recourse promissory note and the venturers executed a guaranty
that limited the liability of the individual joint venturers to twenty percent of
the outstanding indebtedness on the note. The note did not contain a similar
limitation of liability clause, even though the individual venturers would, as
a matter of law, have joint and several liability for payment of the note, 12'
and did not refer to the guaranty. The borrower defaulted and the bank
foreclosed its lien and then sued the borrower and its venturers for the defi-
ciency resulting at the foreclosure sale. The case was tried on the pleadings
and stipulated facts. The district court determined that the note and guar-
anty complied with the requirements of D'Oench, Duhme 22 and, on this
basis, held that each venturer's liability under the note was limited to twenty
percent of the outstanding balance. 123 The RTC (who had been appointed
receiver of the bank prior to the issuance of the district court's summary
judgment order) appealed to the Fifth Circuit arguing that the guaranty was
a side agreement not referred to in the note and therefore any defenses or
claims with respect to the note should be barred under D'Oench, Duhme.
In reviewing the record, the Fifth Circuit was unable to find any facts that
supported what the district court described as the inescapable conclusion
that the note and the guaranty were located in the same loan file. 124 Because
the location of the guaranty was the critical element as to whether D'Oench
Duhme applied, the Fifth Circuit concluded that no determination could be
made regarding its application. 125 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit vacated
the applicable portion of the district court's summary judgment order and
remanded the D'Oench, Duhme issue to the trial court to develop the facts
needed to reach a determination as to whether D'Oench, Duhme was appli-
cable.' 26 In addition, the Fifth Circuit informed the district court that the
121. See Fincher v. B&D Air Conditioning and Heating Co., 816 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1991, writ denied), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 77 (1992); Martin v.
First Republic Bank, Fort Worth, N.S., 799 S.W.2d 482, 487 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990,
writ denied).
122. Oaks Apartments, 966 F.2d at 999.
123. Id. at 998-99.
124. Id. at 1000. In what can be described as a torpedo fired at the district court judge, the
court observed that the record reflected that the district court judge "asked whether or not the
[g]uaranty was in the file with the [n]ote and ... was told that the stipulated facts simply do
not indicate where or by whom the [g]uaranty was held." Id. Not satisfied with its first tor-
pedo, the court fired a second at the district court by acknowledging that the "[c]ourt's factual
inquiry on remand will undoubtedly uncover all necessary items needed for the application of
D'Oench Duhme." Id. at 1001.
125. Id. The court also declined to address the applicability of Section 1823(e) until the
district court reached a special finding as to the applicability of Section 1823(e) and fully devel-
oped the applicable D'Oench, Duhme facts. Id.
126. Id. Apparently lacking some confidence in the district court's ability to properly apply
the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, the court instructed the district court to apply D'Oench, Duhme
if the facts showed that the guaranty was not contained within the loan transaction files and
not to apply D'Oench, Duhme if the facts showed that the guaranty was within the bank's loan
transaction file. Id. at 1000.
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Fifth Circuit has recognized that D'Oench, Duhme does not bar a borrower
from asserting claims or defenses based on a lender's failure to perform its
obligations in an agreement with the borrower that imposes specific obliga-
tions both on the lender and the borrower, provided that the agreement is in
the lender's written bank records. 127
Bradford v. American Federal Bank, F.S.B. 128 deserves discussion because
it is contrary to Fifth Circuit precedent in several respects. First, the Brad-
ford court appears to conclude that D'Oench, Duhme will not apply to an
oral side agreement between the borrower and lender if the borrower can
prove that the FDIC has actual knowledge of such agreement. 129 This state-
ment disregards precedent which establishes that D'Oench, Duhme abso-
lutely bars all defenses and claims based on oral agreements, whether or not
the FDIC has knowledge of such oral agreements.' 30 The authors are not
aware of any case so holding and, in fact, the courts have consistently held
that D'Oench, Duhme bars defenses based on a written agreement that is not
contained in the bank's transaction files for the loan to which the agreement
applies. 13' Second, the case holds that the FDIC, as a receiver, is not pro-
tected from usury claims because state law governs when the FDIC is acting
as a receiver.132 Apparently the court ignored the many decisions that have
applied D'Oench, Duhme, a federal common law doctrine, in cases involving
the FDIC, FSLIC and RTC as a receiver. 133 Moreover, several months after
127. Id. Continuing its display of lack of confidence in the district court, the Fifth Circuit
provided detailed instructions to the district court. Specifically, if the district court determined
that the guaranty was not part of the bank's loan transaction files and therefore barred by
D'Oench, Duhme, the district court should then determine if the liability limitation clause was
a mutual contractual obligation of the bank, and if so, whether the obligation had been per-
formed by the bank. If the obligation existed and had not been performed by the bank, the
Fifth Circuit advised the district court that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine would not bar the
venturers' defense based on the language of the guaranty. Id. at 1001.
128. 783 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
129. Id. at 285 (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wood 758 F.2d 156, 162 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985)). The Wood case did not involve D'Oench, Duhme or
Section 1823(e), but instead was a federal holder in due course case. The Wood case held that
"when the FDIC in its corporate capacity, as part of a purchase and assumption transaction,
acquires a note in good faith, for value, and without actual knowledge of any defense against
the note, it takes the note free of all defenses that would not prevail against a holder in due
course." Wood, 758 F.2d at 161. The issue of knowledge under the federal holder in due
course rule simply has no effect on the prong of the D'oench, Duhme doctrine, which bars
claims and defenses based on agreements other than a written agreement that is between the
party asserting the defense or claim and the failed lender and that is located in the lender's
loan transaction files. Supra note 7.
130. E.g., Texas Refrigeration Supply, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 953 F.2d 975,
980 (5th Cir. 1992); Oaks Apartments, 966 F.2d at 995.
131. Eg., Oaks Apartments, 966 F.2d at 998.
132. Bradford, 183 F. Supp. at 286 (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Renda, 692 F.
Supp. 128, 134 (D. Kan. 1988)).
133. Eg., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ammons, 836 S.W.2d 705, 709-10 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [ist Dist.] 1992, no writ); Smith v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 800 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ dism'd). Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 901 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir. 1990); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Murray,
853 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1988); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wood 758 F.2d 156, 160
(6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944, 106 S. Ct. 308 (1985); see also Section 1823(e)
(which applies to the FDIC in its corporate and receiver capacity).
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the Bradford case, the Fifth Circuit specifically held that usury damages
under Texas law are penal in nature and therefore, under federal law, cannot
be asserted against the FDIC in its corporate or receiver capacity. 134
Although not as sweeping as the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, the federal
common law holder in due course doctrine is nevertheless a potent weapon
within the FDIC's arsenal of defenses to avoid a borrower's personal de-
fenses in a suit on a promissory note. Subject to certain qualifications, the
FDIC and RTC each have the right to assert the doctrine to avoid a maker's
personal defenses on a promissory note acquired by the FDIC or RTC in a
purchase and assumption transaction. 135 The entity asserting the doctrine is
not required to meet the technical requirements of a holder in due course
under state law,13 6 but must take the note in good faith and without actual
knowledge of the defense.' 3 7 The Fifth Circuit recently held, however, that
the entity acquiring the note is entitled to a presumption that it purchased
the note without knowledge of any personal defenses and that the maker of
the note is required to produce affirmative evidence to rebut this
presumption. 138
In Sunbelt Savings, F.S.B. v. Montross, 139 a Fifth Circuit panel held that
the federal holder in due course doctrine did not protect the FDIC, RTC or
their successors from personal defenses asserted by makers of non-negotiable
instruments. 14° This holding had the potential of severely limiting the
FDIC's and RTC's use of the doctrine because many of the promissory notes
acquired by them in purchase and assumption transactions were arguably
non-negotiable, including those many variable rate notes that had been exe-
cuted since 1980.141 Because of the exceptional importance of the issue, the
134. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Claycomb, 945 F.2d. 853, 861 (5th Cir. 1991), supra
notes 74-85 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit recently extended its holding in
Claycomb to the RTC where the RTC is the successor agency to the FDIC. First South Sav.
Ass'n v. First Southern Partners II, 957 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1992). See also Federal De-
posit Ins. Corp. v. Royal Park No. 14, Ltd., 800 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (United States
and its agents are immune from claims of usury under doctrine of sovereign immunity).
135. E.g., Oaks Apartments, 966 F.2d at 995; Resolution Trust Corp. v. Montross, 944
F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Campbell Leasing, 901 F.2d 1244; Murray, 853 F.2d
1251; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Adam, 803 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
136. E.g., Campbell Leasing, 901 F.2d at 1249.
137. Ammons, 836 S.W.2d 605; Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Mackie, 949 F.2d 818,
824 (5th Cir. 1992); Wood, 758 F.2d at 161.
138. Mackie, 949 F.2d at 825-26.
139. 923 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1991).
140. Id. at 358. The FDIC apparently argued that negotiability was merely a technical
requirement under state law pertaining to holder in due course status, and therefore was not a
requirement of the federal holder in due course doctrine. The court, however, concluded that
negotiability was not a technical requirement of holder in due course status, but rather was the
foundation underlying holder in due course status. Montrose, 949 F.2d at 356.
141. The FDIC and RTC also had to be concerned about those many promissory notes
acquired by them that contained clauses recognizing that the note was not fully advanced at
the time of execution. This concern was fully realized by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Resolu-
tion Trust Corp. v. Oaks Apartments J. V., wherein the court held that a note which contains an
obligation to pay a specific sum "or so much thereof as may be advanced" does not specify a
sum certain to be paid and therefore is non-negotiable. Oaks Apartments, 966 F.2d at 1001-02.
1726 [Vol. 46
REAL PROPERTY
Fifth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc,142 thereby leaving the issue un-
settled. 143 During early October of 1991, the Fifth Circuit delivered a major
blow to the FDIC and RTC by reinstating the panel's original Montross
opinion. 144 The court, however, left two significant doors open. First, the
court made clear that the personal defenses could not be based on agree-
ments barred under D'Oench, Duhme or Section 1823(e).145 Second, the
court stated that it was not taking a position on whether a variable interest
rate note is a negotiable instrument under Texas law,146 perhaps because the
court had recently requested the Texas Supreme Court to answer that partic-
ular issue. 14
7
In Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee,148 the Texas Supreme Court
answered the Fifth Circuit's question regarding the negotiability of a varia-
ble interest rate note. In a decision that could have only brought smiles and
giddiness to the FDIC and the RTC, the Court concluded that a promissory
note that provides for interest at a rate that can be determined only by refer-
ence to a bank's published prime rate does not violate the sum certain re-
quirement of negotiability under the Texas Uniform Commercial Code and
therefore is negotiable. 149 The court defined a bank's published prime rate
as "only those rates which are public, either known to or readily ascertain-
able by any interested person."' 50 The court stated, however, that it would
142. Sunbelt Savings, F.S.B. v. Montross, 932 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1991), on suggestion for
rehearing en banc.
143. See Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 697 n.3 (5th Cir. 1991)
(FDIC and RTC use of federal holder in due course doctrine is an open question in the Fifth
Circuit).
144. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Montross, 944 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
145. Id. at 228-29.
146. Id. at 228.
147. Ackerman v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 930 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1991). The specific
question certified to the Texas Supreme Court was:
Is a promissory note requiring interest to be charged at a rate that can be deter-
mined only by reference to a bank's published prime rate a negotiable instru-
ment as defined by the Texas Uniform Commercial Code?
Id. at 4.
148. 831 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1992).
149. Id. at 795. In a dissenting opinion, four justices disagreed with the court's conclusion,
generally emphasizing that the vast majority of courts considering the issue have concluded
that a variable interest rate note is non-negotiable, and that the majority's opinion was an
inappropriate intrusion into the legislative process. Id. at 801-03. Not as instructive as this
portion of the dissent, but more entertaining, was the dissent's very bold response to the Fifth
Circuit's recent statements that the Texas Supreme Court was mysteriously reluctant to accept
questions of first impression certified to it by the Fifth Circuit and that the time within which
the Court answered certified questions had become frustratingly slow. See Jackson v. Freight-
liner Corp., No. 9-7092, slip op. 5171, 5174-75 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 1991), published as modified,
938 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1991). The dissent came out swinging, providing a nearly three page
response to the Fifth Circuit's assault before addressing the substantive issues presented by the
certified question. Amberboy, 831 S.W.2d at 798-801. Not wanting to create an all out war
with the Fifth Circuit, the majority opinion made clear to the Fifth Circuit that the majority of
the court emphatically rejected any criticism of the Fifth Circuit and in no way presumed to
instruct the Fifth Circuit on how to conduct its business. Id. at 798 n. 10.
150. Amberboy, 831 S.W.2d at 797-98. In Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Kralj, 968
F.2d 500, 508, the Fifth Circuit applied the holding in Amberboy to a promissory note that
provided for interest at two percent over the rate per annum announced by Chase Manhattan
Bank of New York at its principal office.
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not specify or limit the manner in which the rate be published because the
negotiability requirement of commercial certainty is satisfied "when the in-
formation is readily available to the public, regardless of the means utilized
to make that information available."' 5' The court recognized that its hold-
ing was contrary to the majority of other states that had addressed the is-
sue, 5 2 but, in the court's opinion, the minority view adopted by the court
was more in tune with the Uniform Commercial Code's stated purpose of
clarifying and modernizing commercial law and current commercial prac-
tices involving the use of variable rate notes.15 3
E. MORTGAGES GENERALLY
Hall v. Resolution Trust Corp. 154 clearly demonstrates a lender's ability to
derail a borrower's attempt to circumvent the language agreed upon in its
loan documents. In Hall, the lender and borrower were parties to a security
agreement that permitted (i) the lender to require the borrower to deliver
additional collateral satisfactory to the lender, if the lender reasonably deter-
mined that its existing collateral (stock and notes) had declined or might
decline in value and (ii) the borrower to obtain a release of certain notes that
were part of the existing collateral by providing as substitute collateral ap-
proximately five million dollars of debenture promissory notes executed by
the borrower or any affiliate of the borrower in form acceptable to the
lender. Under the impression that the lender was in a generous mood (or
perhaps believing that the lender could not interpret the clear language of its
own loan documents), the borrower asked the lender to accept a debenture
note in the amount of 6.45 million dollars in exchange for all of the existing
collateral (stock and notes).155 The lender rejected the borrower's request to
substitute the debenture for the notes and the stock, and asked the borrower
to post additional collateral pursuant to the insecurity clause due to the
stock's declining value and the deteriorating financial condition of the mak-
ers of the pledged notes. Indignant, the borrower refused to deliver addi-
tional security, ceased making payments on the loan and sued the lender for
breach of the insecurity clause and for unreasonably refusing to accept the
borrower's offer of substitute collateral. Believing that it should be entitled
to rely on the contractual language in its loan documents, the lender coun-
terclaimed for acceleration of the note and moved for summary judgment on
all issues. The trial court entered judgment for the lender and the borrower
appealed, arguing that there was an issue of material fact as to whether the
lender had acted reasonably in calling for additional collateral and accelerat-
ing the note. 156
As to the lender's call for additional security, the borrower argued that
151. Amberboy, 831 S.W.2d at 798.
152. Id. at 794.
153. Id. at 796.
154. 958 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1992).
155. The court pointed out that the debenture notes were rejected by the lender because the




the security agreement required the lender to act reasonably and that the
issue of reasonableness was fundamentally a jury question. The court of ap-
peals disagreed, stating that there was undisputed evidence that the collat-
eral was impaired and that the record clearly reflected that the lender had
acted reasonably and consistently with the terms of the agreement. 157 In
support of its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit stated that, "under Texas law, ...
undisputed evidence of significant impairment of the prospect of satisf[ying]
a debt establishes, as a matter of law, the reasonableness of invoking [an]
insecurity provision."1 58
With respect to the borrower's proposed substitution of collateral, the
Fifth Circuit agreed with the trial court's determination that the proposed
substitution was not in accordance with the security agreement provi-
sions. 159 The court observed that the security agreement only permitted the
borrower to substitute note debentures for the pledged notes that were a part
of the collateral. 16° In comparison, the borrower's proposed substitution
was for both the pledged notes and the stock. In the court's judgment, the
fact that the pledged stock was essentially worthless at the time of the bor-
rower's proposal was irrelevant.1 61 The lender had the contractual right to
retain the stock to secure its debt, regardless of the value thereof. 162 The
borrower countered by arguing that the lender had an implied obligation of
good faith and fair dealing and hence should have accepted its proposal.
157. Id. at 78. The court noted that the lender based its call for additional security on
information supplied to it by the borrower, which reflected that the regulatory capital and the
net income of the issuer of the pledged stock had decreased dramatically during the year in
which the borrower made the request to substitute collateral. Id.
158. Id. (citing Finley, Inc. v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 705 S.W.2d 206, 208-09 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sparkman v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 580 S.W.2d 868,
869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Although the court's statement of
Texas law is probably correct, both Finley and Sparkman address the issue of whether the
lender acted in good faith in accelerating a loan containing an insecurity or acceleration-at-will
provision and not whether a lender had reasonably determined if its collateral was sufficient or
had declined in value. In Hall, the lender was not only under a contractual obligation to have
reasonably determined that the collateral had become insufficient or had declined in value, but
was also under a statutory obligation to accelerate only if it had a good faith belief that the
prospect of payment of its debt or performance of the additional collateral clause was im-
paired. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.208 (Vernon 1987), which generally provides
that a term in an agreement stating that one party may accelerate payment or performance at
will or when he deems himself insecure shall be construed to mean that the party shall have the
right to accelerate only if "he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or perform-
ance is impaired." The debtor in Hall apparently did not make the § 1.208 argument, perhaps
in the belief that if the lender won the reasonableness argument, it would logically follow that
the lender acted in good faith. The Fifth Circuit identified two Texas cases that it thought
arguably contrary to the Finley and Sparkman cases: American Bank v. Waco Airmotive, 818
S.W.2d 163, 172 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, writ denied); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Powers,
613 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ). Hall, 958 F.2d at 78. Appar-
ently, the concept in both of these cases that disturbed the court was that good faith must be
determined by the trier of fact. However, neither Waco Automotive nor Powers addressed the
issue of whether good faith could be determined as a matter of law based on summary judg-
ment proof and therefore should not be viewed as contrary to Finley or Sparkman.
159. Hall, 958 F.2d at 78.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 79.
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The court summarily rejected this contention, recognizing that Texas courts
have not imposed a duty of good faith upon a lender in a borrower-lender
relationship.1 63 The borrower finally argued that it had substantially com-
plied with the requirement for substituting collateral.16, The court rejected
this argument, stating that the borrower's substitution proposal was materi-
ally different than that contemplated by the security agreement.165 More-
over, the borrower cited no case in which a Texas court had applied the
substantial compliance doctrine to loan and security agreements and the
court was not inclined to set precedent.166
The result in In re Davis Chevrolet, Inc. 167 is proof positive that the debtor
who bites the hand of a generous lender may lose even in the most benevo-
lent debtor forum, a federal court presided over by a bankruptcy judge. In
this case, the debtor failed to make payment on a note on the date it became
finally due and payable (May 16, 1987). Nearly four years later, the forgiv-
ing (or perhaps dilatory) lender commenced foreclosure proceedings against
the property that secured the note. The lender appointed its first substitute
trustee on March 5, 1991 and the appointment was acknowledged on March
11, 1991. On March 7, 1991, the first substitute trustee signed a notice of
trustee's sale that did not include the amount owed on the note. On March
11, 1991, the lender replaced the first substitute trustee with a second substi-
tute trustee; curiously this appointment was acknowledged on March 5,
1991.168 On March 12, 1991, the second substitute trustee posted the notice
prepared and executed by the first substitute trustee. On April 2, 1991, the
second substitute trustee conducted the foreclosure sale. However, pursuant
to a written agreement entered into on the date of the foreclosure sale, the
altruistic and reasonable lender permitted the debtor to continue to occupy
the property for a period of 10 days, during which time the lender agreed not
to sue the debtor and further agreed to accept $200,000 in consideration for
which the lender would release the property in favor of the debtor. Appar-
ently the 60-day possession agreement did not expressly toll the statute of
163. Id. (citing Cockrell v. Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., 817 S.W.2d 106, 116 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1991, no writ); Georgetown Assoc., Ltd. v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 795 S.W.2d
252, 255 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Victoria Bank & Trust
Co. v. Brady, 779 S.W.2d 893, 902 (Tex. App. -- Corpus Christi 1989), rev'd on other grounds,
811 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1991)).
164. The borrower relied on Telles v. Vasconcelos, 417 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("[Iln all domains of the law, unless it is otherwise provided,
either expressly or by necessary implication, a substantial compliance with the specified re-
quirements [of a contract] is the legal equivalent of compliance." (quoting Christy v. Williams,
292 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956, writ dism'd w.o.j))).
165. Hall, 958 F.2d at 79.
166. Id.
167. 135 B.R. 29 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
168. Perhaps "curiously" is the wrong word. A good bet is that the notary was given both
appointments on the same date and acknowledged them in the wrong order (i.e. the notice
dated the 5th was shown acknowledged on the 11 th and the appointment dated the 11 th was
shown acknowledged on the 5th). If this was the case, hopefully the notary complied with the
provisions of TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 406.14 (Vernon 1988) and TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.




limitations with respect to collection of the deficiency or otherwise. 169 Prior
to the end of the 60-day period, the debtor filed for bankruptcy protection
and then bit the hand of the lender by bringing an adversary proceeding to
invalidate the foreclosure on four grounds: (1) the debtor received no notice
of the amount payable to avoid foreclosure;' 70 (2) the notice of trustee's sale
was filed and posted less than 21 days prior to the foreclosure; (3) the notice
of trustee's sale was improperly signed by the substitute trustees; and (4) the
statute of limitations was not tolled by the 60 day agreement.' 7'
The debtor first argued that it had not received a notice setting forth the
amount payable in order to avoid a foreclosure. In the court's judgment,
such a notice is not required under Texas law because neither the Texas
statute governing non-judicial foreclosure sales' 72 nor the Texas Uniform
Commercial Code section governing demands for payment 73 requires that a
debtor receive notice of the amount due in order to avoid foreclosure.' 74
Even if Texas law requires such a notice, the court concluded that Texas law
permits presentment of demand to be waived by a clear and unequivocal
writing and that the loan documents executed by the debtor contained such
a clear and unequivocal waiver.'7
The debtor next argued that the 21-day posting and mailing period speci-
fied in Section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code 176 requires that the period
commencing with (and including) the date of posting and ending on (and
including) the date of foreclosure may not be less than 21 days. The court
concluded that the debtor's method for calculating the 21-day period was
incorrect.' 77 Texas law, the court observed, does not require that both the
day of posting and the date of foreclosure be excluded in calculating the
twenty-one day notice period. 178
169. Davis Chevrolet, 135 B.R. at 31.
170. The facts indicate that the notice of trustee's sale did not include the amount owed on
the note.
171. Id. at 30-31.
172. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1993).
173. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.501 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993).
174. Davis Chevrolet, 135 B.R. at 32.
175. Id. (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.51 l(b)(1) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993);
Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 893 n.6 (Tex. 1991); Sydnor v.
Gascgoigne, 11 Tex. 449, 456 (1854)).
176. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1993).
177. Davis Chevrolet, 135 B.R. at 33.
178. Id. (relying on Newman v. Woodhaven Nat'l Bank, 762 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1988, no writ); Huston v. Sadler, 501 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, no
writ)). The bankruptcy court read Woodhaven Nat'l Bank to say that the 21-day period under
§ 51.002 could include either the day of posting or the day of foreclosure sale, but not both.
Davis Chevrolet, 135 B.R. at 33. Perhaps a more accurate reading of Woodhaven Nat'l Bank is
that the court recognized that no Texas case had held that both the day of posting and the day
of sale must be excluded in the calculation of the 2 1-day notice period while several cases have
held that the date of sale is excluded from the 21-day period but the day of posting is included.
See Huston, 50i S.W.2d at 730; Hausmann v. Texas Say. & Loan Ass'n, 585 S.W.2d 796, 800
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Although it is not clear, the Woodhaven
Nat'l Bank court apparently included the day of posting. In a recent federal district court
case, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Royal Park No. 14, Ltd., 800 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Tex.
1992), the court cited Woodhaven Nat'l Bank for the principle that Texas courts follow the
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The debtor also claimed that the authority of the substitute trustees was
ineffective because their appointments were not acknowledged on the same
day they were signed. The court concluded that the validity date of an ap-
pointment of a trustee or successor is controlled by the deed of trust.179 The
deed of trust in this case permitted the holder of the note to appoint a substi-
tute trustee or a successor trustee to act in place of the named trustee "with-
out other formality than the designation in writing of a substitute or
successor trustee."' 80 No requirement of acknowledgement was set forth in
the deed of trust and the court cited ancient Texas precedent for the proposi-
tion that appointments are valid between the parties and those with notice
when validity is not dependent on a proper acknowledgement.18, Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that the appointments of the trustees were valid
and became effective on the date their respective written appointments were
executed. ' 8 2
As to whether the second substitute trustee had authority to post the no-
tice of foreclosure prepared by the first substitute trustee, the court cited
Texas cases that held that a substitute trustee may foreclose pursuant to a
valid notice of sale posted by a prior trustee.' 8 3 From this principle, the
court logically concluded that because the notice of foreclosure was prepared
by the first substitute trustee pursuant to the deed of trust during the effec-
tive period of the first substitute trustee's appointment, there was no need for
the second substitute trustee to prepare another notice of sale. 184
With respect to the debtor's argument regarding the statute of limita-
tions, 185 the court simply would not permit the debtor to avoid its contrac-
rule that only the date of sale is excluded in calculating the 21 day notice period under § 51-
002. Id. at 481.
179. Davis Chevrolet, 135 B.R. at 33.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 33 (citing Palmer v. Texas Tram & Lumber Co., 23 S.W. 38 (Tex. Civ. App.
1893, no writ)). The Palmer case dealt with an irregular acknowledgement on a deed and at
best inferentially supports the broad statement by the court. Perhaps the court would have
been better advised to simply emphasize that the deed of trust did not require the appointment
to be acknowledged and that the court discovered no Texas law requiring that the appointment
be acknowledged. Absent any deed of trust or legal requirement of acknowledgement, the
acknowledgements were irrelevant.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 34 (citing Tarrant Sav. Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.
1965); Loomis Land & Cattle Co. v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 533 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
184. Id.
185. The statute of limitations issue in this case is somewhat confusing. The facts of the
case indicate that the statute of limitations would not have run on the note until May 16, 1991,
that the foreclosure sale occurred on April 2, 1991, that the debtor remained in possession of
the foreclosed property pursuant to a written agreement entered into on the date of the foreclo-
sure sale and pursuant to which he had a limited right to reacquire the property, that the
trustee's deed was recorded on April 9, 1991 and that the debtor filed for bankruptcy on May
20, 1991. Id. at 31, 34. Obviously, the sale and the recording of the trustee's deed took place
before the expiration of the four year statute of limitations period and prior to the bankruptcy.
The debtor only remained in possession of the property (without any apparent claim of owner-
ship of the property) pursuant to a written agreement. On these facts, it appears that the
foreclosure sale was completed prior to the expiration of the limitations period (without regard
to tolling). The tolling issue would, however, remain important to the creditor if it intended to
collect the payments the debtor agreed to make pursuant to the possession agreement.
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tual obligations by asserting an "I got you" argument. The court observed
that Texas law estops a party from asserting limitations if that party's con-
duct induces the other party to not bring its action within the limitations
period.' 8 6 The court concluded that the terms and conditions contained in
the 60-day possession agreement entered into between the debtor and the
lender on the date of the foreclosure sale induced the lender to not bring suit
within the limitations period.' 8 7 Accordingly, the court turned the bor-
rower's argument on its ear, concluding that the limitations period was ex-
tended for the 60-day period within which the lender had previously agreed
not to bring suit.'8 8
In three cases decided during the Survey period, a party sued a mortgagee
in order to have a portion of the mortgagee's collateral released from its lien.
One of the three is noted below, 189 while the other two deserve discussion.
In the first case, Groschke v. Gabriel,190 the mortgagor sued the mortgagee
for release of a six acre tract from the mortgagee's lien. The mortgagor
purchased the six acre tract, as well as 289 acres of other land, from the
mortgagee, and executed a wraparound note, which wrapped around a note
executed by the mortgagee, payable to a third party. 19 1 The mortgagee se-
cured payment of the wraparound note by a second lien deed of trust, which
contained a release provision entitling the mortgagor to obtain a partial re-
lease of the six acres from the second lien deed of trust so long as (i) the
wraparound note was not in default, (ii) the wrapped note was paid in full,
and (iii) the first lien securing the payment of the wrapped note was fully and
finally released.192 The mortgagor defaulted on the first principal payment
due on the wraparound note and the mortgagee posted the property for fore-
closure. Thereafter, the mortgagor and mortgagee reached an agreement
pursuant to which the mortgagee agreed to accept the missed principal pay-
ment one year after the original due date and to forbear from foreclosing on
the property.1 9 3 Approximately three weeks before the deferred principal
payment was to become due, the mortgagor purchased the wrapped note and
186. Id. at 35 (citing Zimmerman v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1990, writ denied)).
187. Id. The court had to stretch somewhat to reach a conclusion that the lender was
induced not to bring suit within the limitations period. Clearly, the lender could have saved
itself several headaches and enabled the court to avoid unnecessarily expending its energy by
including a specific tolling provision in its agreement with the debtor.
188. Id. The court further held that the limitations period would be extended to the extent
permitted under the Federal Bankruptcy Code.
189. Lindsey v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 960 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1992) (where mortgagor
entered into letter agreement to lift automatic stay to permit mortgagee to foreclose lien and
security interest and at the same time announced its intention to retain ownership of peanut
allotment covering land to be foreclosed upon, such oral reservation was insufficient to bind
mortgagee to agreement to release its interest in peanut allotment in favor of mortgagor with-
out evidence that mortgagee agreed to release its lien against peanut allotment).
190. 824 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
191. Id. at 608.
192. Id. at 608-09 n.2.
193. Apparently, the mortgagee expressly agreed to reserve its right to foreclose its lien in




the first lien securing its payment. The original holder of the wrapped note
delivered to the mortgagor both a release of the first lien (which was not
recorded) and an assignment of the first lien.194 The mortgagor then appar-
ently offered the wrapped note to the mortgagee 95 and demanded that the
mortgagee release its lien against the six acre tract, but the mortgagee re-
fused. 196 Not surprisingly, the mortgagor failed to make the principal pay-
ment and shortly thereafter sued the mortgagee for failing to release the six
acre tract. 19 7 Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court
granted the mortgagee's motion, and the mortgagor appealed. 198
On appeal, the mortgagor's argument revealed an interesting strategy that
was perhaps too slick for the appeals court. The mortgagor argued that at
the time it requested the release of the six acre tract, the mortgagor was not
in default under the wraparound note, the wrapped note had been satisfied,
and the wrap deed of trust had been released. Accordingly, all conditions
precedent to the release had been satisfied and the mortgagee had breached
its obligation to release the six acres. The mortgagor attempted to convince
the court that the mortgagor was not in default on the wraparound note at
the time of the demand for the release of the six acres because the deferred
principal payment was not due for approximately another three weeks. The
court hemmed and hawed, and, without citing case law to support its posi-
tion, concluded that the extension agreement regarding the initial principal
default did not negate that default. 199 This conclusion was reached by the
court despite the fact that the mortgagee had agreed to permit the mortgagor
to defer the payment for up to one year. In addition, having the benefit of
not particularly relevant hindsight, the court placed some importance on the
mortgagor's default on the deferred principal payment three weeks after the
demand for the release of the six acres. 2° ° These two defaults, according to
the court, made it clear that the first condition precedent to the release of the
six acres was not satisfied. 20'
As to the issue of satisfaction of the wrapped note, the court observed that
194. Obtaining the release was obviously an effort by the mortgagor to satisfy one of the
conditions precedent to the release of the six acre tract, specifically that the first lien be fully
and finally released.
195. See Groschke, 824 S.W.2d at 612. The case is not clear as to when this offer was made
to the mortgagee, but it appears to have been made shortly before the written demand for the
release of the six acres.
196. Id.
197. The mortgagor sought and obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting the mortgagee
from foreclosing its lien against the six acres. The mortgagee proceeded with foreclosure
against the remaining 289 acres covered by the deed of trust without objection by the mortga-
gor. Id.
198. Id. It is somewhat curious that the trial court granted the mortgagee's motion for
summary judgment in light of the trial court's issuance of the temporary injunction prohibiting
the mortgagee from foreclosing its lien, which would have required the trial court to reach a
determination that the mortgagor had a probable right of recovery in a trial on the merits.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. If this had been the sole condition that had not been satisfied, the court's conclu-
sion that the default had not been waived was open to challenge on appeal because the exten-
sion agreement allowed the mortgagor to defer the payment for a one-year period and the
default on the deferred payment which did not occur until after the demand for the release,
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the mortgagor admitted that the wrapped note was not paid in full by testify-
ing that she expected to either obtain the six acres through an exchange for
the wrapped note or receive the $89,000 she had invested in the purchase of
the wrapped note. 20 2 This testimony, according to the court, clearly estab-
lished that the note had not been paid in full because the mortgagee still
owed $89,000, no matter who owned the note. 20 3 While the court was busy
fine-tuning its tunnel vision, it failed to recognize that if the wrapped note
was delivered to the mortgagee in exchange for the release of the six acres,
the mortgagee's unpaid obligation would have been owing to himself and
therefore tantamount to being paid in full.2 °4
As to the third condition precedent, the court was not impressed by the
fact that the mortgagor had a signed release in its hands because the release
had not been recorded and would not be recorded until the release of the lien
securing the wraparound note on the six acres had been signed. 20 5 Although
this is a technically correct conclusion, the court could just as easily have
deemed the condition of release satisfied if the exchange of the releases was
to occur simultaneously, a common occurrence in commercial transactions.
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Kemp is susceptible to several interpretations. 20 6
To some, it may demonstrate that the law can produce an inequitable result,
but to others, it illustrates the Fifth Circuit's efforts to uphold the "integrity
of the public records system of Texas. ' 20 7 In Kemp, a developer obtained a
loan from a lender to finance the development of residential subdivision lots.
The initial loan funds proved insufficient and the developer obtained addi-
tional financing from a second lender. Pursuant to a subordination agree-
ment executed by the two lenders, the original lender subordinated its lien to
the lien of the second lender and agreed to release its lien as to individual
was, based on the facts presented in the case, irrelevant. Certainly, when reading this case, one
can sense that the court simply did not approve of the mortgagor's strategy.
202. Id. at 613.
203. Id.
204. If the wrapped note did not contain an anti-merger clause, there certainly exists an
argument that upon assignment of the wrapped note to the mortgagee, the mortgagee's obliga-
tion to pay would have merged with its right to collect, thereby extinguishing the debt. The
court further supported its conclusion by pointing out that the mortgagee was not required to
accept the wrapped note in lieu of the deferred principal payment ($53,000). Id. at 612.
Although this observation is correct, the facts indicate that the wrapped note was being offered
in exchange for the six acres and not for satisfaction of the deferred payment. The court also
observed that the mortgagee had four more years to pay the wrapped note and during that
time had the right to receive approximately $400,000 under the wraparound note. Id. This
right, according to the court, would be lost if the mortgagee accepted the wrapped note. Id.
Either the court failed to include relevant facts in its opinion or the court simply reached a
wrong conclusion. The facts indicate that the mortgagor requested the mortgagee to accept
the wrapped note in exchange for the release of the six acres, not in satisfaction of all of the
debt or for the release of any other acreage covered by the deed of trust.
205. Id. at 614.
206. 951 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1992).
207. Id. at 659. In its conclusion the court stated:
We refuse to allow the ... [lot owners] to manipulate the system by using the
recordation of the Subordination Agreements as a subterfuge for ignoring the
properly recorded ... [l]iens. Such a construction of this case would annihilate




lots upon receiving notice from the second lien lender that there was a pend-
ing sale. The subordination agreement was recorded in the appropriate
county records. The original lender was taken over by the RTC and its as-
sets were transferred to another lending entity. That entity filed a lawsuit
against the second lender, challenging the enforceability of the subordination
agreement and asserting the priority of its lien.20° The first lender also filed
a notice of lis pendens referencing the lawsuit. Subsequently, the developer
defaulted on the loan and the original lender commenced foreclosure pro-
ceedings. Prior to the commencement of the foreclosure proceedings, sev-
eral individuals purchased and then constructed homes on subdivision lots,
without having obtained a specific release of the original lender's lien. This
suit was then brought by the lot purchasers to prohibit the foreclosure as to
their lots, claiming entitlement to the partial release provisions in the re-
corded subordination agreement. The district court dismissed the purchas-
ers' suit against the original lender and realigned the parties, whereupon the
original lender sued for judicial foreclosure of its lien and the individual
homeowners counterclaimed for the value of the improvements they had
constructed on the lots.20 9 The trial court granted the original lender's mo-
tion for summary judgment and ordered the lender's lien to be foreclosed,
leaving the homeowners with reduced cookie jar reserves, as they were to
receive nothing for their improvements. 21 0
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment.21' The
lot owners argued that the original lender's lien should be deemed released
for two reasons. First, the release provisions that were recorded at the time
the lot owners purchased their lots caused the original lender's lien to be
automatically released when it received notice of the sale as contemplated in
the subordination agreement. In the court's judgment, the lot owners were
attempting to have their cake and eat it too, in that they were relying on the
recordation statute while wholly disregarding the fact that under the same
statute they had notice of the original lender's lien, and no release of that
lien was of record. 212 The recordation statutes, the court opined, are a time
honored mechanism that permit "one who seeks to purchase [land to] safely
judge the validity of title." 213 Here, the lot owners failed to take full advan-
tage of the safety offered by the recordation statute when they failed to verify
whether the original lender had released its lien as to their lots.21 4
208. The assignee was the actual party to file the lawsuit and notice of lis pendens. Id. at
659-60 n.2.
209. Id. at 660.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. The lot owners relied on two Texas cases: Moran v. Wheeler, 27 S.W. 54 (Tex. 1894)
and Cook v. Leslie, 59 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1933, no writ). The court
distinguished both cases from the facts before it. Moran involved the effect of a release of lien
that had been properly recorded, and not, as in this case, a recorded agreement to release a
lien. In Cook, the purchasers not only had notice of an agreement by the lender to release
provisions which affected their lots, but the deed from the mortgagee to the mortgagor bound
the mortgagee to its release provisions. Kemp, 951 F.2d at 662.
213. Kemp, 951 F.2d at 662 (citing Moran, 27 S.W. at 55).
214. In the court's judgment, the issue was not whether the lot owners had notice of the
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In the court's judgment, if the lot owners were to prevail, they had to
show that they were entitled to the benefit of the original lender's contrac-
tual agreement to release its lien upon receiving notice of the purchase of
their lots. 215 Since the lot owners were not parties to the subordination
agreement, they had to prove that they had third party beneficiary status.21 6
Recognizing that Texas law requires a party claiming third party beneficiary
status to show that from the terms of the contract the parties intended to
benefit the third party,217 the court concluded that the lot owners failed to
meet this burden. 218 The trial court found and the Fifth Circuit agreed that
the subordination agreements did not mention the lot owners or otherwise
indicate that the two lenders intended that the lot owners benefit from the
release provisions. 219 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the lot
owners were not third-party beneficiaries to the subordination agreement. 220
In what may have been their last chance to salvage a substantial portion of
their investment in their homes,221 the lot owners argued that they were
good faith improvers under Texas law and therefore entitled to compensa-
tion for their improvements to their lots. 222 The court found that under
Texas law a purchaser who makes improvements to property while under a
good faith belief that it has good title to the property is entitled to compensa-
tion for those improvements. 223 On the facts before it, the court concluded
that the lot owners were not entitled to compensation for the improvements
because at the time the improvements were made the lot owners had con-
structive knowledge of the original lender's lien. 224
Vista Development Joint Venture II v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. 225
shows that, in today's environment, a mortgagee may be able to overcome
both drafting inconsistencies in its loan documents and its own failure to act
release provisions, but whether they could claim the benefits of the release provisions. Id.
Your authors agree with the court's identification of the ultimate issue as benefit and not no-
tice. However, the court failed to recognize that the right to rely on notice under the recorda-
tion statutes may result in the right to claim a benefit.
215. Id.
216. Id. (citing Old Stone Bank v. Fidelity Bank, 749 F. Supp. 147, 152 (N.D. Tex. 1990)).
217. Id. (citing Talman Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Ill. v. Am. Bankers Ins., 924 F.2d
1347, 1351 (5th Cir. 1991); Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ); Cunningham v. Healthco, Inc., 824 F.2d 1448, 1455




220. Id. The lot owners also argued that the district court erred by not abating the foreclo-
sure proceedings pending the disposition of the lawsuit between the two lenders regarding the
superiority of the original lender's lien and the enforceability of the subordination agreement.
The court concluded that whatever the outcome of the litigation between the lenders, the result
was only as between the parties to the lawsuit and that the interest of the original lender would
remain superior to the interest of the lot owners. Id.
221. Perhaps this was not the lot owners' last chance because there was at least one title
company that was a party to the action. There is no mention in the case, however, of the
liability, if any, asserted against the title company.
222. Kemp, 951 F.2d at 665.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 822 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
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prudently in protecting its secured indebtedness. In Vista, the loan to the
mortgagor was non-recourse, with the exception of certain items for which
the mortgagor had personal liability. The note contained a carveout provi-
sion, which provided that the mortgagee, after the occurrence of an event of
default, had the right to recover from the mortgagor ad valorem taxes that
were due but not paid by the mortgagor. The deed of trust also contained a
carveout provision relating to ad valorem taxes, but its language varied from
the note in that the mortgagee's right to recover ad valorem taxes arose only
after the occurrence of an event of default and during the pendency of the
default. The mortgagor defaulted under the note by failing to pay the last
installment and failing to pay the property taxes then due for the current and
prior year. The mortgagee foreclosed its lien, shortly after foreclosure paid
the past due ad valorem taxes, and then sued for the amount of the taxes.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the mortgagee and the mort-
gagor appealed. 226
On appeal, the mortgagor argued, somewhat weakly, that its liability for
the taxes was extinguished because, under Smart v. Tower Land & Invest-
ments Co.,227 the taxes became a part of the nonrecourse debt when they
were paid by the mortgagee. The court agreed that the debt became part of
the overall indebtedness secured by the deed of trust, but disagreed with the
mortgagor's reliance on Smart, stating that the court in Smart restricted its
holding to cases where there is no contractual language permitting the mort-
gagee to also enforce its right to reimbursement as a personal debt.22 8 In
overruling the mortgagor's first point of error, the court concluded that, un-
like the contracts in Smart, the contracts before it expressed the parties' in-
tent to impose personal liability on the mortgagor for the payment of the ad
valorem taxes. 229
The mortgagor next argued that the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship
created by the deed of trust had terminated prior to the time the mortgagee
paid the taxes, thereby conveniently relieving the mortgagor from any liabil-
ity for payment of the taxes.230 Although this argument was more appealing
than the first argument, the court was not moved. The court acknowledged
that under the deed of trust the trustee was permitted to seek reimbursement
for only the taxes paid during the pendency of the default, and that at the
time the taxes were paid the foreclosure had already occurred. 23' The court,
however, recognized that the note also permitted the mortgagee to seek re-
imbursement for taxes that, after a default, were due but not paid, without
limitation as to time of recovery. Construing the deed of trust and note as
one instrument, the court resolved the internal conflict by concluding that
the note and deed of trust provisions provided alternative means of recov-
226. Id. at 306.
227. 597 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1980).
228. Vista, 822 S.W.2d at 307-08 (citing Smart, 597 S.W.2d at 337).
229. Id.
230. The mortgagor argued that the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship terminated upon
the foreclosure of the deed of trust.
231. Vista, 822 S.W.2d at 308.
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ery.2 3 2 Therefore, the court concluded that the mortgagee was not paying
the taxes pursuant to the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship under the deed
of trust, but rather pursuant to its contractual right under the note.233 Ap-
parently under the impression that the mortgagee was unable to fend for
itself, the court went beyond the mortgagee's arguments and concluded that
by paying the taxes, the mortgagee became subrogated to the lien of the
taxing authority, thereby securing the mortgagor's recourse reimbursement
obligation.2 34 Although the mortgagee emerged from this litigation rela-
tively unscathed and perhaps protected beyond what it anticipated, the
mortgagee would have been much more prudent to have satisfied the taxes




In addition to the usury issues pertaining to D'Oench, Duhme and other
related federal defenses discussed previously, 235 Texas courts were presented
with a number of other usury-related issues during the Survey period. In
addressing those issues, the courts recognized that the spreading doctrine is
alive and well, 236 the mere act of charging interest on past due interest is not
usury, 237 equitable defenses are available to defeat a claim of usury (includ-
ing claims that a debtor originates by setting up a lender to commit a techni-
cal violation and those that take on the characteristics of small or trifling
matters), 238 the interest rate applicable to a loan transaction need not be in
writing and may be established by a course of conduct, 239 and a net profits
assignment, although the proper subject of a usury claim, may be saved by a
properly drafted savings clause240 and a guarantor may not deny the en-
232. Id. at 307-08.
233. Id. at 308. Somewhat surprisingly the court, on appeal from a summary judgment,
was able to conclude without trouble or equivocation that there was not a material fact issue
created by the differing carve-out language in the deed of trust and the note.
234. Id. at 308-09 (relying on Smart, 597 S.W.2d at 338, wherein the Texas Supreme Court
recognized that "[u]nder various circumstances[,] ... [a mortgagee discharging taxes] may be
subrogated to the taxing authority's lien to the extent necessary for his own equitable
protection.").
235. See supra notes 86-153 and accompanying text.
236. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. Commercial Fed. Bank, 834 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1992, no writ) (prepayment penalty payable on the acceleration of loan to be spread
over the entire period the loan was outstanding for purpose of determining if the loan was
usurious).
237. Shoberg v. Shoberg, 830 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no
writ).
238. HSAM Inc. v. Gatter, 814 S.W.2d 887, 890-92 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ
dism'd by agr.).
239. Matter of Worldwide Trucks, Inc., 948 F.2d 976, 980 (5th Cir. 1991).
240. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Mackie, 962 F.2d 1144, 1151 (5th Cir. 1992).
Mackie is not a case of first impression in the Fifth Circuit. In In re Casbeer, 793 F.2d 1436
(5th Cir. 1986), the Fifth Circuit concluded that the profits assignment at issue was not usuri-
ous because the assignment contained a savings clause that provided that the assignment, to-
gether with other interest on the loan, would not exceed the maximum allowable interest rate.
Id. at 1447 n.30. However, in Federal Say. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Locke, 718 F. Supp 573
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forcement of its guaranty on the basis that the guaranteed obligation is
usurious.
24 1
B. DID A CHARGING OF USURIOUS INTEREST OCCUR?
During the Survey period, several Texas courts addressed the issue of
what constitutes a charging of interest under the statutory definition of inter-
est.242 In the one Texas case worthy of text discussion, George A. Fuller Co.
v. Carpet Services, Inc.,243 the Texas Supreme Court formed the beginnings
of the principle that a claim of usury may not accrue solely out of the judi-
cial process. Carpet Services involved a subcontractor who performed work
pursuant to a subcontract with a general contractor. Under the subcontract,
the general contractor was not obligated to pay the subcontractor until the
general contractor received payment from the owner. If the general contrac-
tor failed to pay the subcontractor after receiving payment from the owner,
the subcontractor was entitled to interest. After completing its work, the
subcontractor was not paid for its work and sued the general contractor for
payment, together with prejudgment interest for a period that commenced
prior to the owner's payment to the general contractor. The general con-
tractor claimed that the subcontractor's claim for interest constituted usury
since no interest was due for the period preceding the contractor's receipt of
funds from the owner. The trial court agreed with the general contractor
and ordered that the subcontractor forfeit both the payment due and all in-
terest. 24 The subcontractor appealed and the court of appeals reversed,
holding that a demand for usurious interest in a pleading was not a usurious
charge of interest. 245 The general contractor appealed to the Texas Supreme
Court.
The central issue identified by the Texas Supreme Court was whether the
pleading in which the subcontractor claimed interest was a "charge" for in-
terest under the Texas usury statute. 246 The court noted that the statute
(W.D. Tex. 1989), the district court relied on In re Casbeer in holding that a net profits assign-
ment could not form the basis of a usury claim. Id. at 584. In Mackie, the Fifth Circuit
removed any confusion created by Locke by stating that the Locke court had mischaracterized
the holding of In re Casbeer. Mackie, 962 F.2d at 1151.
241. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1163 (1992); Sunbelt Say., FSB v. Birch, 796 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
242. E.g., McKenna Inv. v. Atlas Energy Corp., 832 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1992, no writ) (trial court did not commit reversible error by finding that letter sent to
borrower following foreclosure demanding unpaid principal and interest due under non-re-
course promissory note was not a charging of interest); Shoberg v. Shoberg, 830 S.W.2d 149,
153 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1992, no writ) (estranged wife argued that a charging of
usurious interest occurred when she did not seek increased child support from her ex-husband
because of ex-husband's threat to foreclose lien against her residence, but court could not
fathom how estranged wife's forbearance from seeking child support could constitute a charge
within the meaning of Texas usury statute); HSAM, 814 S.W.2d at 890 (mortgagee's payoff
quote, which included a late charge that was not actually due, constituted a charging under
Texas usury statute).
243. 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1992).
244. Id. at 604.
245. Id.
246. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (1), (2) (Vernon 1987 & Vernon Supp.
1993), which generally provides for penalties in the event a person "contracts for, charges or
receives interest which is" greater than the lawful amount.
1740 [Vol. 46
REAL PROPERTY
does not provide guidance as to what constitutes a charging of interest, but
found helpful the legislature's declaration that in enacting the interest legis-
lation, it intended to protect Texas citizens from abusive and deceptive prac-
tices by unscrupulous operators, lenders and vendors in consumer
transactions. 247 The court concluded that the wrongs that the legislature
sought to eradicate are not present in a pleading that makes a demand for
prejudgment interest.24 8 Moreover, recognizing that the usury statutes are
not intended to be a "trap for the unwary pleader in a court proceeding," the
court concluded that claims for excessive interest in a pleading are best dealt
with in the action of which the pleading is a part rather than through usury
laws.249 Accordingly, the court held that the demand for usurious interest
in the pleading filed with the court was not a charging of usurious interest
under the Texas usury statute.25 0
Although not necessary to the court's holding, the court expressly disap-
proved of a 1979 court of appeals decision, Hagar v. Williams,25 1 which held
247. Carpet Services, 823 S.W.2d at 604 (citing Act of May 23, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch.
24, § 1, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 609).
248. Id. at 606.
249. Id. Sumrall v. Navistar Fin. Corp., 818 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991,
writ denied), was decided by the Beaumont court of appeals several months before Carpet
Services and raises an interesting issue since the Texas Supreme Court denied writ of error. In
Sumrall, the borrower obtained a loan to purchase certain vehicles from time to time. The
borrower ran into financial difficulty and filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Federal
Bankruptcy Act. In the bankruptcy proceeding, the borrower and lender agreed to certain
stipulations, two of which were the amount of principal owed to the lender and the per diem
interest accruing on the unpaid principal. Both stipulations were based on information pro-
vided by the lender. The principal set forth in the stipulation was greater than the amount of
principal actually outstanding and therefore the per diem interest was excessive. The borrower
was dismissed from bankruptcy and again defaulted under the lender's note. The lender repos-
sessed the vehicles and the borrower sued, alleging, among other things, usury based on the
stipulations submitted in the bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court concluded that, as a mat-
ter of law, the bankruptcy stipulations constituted a charging of interest that was usurious on
its face. Id. at 559.
On appeal, the lender argued that the bankruptcy pleadings could not constitute a charging
of interest, relying on the Dallas court of appeals' decision in Carpet Services. The Beaumont
court determined that the Dallas court's decision in Carpet Services was based on that court's
determination that when a pleader makes a claim for interest in filing a suit, the pleader's claim
is against the court and not the debtor. Id. at 553. The Beaumont court rejected this reason-
ing, concluding that a court is only a procedural medium by which a lender can make a claim
for interest against its borrower. Id. Clearly, the Dallas court's rationale, as identified by the
Beaumont court, was not the basis for the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Carpet Services,
so perhaps the Beaumont court would reach a different conclusion if again presented with a
similar fact situation. Although the Texas Supreme Court denied the lender's writ of error
application, the denial of writ by the Texas Supreme Court does not validate the Beaumont
court of appeals' holding that the bankruptcy stipulations constituted a charging of usury.
First, the lender's writ of error not place this issue squarely in front of the supreme court.
Secondly, the facts submitted to the supreme court make it clear that the bankruptcy stipula-
tions were not in the true nature of a judicial pleading. Rather, the lender and bankrupt
borrower had agreed upon a modification of the loan documents and sought the bankruptcy
court's approval of those modifications in accordance with applicable bankruptcy law. Under
such facts, the issue of usury is more properly controlled by the written modification agree-
ment, as opposed to treating the request for the approval of the documents by the bankruptcy
court as a pleading which, under Carpet Services, does not result in a charging of interest.
250. Carpet Services, 823 S.W.2d at 603.
251. 593 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ).
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that a charge, as used in the usury statute, means "unilaterally placing on an
account an amount due as interest. ' 252 The court went on to hold that, in
addition to placing interest on an account, the placement must be communi-
cated to the debtor to constitute a charge under the usury statute.253 Lend-
ers may find this holding to be a significant defense to usury claims.
Two recent Fifth Circuit cases have expanded the holding in Carpet Serv-
ices regarding usurious interest claimed in judicial pleadings. In First South
Savings Association v. First Southern Partners, 1,254 two individuals executed
separate guaranty agreements covering a promissory note executed by a
partnership, the general partners of which were the individual guarantors.
Each guaranty agreement expressly limited the guarantor's liability under
the note to fifty percent of the unpaid principal balance. 255 The partnership
ultimately defaulted under the note and the FSLIC (which had succeeded to
the rights of the original lender) sued the borrower and the guarantors for
the outstanding principal balance of the note. The guarantors counter-
claimed, alleging the charging of usurious interest through several letters
and through claims contained in the original complaint, each of which de-
manded that the guarantors pay the entire unpaid principal balance of the
note and interest on the note, notwithstanding the provisions of the guaranty
agreements limiting each guarantor's liability to only fifty percent of the un-
paid principal balance of the note. 256 The guarantors argued that the de-
mand for the amount of interest and principal for which the guarantors were
not liable constituted a usurious charging of interest. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the lender and the guarantors appealed. 257
The Fifth Circuit recognized that the demand letters and the claims made
in the original complaint for interest and all principal under the note were
erroneous. 258 Merely being erroneous, however, did not, according to the
court, constitute a charge for usurious interest.259 First, the court concluded
that the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Carpet Services260 disposed of the
guarantors' contention that charging of usurious interest can occur in plead-
ings.26' Although the specific holding of Carpet Services was not necessarily
252. Carpet Services, 823 S.W.2d at 605 (citing Hagar, 593 S.W.2d at 788).
253. Id. One justice dissented with the majority's overruling of Hagar, stating that the
court was "acting in the dark, without the benefit of an adversarial presentation, and without
considering the manifold implications of its ruling." Id. at 607 (Mauzy, J., concurring in part).
The dissenter also concluded that the court's rejection of Hagar necessarily resulted in a rejec-
tion of a similar holding in Williams v. Back, 624 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex. App.-Austin 1981,
no writ). The supposed implicit rejection of Back gave the dissenter particular heartburn since
in Back the lender had mailed a notice containing the alleged usurious charge, but the debtor
had not received it.
254. 957 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1992).
255. The note and each guaranty also contained a savings clause.
256. The counterclaim was actually brought against the RTC (which had succeeded to the
rights of the FSLIC) and a newly formed federal savings association, which had acquired the
assets of the original lender, including the note and guaranties sued upon.
257. First South, 957 F.2d at 174.
258. Id. at 176. The court of appeals described the trial court's judgment as cryptic. Id.
259. Id. at 177.
260. 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1992).
261. First South, 957 F.2d at 177. A subsequent Fifth Circuit case concluded under similar
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dispositive of the guarantors' claim, it appears that the Fifth Circuit's appli-
cation of Carpet Services to defeat the guarantors' claim that the complaint
constituted a charging of usurious interest was correct in light of the ration-
ale of Carpet Services.262
As to the demand letters, the court observed that Texas law defines inter-
est as compensation for the use, detention or forbearance of money. 263 Here,
the demand letters demanded that the guarantors pay sums owed under the
promissory note that was the subject of the guaranty and, according to the
court, did not constitute a demand for interest because the borrower, not the
guarantor, received the use, forbearance and detention of money under the
note. 264 The guarantors argued that under the Texas Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Houston Sash & Door Co., Inc. v. Heaner265 a claim for usury could
be made under a guaranty. 266 The Fifth Circuit agreed that the guarantors
in Houston Sash & Door were permitted to assert a claim of usury under the
guaranty, but pointed out that the guaranty contained a separate provision
providing for interest if the guarantor failed to pay certain sums by a speci-
fied date. It was this provision that gave rise to the claim of usury under the
Houston Sash guaranty. 267 By pointing out Houston Sash, the guarantors
shot themselves in the foot, as the court relied on the guarantors' cited case
to reach a conclusion that the guarantors sought to avoid: that an erroneous
claim under a guaranty that does not contain a separate interest provision is
simply an erroneous claim and not a charging of interest under the Texas
usury statute.268
Remaining consistent with the reasoning of Carpet Services and First
South, but going beyond the holding in each of those cases, the Fifth Circuit,
in Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. Kralj,269 held that neither
pleadings that make a claim for usurious interest nor interrogatory answers
that demand an amount of usurious interest constitute an unlawful charge of
interest under Texas usury laws. 270 In Kralj, the borrower defaulted under a
promissory note that was arguably usurious on its face.271 The borrower
facts that a pleading would not constitute a charging under the usury statue. Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Oaks Apartments J.V., 966 F.2d 995, 1002 (5th Cir. 1992).
262. The Fifth Circuit confirmed this reasoning in Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. v. Kralj, 968
F.2d 500, 503-04 (5th Cir. 1992).
263. First South, 957 F.2d at 177 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a)
(Vernon 1987)).
264. Id.
265. 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979).
266. First South, 957 F.2d at 177.
267. Id.
268. Id. In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Oaks Apartments J.V., 966 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1992),
the Fifth Circuit, without discussion, concluded that a demand letter sent under a similar fact
situation did not constitute a charging under the usury statute. Id. at 1002.
269. 968 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1992).
270. Id. at 505.
271. See discussion of the facts in Kralj, infra note 278 and accompanying text. The origi-
nal lender failed, the FSLIC was appointed the receiver, and thereafter entered into an acquisi-
tion agreement with another lender pursuant to which that lender would acquire the assets of
the failed lender, including the note sued upon. The FSLIC removed the case from state court
to federal court and the new lender intervened.
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presented interrogatories to the lender to verify the method of calculation of
interest under the note, and the lender used 18% per annum calculated over
a 360-day year. The borrower then filed a counterclaim against the lender,
alleging that the demand in the complaint and the response to the interroga-
tories constituted a charging of usurious interest. Recognizing that it had
stubbed its toe, the lender hurriedly amended its complaint and the interrog-
atories to demand only a lawful amount of interest. The lender then filed a
motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted, and the
borrower appealed. 272
Relying on the holding and rationale of Carpet Services and other cases, 273
the court concluded that if the underlying documents are not usurious, the
purpose of the usury laws would not be served by imposing usury penalties
where a lender demands interest in excess of that permitted by the underly-
ing agreements in pleadings and related interrogatories. 274 Accordingly, the
court held that neither the lender's pleadings nor its answers to interrogato-
ries could support a claim for a charge of usurious interest. 275
C. SAVINGS CLAUSES
Although properly drafted savings clauses have long been held to defeat
most usury claims, 276 savings clauses have not been an unsinkable life pre-
272. Kralj, 968 F.2d at 503.
273. Id. (relying on e.g., First South, 957 F.2d at 176-77; Gibraltar Say. v. L.D. Brinkman
Corp., 860 F.2d 1275, 1296 n.26 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2432 (1989)).
274. Id. at 504. The court placed some importance on the fact that, after receiving the
borrower's counterclaim, the lender promptly amended its complaint and written answers to
the interrogatories to provide for a lawful rate of interest. Although not neatly tied together,
the importance of the amendments assumed by the court is in keeping with the rationale of a
district court opinion relied on by the court:
[C]onstruing a claim asserted only in a pleading filed in a law suit as an interest
charge triggering the draconian penalties of usury would do little to serve any
reasonable purpose of the statute. There is little risk of overreaching or coercion
because the sum claimed would never be payable absent judicial approval....
(T]his proffered construction would exalt form over substance and attach a
heavy penalty to a pleading error contrary to the policy of both state and federal
rules of procedure that amendments ought to be freely allowed to avoid
injustice.
Id. at 504 n.10 (emphasis added) (citing Fibergate Corp. v. Research-Cottrell, Inc., 481 F.
Supp. 570 (N.D. Tex. 1979). But cf Sumrall v. Navistar Fin. Corp., 818 S.W.2d 548, 553
(Tex. App. -Beaumont 1991, writ denied) ("To permit a creditor, upon being faced with
claims by a debtor that excessive charges in violation of usury statutes were made, to escape
liability by reducing usurious charges to within statutory limits would totally negate the intent
and render ineffective our usury statutes.").
275. Kralj, 968 F.2d at 505.
276. E.g., Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977). During the Survey
period, the courts concluded that savings clauses would defeat a usury defense under a variety
of circumstances. E.g., First South, 957 F.2d at 178 (erroneous statements in demand letters
remedied by virtue of savings clause); Nevels v. Harris, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937); Federal De-
posit Ins. Corp. v. Claycomb, 945 F.2d 853, 860-861 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, SHWC, Inc.
v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 112 S. Ct. 2301 (1992) (savings clause set forth in loan docu-
ments, including a profits assignment, defeated usury defense under Texas law); Affiliated Cap-
ital Corp. v. Commercial Fed. Bank, 834 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ)
(savings clause which provided for rebate of interest in excess of maximum legal rate defeated




server for loan transactions that are usurious on their face.277 Two cases
decided during the Survey period, however, give some indication that certain
transactions that may be usurious on their face will nevertheless avoid a
usury claim if the loan documents contain a properly drafted savings clause.
In Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. v. Kralj,278 the clauses at issue
(i) provided for stated interest equal to the lesser of the maximum rate per-
mitted by applicable law or two percent (2%) above an agreed upon prime
rate, (ii) provided that past due installments would bear interest at the maxi-
mum legal rate or if no maximum legal rate was established, then at a rate of
five percent (5%) above the prime rate and (iii) provided that the amount of
interest payable would be calculated on the basis of a daily rate equal to
1/360th of the annual percentage rate. Following the borrower's default, the
lender demanded an amount of interest that was based on 18% per annum
(the then existing maximum legal rate), calculated, however, on a 360-day
year as contemplated by the note. By using a 360-day year, the actual per
annum rate used in the calculation was 18.25%, which exceeded the then
existing maximum legal rate. The lender sued the borrower and the bor-
rower defended claiming, among other things, that the note was facially usu-
rious due to the 360-day calculation clause. The lender argued that although
one clause in the note charged excessive interest, the savings clause defeated
a construction of the contract that would violate usury laws. The trial court
agreed with the lender, concluding on motion for summary judgment that
the note was not usurious on its face, and the borrower appealed. 279
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit recognized that under Texas law the mere
existence of a savings clause will not defeat a usury claim in a transaction
that is usurious on its face.280 Moreover, the court concluded that Texas law
required the court to construe the terms of the savings clause as a whole and
in light of the circumstances surrounding the transaction.281 Apparently not
convinced that the note at issue was usurious on its face, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the applicable documents and the facts and circumstances
surrounding them did not establish that the lender intended to charge or had
a practice of charging usurious interest. 28 2 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
held that the savings clause remedied "any problem with the clause in the
note containing reference to calculations regarding the 360-day year." 283
277. E.g., Smart v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 597 S.W.2d 333, 341 (Tex. 1980); Woodcrest
Assoc., Ltd. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 775 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1989, writ denied) ("The mere presence of such a [savings] clause, however, will not rescue a
transaction that is necessarily usurious by its explicit terms."); Terry v. Teachworth, 431
S.W.2d 918, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) Mack v.
Newton, 737 F.2d 1343, 1371 (5th Cir. 1984).
278. 968 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1992).
279. Id. at 503.
280. Id. at 506 (citing Woodcrest, 775 S.W.2d at 438).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. The borrower argued that the lender had a practice of charging pre-default and
post-default interest at a usurious rate. To establish this practice, the borrower presented no
evidence other than a computer printout produced by the lender's employee who calculated
the amount of the interest claimed by the lender. The court was unimpressed, concluding that
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Lawyers relying on the Kralj holding to defeat claims of usury based on
the effect of a 360-day interest calculation clause should proceed with the
utmost caution. Although the Kralj holding is somewhat broad, the facts of
the case are extremely important to the outcome. First, the note at issue
expressly capped stated interest at the maximum rate permitted under appli-
cable law and limited delinquent interest to the maximum rate permitted
under applicable law; therefore, the 360-day clause arguably did not apply to
either the stated interest clause or the delinquent interest clause. Second, as
the court noted,284 the 360-day calculation provision was in the paragraph
that defined the prime rate of interest; therefore, the 360-day calculation pro-
vision arguably applied only to the calculation of the prime rate of interest,
and not to the calculation of interest at the maximum rate permitted by
applicable law. In conclusion, Kral is consistent with existing Texas law 28 5
and in no way vitiates Nevels v. Harris,286 where the Texas Supreme Court
recognized that "a person may [not] exact from a borrower a contract that is
usurious under its terms, and then relieve himself of the pains and penalties
visited by law ... by merely writing into the contract a disclaimer of any
intention to do that which under his contract he has plainly done. '28 7
In Affiliated Capital Corp. v. Commercial Federal Bank,28 8 the borrower
executed a note that required him to pay a penalty in the event the principal
was paid prior to maturity or in the event the balance of the note became due
prior to maturity. The amount of the penalty was equal to that amount that
would compensate the lender for interest that would not be paid in the fu-
ture due to the prepayment. The note also contained a savings clause that
generally provided that in no event would the amount of interest required to
be paid or actually paid ever exceed the maximum interest permitted under
applicable law. Following the borrower's default under the note, the lender
the computer printout was not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding
the lender's practice of charging usurious interest. Id.
284. Id. at 505.
285. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Lawler v.
Lomas & Nettleton Mortgage Investors, 691 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1985), wherein the court
held that a note that provided for an interest rate at the maximum rate permitted under appli-
cable law and that calculated interest on the basis of a 360-day year was usurious. This hold-
ing was reached notwithstanding the existence of a savings clause in the note at issue.
However, the facts in Lawler are significantly different than the facts in Kraj. First, there was
no indication in Lawler that the stated interest was capped to the lesser of the maximum rate
permitted by applicable law or the stated rate. Second, the 360-day calculation provision in
the note was clearly applicable to the calculation of the amount of interest that was due at the
stated rate. Under these facts, the Fifth Circuit would not have reached a conclusion different
than that reached in Lawler.
286. 102 S.W.2d 1046 (Tex. 1937).
287. Id. at 1050. The language quoted from Nevels is significantly different from the lan-
guage from Woodcrest relied on by the Fifth Circuit. The "mere presence" language from
Woodcrest seems to indicate that some further analysis is required in facially usurious transac-
tions, while the language from Nevels may dictate a conclusion that the savings clause is inef-
fective with respect to the facially usurious clauses. However, if the savings clause goes beyond
negating the intention to charge usurious interest by providing that all agreements for interest
are deemed limited to the maximum rate permitted by law and/or further provide for the
return of any usurious interest actually collected, perhaps the quoted language in Nevels is
avoided.
288. 834 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
1746 [Vol. 46
REAL PROPERTY
accelerated the note, demanded payment of principal, interest and the pre-
payment penalty and then foreclosed its lien securing payment of the note.
The borrower sued the lender, claiming, among other things, that the lender
had charged and contracted for usurious interest.
The borrower argued that the note was usurious on its face and therefore
could not be protected by the savings clause. The borrower based its argu-
ment on a hypothetical failure by the borrower to qualify for its first advance
under the loan. If such failure had occurred, the prepayment provision
would have been triggered and the borrower would have been required to
pay the prepayment penalty, an amount far in excess of the amount of inter-
est which would have been permitted under applicable law. The court sim-
ply concluded that the borrower's understanding of the law was inaccurate
and, relying on Nevels, concluded that a savings clause requiring the reduc-
tion of the interest payable to a legal amount saves a contract from being
usurious on its face.2 89 Although the result reached by the Affiliated Capital
court was correct and Nevels was properly applied to the facts of Affiliated
Capital,290 Nevels does not stand for the broader principle that a savings
clause prevents an otherwise clearly usurious contract from being usurious
on its face. 29 1 A contrary conclusion would appear to emasculate substan-
tially that portion of Nevels that recognized that a lender will not be saved
from the penalties of usury by writing into a clearly usurious contract a
provision that disclaims to do that which it has plainly done. 292
The borrower in Affiliated Capital also argued that the lender charged
usurious interest by requiring the prepayment penalty on the accelerated
debt as a separate and new contract. Therefore, the borrower argued, the
amount of the prepayment penalty should have been viewed as one day's
interest and usurious and neither the savings clause nor the doctrine of
spreading should be applied to prevent the usury claim. The court found no
law directly on point, but considered three cases cited by the borrower, two
of which were distinguished by the court with little difficulty. 293 The court
was forced to give some thought to an ancient Texas Supreme Court deci-
289. See id. at 526.
290. The authors do not believe that the note in Affiliated Capital was usurious on its face
and that the court therefore properly applied the savings clause. Perhaps the real issue created
by the Nevels case is what constitutes a note that is usurious on its face. See, e.g., Smart v.
Tower & Land Inv. Co., 597 S.W.2d 333, 340-41 (Tex. 1980).
291. Perhaps the limitation recognized in Nevels most clearly applies to a note that con-
tracts for interest at an obviously usurious rate (i.e., 30% per annum on a non-residential loan)
and then attempts to limit that clause by a savings clause. One could logically argue, however,
that a properly drafted savings clause (i.e. one that expressly limits the amount of any interest
payable under the note to the maximum amount permitted by applicable law) modifies the
express interest provision to a legal rate. Although this is a logical argument, we must then
wonder what is left of the limitation set forth in Nevels.
292. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
293. 834 S.W.2d at 525 (distinguishing General Motors Corp v. Uresti, 553 S.W.2d 660
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (consumer credit case involving refund of time-
price differential in case of a voluntary prepayment); Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d
209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (time price differential case involving
charging and collection of unearned time price differential)).
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sion, Crider v. San Antonio Real Estate Building & Loan Association,294
wherein the Texas Supreme Court held that upon acceleration of a note, the
unpaid principal balance together with all accrued interest constituted a sin-
gle, new obligation, upon which interest could be charged. 295 In the present
case, the court observed that the prepayment penalty was designed to be a
one-time charge to compensate the lender for the interest not received due to
the prepayment and not a charging of post-acceleration interest on the ma-
tured debt, which was expressly covered by another provision in the note
analogous to the provision at issue in Crider.296 These facts, in the court's
judgment, were sufficient to distinguish Crider and support a finding that the
amount of the prepayment charge was covered by the savings clause and the
doctrine of spreading. 297
III. GUARANTIES
The law concerning guaranties is far broader than the scope of this article.
Several Survey period cases concerning guaranties, however, are of particu-
lar relevance to the real estate practitioner and are therefore appropriate for
discussion.
In Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., ex rel. Sunbelt Federal Savings,298 the
Texas Supreme Court adopted the transactional approach to res judicata,
holding that a "subsequent suit will be barred if it arises out of the same
subject matter of a previous suit and which through the exercise of diligence,
could have been litigated in a prior SUit. ' ' 299 Although the holding of Barr is
generally applicable to res judicata, the facts of Barr show how the rule will
apply to a lender's claims against a guarantor who is also a partner of the
294. 35 S.W. 1047 (Tex. 1896).
295. Id. at 1048.
296. Affiliated Capital, 834 S.W.2d at 525.
297. Id. at 525-26. In support of its holding, the court analogized Dixon v. Brooks, 678
S.W.2d 728, 731 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), wherein the court
combined a one-time late charge and interest on principal to determine if the amount collected
was usurious. The borrower in Affiliated Capital pointed to another late charge case, Fisher v.
Westinghouse Credit Corp., 760 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ), but this case
was inapposite since the late charge was a percentage charge assessed on a daily basis until the
late payment was made. The Affiliated Capital case did not note this difference, but was able
to successfully distinguish Fisher on other grounds. See Affiliated Capital, 834 S.W.2d at 526.
298. 837 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1992).
299. Id. at 631. The court recognized that in Foster v. Wells, 4 Tex. 101,104 (1849), it had
adopted a transactional approach to res judicata by holding that res judicata barred not only
the claims litigated but also claims that could have been litigated in the original action. Due to
the broad nature of this holding, the court, in subsequent decisions, restricted the transactional
approach of Foster by adopting a number of theories and tests. The Barr court admitted the
confusion that its prior holdings had created and sought to clarify res judicata by reaffirming
the transactional approach and overruling the test adopted in one of its prior cases, Griffin v.
Holiday Inns of Am., 496 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1973). Although the Barr court specifically over-
ruled only Griffin, Barr probably has the effect of overruling the policy analysis of res judicata
used in Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Kownslar, 496 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1973). Barr, 827
S.W.2d at 631. Although the court appears to adopt the transactional approach set forth in
the Restatement of Judgments § 24(1), the rule announced by the court is somewhat more
limiting because of its requirement in Barr that the claim sought to barred could have been,
through the exercise of diligence, litigated in a prior suit. Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 629-30.
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borrowing entity. In Barr, the lender sued the borrowing entity on the note
and the partner/guarantor on his guaranty. When the partner/guarantor
was awarded summary judgment in the action on the guaranty, the lender
joined the partner/guarantor to the action on the note, asserting liability
against the partner/guarantor in its capacity as a partner of the borrowing
entity.3°° Applying the transactional rule of res judicata to the facts, the
Barr court concluded that the action under the note brought against the
partner/guarantor was barred by res judicata. 30 Barr makes clear that
lenders bringing suits on their debt must strongly consider joining all liable
parties in every capacity that such liability may be created. Similarly, if a
lender in a suit on a debt should fail or elect not to sue a particular party in
all capacities, the defending party should strongly consider the ramification
of failing to raise all defenses it may have on the debt under any capacity.
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Northpark Joint Venture30 2, the guarantors of
a note appealed from a district court's order imposing liability on the guar-
antors for a portion of a deficiency judgment entered against the maker of a
non-recourse note obligation. On appeal, the guarantors directed the court's
attention to language in the guaranty that provided that the guarantors were
required to pay "the indebtedness or other liability ... which ... [the bor-
rower] may now or at any time hereafter owe [the lender]." '30 3 This lan-
guage, the guarantors argued, limited their liability to the amount of the
deficiency that the borrower was required to pay the lender. If the guaran-
tors' argument was correct, the guarantors would have no liability for the
deficiency since that amount was non-recourse to the borrower. Although
this is an interesting technical argument, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the guarantors misunderstood the meaning of their guaranty. 3° 4 The court
concluded that the fact that the borrower's debt was non-recourse had no
bearing on whether the note was an indebtedness owed by the borrower to
the lender. 30 5 Indebtedness, according to the court, is the state of being in
debt, and the borrower incurred a debt when it signed the note. 30 6 Refusing
to elevate form over substance, the court concluded that the guaranty unam-
biguously obligated the guarantors for the deficiency.
30 7
The guarantors also argued that under Texas law the liability of the guar-
antor is equal to that of its principal. 308 The court acknowledged the general
300. Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 628.
301. Id. at 631.
302. 958 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1992).
303. Id. at 1320.
304. The court recognized that if a guaranty contract is ambiguous, the court must give the
contract the construction that is most favorable to the guarantor. Id. (citing Coker v. Coker,
650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983)). However, if the contract is unambiguous, the court is




307. Id. at 1320-21.
308. The guarantors cited Technical Consultant Serv., Inc. v. Lakewood Pipe of Texas,
Inc., 861 F.2d 1357, 1363 (5th Cir. 1988) (interpreting Texas law), in support of their argu-
ment. Northpark, 958 F.2d at 1321.
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rule proffered by the guarantors, but directed the guarantors' attention to an
exception to that rule that permits the guaranty to impose on the guarantor
liability greater than that of its principal. 30 9 By agreeing to pay not only the
borrower's liability to the lender, but also the borrower's indebtedness to the
lender, the guarantors, in the court's judgment, agreed to greater liability
than that imposed on the borrower. 310 Not to be deterred by the court's
calm and logical rejection of their arguments, the guarantors further argued
that they did not intend to agree to any liability greater than that of the
borrower. Suggesting that the guarantors' argument was somewhat ludi-
crous, the court reminded the guarantors of a provision in the note that in
fact placed greater liability on the guarantors than the borrower by specifi-
cally excluding the guaranty from the provision that made the note non-
recourse to the borrower. 31'
While In re Corland Corp. 312 involves a fact situation not likely to reoccur
on a regular basis, the Fifth Circuit's holding and reasoning should
strengthen certain guaranties in bankruptcy situations. In Corland, the bank
renewed a loan to a borrower and the borrower delivered its renewal note to
the bank. On the same date, the borrower renewed a loan to a third party to
whom the borrower had lent a portion of its original loan from the bank.
The third party gave its renewal note to the borrower and personally guaran-
teed the bank's loan to the borrower. The third party/guarantor and bor-
rower intended that the third party's payments to the borrower would be
used by the borrower to make payments on the borrower's debt to the bank.
This procedure was followed until the borrower filed for bankruptcy, at
which time the third party/guarantor began making payments directly to
the bank and the bank credited all such payments to the borrower's note.
The bank apparently never presented a demand to the third party/guarantor
to make the periodic payments under the borrower's note to the bank, but a
demand was made for the guarantor to make (and the guarantor made) the
balloon payment that eventually became due under the borrower's note.
Following (and perhaps waiting for) the balloon payment, the trustee in the
borrower's bankruptcy proceeding filed an action against the third
party/guarantor seeking to set aside the payments made by the third
party/guarantor to the bank. The third party/guarantor and the bank ar-
gued that the payments were made pursuant to the guaranty and not pursu-
ant to the third party/guarantor's note to the bankrupt borrower.
Concluding that the third party/guarantor's payments were constructive
payments on its note to the borrower, the bankruptcy court held that the
309. Northpark, 958 F.2d at 1321 (citing Western Bank-Downtown v. Carline, 757 S.W.2d
111, 114 n.7 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Simpson v. Mbank Dallas,
N.A., 724 S.W.2d 102, 110 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ refd n.r.e.)).
310. Id.
311. Id. Perhaps to counteract an argument presented by the guarantors, the court noted
that where a guaranty is absolute and unconditional, all of the terms of the note covered by the
guaranty are deemed incorporated into the guaranty. Id. at 1321 n. 13. Because the guaran-
tor's liability under the guaranty was not subject to a condition precedent, the guaranty was
absolute and unconditional, thereby incorporating all of the terms of the note. Id.
312. 967 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1992).
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trustee could avoid the third party/guarantor's payments to the bank.313
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court and the third
party/guarantor appealed.314
Much to the bank's and the third party/guarantor's delight, the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed the bankruptcy court and district courts, holding that the third
party/guarantor's payments to the bank were payments made pursuant to
the third party/guarantor's guaranty. 31 5 Finding fault with the bankruptcy
court and district court for concluding that the payments were constructive
payments under the third party/guarantor's note without considering the
effect of the guaranty, 316 the Fifth Circuit concluded that upon the bor-
rower's default in payment of its note to the bank, the third party/guarantor,
irrespective of the lack of notice from the bank, became liable on the note.317
The Fifth Circuit then addressed the issue of whether the third party's pay-
ments were made pursuant to its note or its guaranty. In support of its posi-
tion, the trustee made four arguments, none of which the Fifth Circuit found
particularly appealing. 318 Additionally, the court observed that the third
party/guarantor would have acted irrationally if it had paid on the note in-
stead of the guaranty because it would have exposed itself to additional lia-
bility.319 Under this circumstance, the court thought it could reach no
conclusion other than that the payments had been made pursuant to the
guaranty and not the note.320
The trustee finally argued that the payments by the third party/guarantor
were post-petition transfers of property of the estate barred by the bank-
ruptcy code. The court summarily rejected this contention, stating that the
funds were not property of the estate because they came from the third
party/guarantor, not the borrower.3 21 To hold otherwise, the court con-
cluded, would render guaranties worthless in bankruptcies. 322
313. Id. at 1073.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1075.
316. Id. at 1073.
317. Id. at 1073-74 (relying on United States v. Select Meat Co., 275 F. Supp. 38, 45 (W.D.
Tex. 1967)); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.416 (a), (e) (Vernon 1968).
318. Corland, 967 F.2d at 1074-75. The one non-procedural argument made by the trustee
concerned language in the third party/guarantor's note that gave the third party/guarantor
the right to make payments on the borrower's note and receive corresponding credits under its
note. The trustee argued that enforcement of the guaranty would make the credit language
redundant and meaningless. The court quickly disposed of the trustee's argument by conclud-
ing that the bank received benefit under the guaranty, not under the credit language in the
note. Id. at 1075.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1076.
322. Id. The third party/guarantor also argued for a right to offset the payments made
pursuant to the guaranty against its note to the borrower. Although the third party/guarantor
failed to seek a lifting of the automatic stay to assert an offset under § 553(a) of the bankruptcy
code, this omission was not fatal to its claim of offset. The trustee filed a turnover action under
§ 542 (b) of the bankruptcy code, which permits a right to offset debts that are mutual and pre-
petition. Id. at 1077. Mutuality existed because of the third party/guarantor's note to the
borrower and the third party's subrogation right under the borrower's note to the bank arising
from the third party's payments under the guaranty. The issue of whether the third
party/guarantor's claim for reimbursement arose pre-petition was less clear. The court, how-
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IV. CHOICE OF LAW
Several important choice of law cases were decided during the Survey pe-
riod. 323 In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Northpark Joint Venture,3 2 4 a Texas
corporation made a loan to a Texas joint venture evidenced by a note and
secured by a deed of trust lien placed against real property located in Missis-
sippi and guaranties executed by the venturers of the borrower. The note
and the deed of trust each contained a choice of law clause, the note provid-
ing for the application of Texas law, and the deed of trust providing for the
application of Mississippi law. The borrower defaulted on the note, and the
lender foreclosed its lien and sued the guarantors for payment of the defi-
ciency. Applying Texas law to the deficiency claim, the district court or-
dered summary judgment in favor of the lender. 32 5
On appeal, the guarantors argued that the district court should have ap-
plied Mississippi law to the deficiency action. 326 Pointing to language in the
deed of trust that provided that the grantee would remain liable for any
deficiency following foreclosure, the guarantors asserted that the deed of
trust created the right to a deficiency judgment and the deficiency action
should therefore be controlled by the deed of trust choice of law clause. Ig-
noring the deed of trust and instead relying on several Texas cases, 3 2 7 the
Fifth Circuit disagreed with the guarantors, stating that a deficiency action is
an action involving enforcement of the underlying debt and does not arise
out of the foreclosure action.328 Having disposed of the choice of law clause
in the deed of trust, the court concluded that the guarantors had ratified the
choice of law clause contained in the note through their respective guaran-
ever, found its way through the fog and held that the reimbursement claim was pre-petition
since the third party/guarantor, as the holder of the subrogation right, stood in the shoes of
the bank and the bank's right to payment clearly arose pre-petition. Id. at 1078.
323. In addition to two Fifth Circuit cases, a district court opinion, Pennsylvania House,
Inc. v. Juneau's Pennsylvania House, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Tex. 1992), discussed this
issue. This case is not particularly noteworthy, especially in light of the fact that neither the
court nor the litigants chose to recognize the contractual choice of law rules announced by the
Texas Supreme Court in DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990). How-
ever, the case addressed an argument the authors have heard in their legal practice, and is
noteworthy at least in that respect. In Pennsylvania House, the holder of a security interest,
following foreclosure of that interest, sued for recovery of a deficiency. The applicable security
documents each contained a choice of law provision that generally provided that the loan
documents would be construed under and in accordance with the laws of Pennsylvania. The
debtor argued that in determining whether the holder properly foreclosed its interest, the par-
ties were not bound to the choice of law provisions because they addressed the construction of
the documents and not the enforcement of remedies. The court summarily rejected the bor-
rower's position as a mere semantical argument and refused to "recognize the artificial distinc-
tion between construction of the agreement and enforcing legal remedies..." Pennsylvania
House, 791 F. Supp. at 161.
324. 958 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1992). This case also involved guaranty issues discussed in
Section III above.
325. Id. at 1315, 1318.
326. The RTC conceded that if Mississippi law governed the substantive issues in the defi-
ciency action, summary judgment was inappropriate.
327. Northpark, 958 F.2d at 1318 (citing Resource Say. Ass'n v. Neary, 782 S.W.2d 897,
902 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); First Commerce Realty Investors v. K-F Land




ties of the payment of the note, 329 and held that the choice of law clause in
the note controlled the substantive issues of the case.330 The procedural
value of this portion of the court's holding is questionable in light of the
court's failure to analyze the effectiveness of the choice of law clause con-
tained in the note under Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws (Section 187),"33 as required by DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.3 3 2
Perhaps not wholly comfortable with its holding regarding the choice of
law clause contained in the note, the court assumed that the parties had not
chosen Texas law and proceeded to determine which state had the most sig-
nificant relationship with the transaction, 333 as required by Section 188 of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (Section 188), which generally
provides that, in the absence of an effective choice of law clause, the law of
the state that has the most significant relationship with the transaction will
control.334 The court had no difficulty concluding that Texas had the most
significant relationship with the transaction, observing that the note and
guaranties were negotiated in Texas, the parties were all either residents or
domiciles of Texas, and the note and guaranties, by their terms, were wholly
performable in Texas.3 35 In assessing the relative importance of these fac-
tors, the court concluded that Texas had a great interest, while Mississippi
had no interest, in resolving the central issue of whether the Texas debtors
were liable under guaranties delivered to and held by the Texas creditors.3 36
In a second choice of law decision, Chase Manhattan v. Greenbriar North
Section JJ,337 the Houston court of appeals (First District), unlike the Fifth
Circuit in NorthPark, analyzed the applicable choice of law clause under
Section 187.338 The facts show that the borrower negotiated and executed a
note in New York and that the note was secured by a guaranty executed in
New York and by a deed of trust executed in Texas.339 The note and the
guaranty each contained a choice of law clause that provided that the appli-
329. Id. at 1319. Certainly the court's determination was consistent with prior Texas cases
holding that when the borrower of a guaranteed obligation defaults in payment, the guarantor
becomes liable on the guaranteed obligation according to its terms. See Matter of Corland
Corp., 967 F.2d 1069, 1074 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
330. Northpark, 958 F.2d at 1320.
331. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
332. 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex. 1990). The court's failure to analyze the choice of law
provision under § 187 of the Restatement is somewhat curious in light of the court's recogni-
tion of the requirements of § 187 and its specific statement that it was not addressing the § 187
analysis. Northpark, 958 F.2d at 1318 n.6. Moreover, the court could have concluded under
§ 187 that the choice of law clause was effective.
333. Northpark, 958 F.2d at 1319.
334. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). Section 188 was
adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 678.
335. Northpark, 958 F.2d at 1319. Section 188 provides that the factors to be considered
by the court, as well as others, that are to be considered in determining which state has the
most significant relationship to the transaction.
336. Id. Section 188 provides that the contacts described in § 188 are to be considered
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
337. 835 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
338. Id. at 723-28.




cable instrument would be governed by and construed in accordance with
New York law. The deed of trust provided for remedies that conformed to
Texas law and further provided that the maximum permitted interest rate on
the note would be controlled by New York law. The original lender was
ultimately acquired by another lender (Chase Manhattan), who succeeded to
all of the rights of the original lender under the various documents. Thereaf-
ter, the borrower, while in Texas, executed a renewal note containing a
choice of law clause similar to that contained in the original note. In con-
nection with the renewal note, the deed of trust was modified and the guar-
antors executed a new guaranty covering the renewal note. 34°
The borrower subsequently defaulted on the renewal note, the lender fore-
closed its lien, and, without following a New York requirement that the
lender obtain an order confirming the sale of the property within 90 days
after the foreclosure and a judicial determination of the fair market value of
the property, sought a deficiency judgment against the borrower and the
guarantors. The borrower and guarantors asserted that the parties had cho-
sen New York law to control the issue of deficiency and because the lender
had failed to follow New York law in that regard, the borrower and guaran-
tors were relieved of any liability for the deficiency. 341 To the bank's cha-
grin, the district court agreed with the borrowers and guarantors and
entered summary judgement in their favor.342
On appeal, the lender argued that the district court should have applied
Texas law to the deficiency issue and the court, in accordance with DeSantis,
proceeded to analyze the effectiveness of the contractual choice of law provi-
sions under Section 187.343 Under Section 187(1), a choice of law clause is
to be applied to an issue if that issue could have been resolved by placing an
explicit provision in the documents. 344 The court concluded that the parties
could have placed a specific provision in the contract documents to provide
for a deficiency and accordingly held that the choice of New York law was
therefore enforceable.3 45 The court found support for its holding under
comment c to Section 187, which provides that the court shall apply the
chosen law to rules of contract law relating to, among other things, condi-
tions precedent. 346 According to the court, the New York requirement to
obtain a judicial confirmation of sale and fair market value prior to obtaining
a deficiency judgment were conditions precedent of the nature covered by
340. The facts do not indicate in which state the renewal note and the deed of trust modifi-
cation were executed or in which state those instruments or the renewal note were negotiated.
341. The lender did not dispute that it had not complied with deficiency procedures under
New York law, which generally prohibit a deficiency judgment unless the lender obtains an
order confirming sale of the property within 90 days of the consummation of the sale.
342. Greenbriar, 835 S.W.2d at 723.
343. Id. at 723-28.
344. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971).
345. Greenbriar, 835 S.W.2d at 724. Cf. Northpark J. V., 958 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1992),
wherein the court generally ignored a provision regarding a deficiency contained in the deed of
trust and instead concluded that the issue of deficiency was a matter of state law. See supra
notes 324-28.
346. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. c (1988).
1754 [Vol. 46
REAL PROPERTY
comment c.347 The court recognized that in DeSantis, the Texas Supreme
Court reached a conclusion that the enforceability of a non-competition
agreement was not an issue that the parties could have resolved by explicit
agreement.3 48 The appeals court had no disagreement with DeSantis, but
the issue before the appeals court was not one of enforceability, but rather
one of conditions precedent to obtaining a deficiency judgment. 349
Perhaps as a reflection of the court's confidence in its holding that the
New York statutory preconditions to a deficiency judgment were of the na-
ture that could have been resolved in the parties' contract, the court assumed
the inaccuracy of its own holding and proceeded to analyze the effectiveness
of the contractual choice of law clauses under Section 187(2).35o Section
187(2) generally provides that even if the issue does not pass muster under
187(1), the choice of law provision will be enforced unless (a) the chosen
state has no substantial relationship to the transaction and there is no rea-
sonable basis for the parties' choice or (b) the law of the chosen state would
be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state having a materially greater
interest in the particular issue and that, in the absence of a choice of law
clause, would be the state with the most significant relationship to the trans-
action under Section 188.351
In determining whether New York had a substantial relationship to the
transaction as contemplated under Section 187(2)(a), the court noted that
the renewal note was payable in New York, the lender's principal place of
business was in New York, the deed of trust modification provided that the
maximum permissible interest rate would be determined according to New
York law, and that the renewal note and related guaranty each provided that
they would be construed and enforced in accordance with New York law. 352
These facts, according to the court, were sufficient to establish a substantial
relationship between New York and the transaction. 353
347. Greenbriar, 835 S.W.2d at 724. Although the New York pre-deficiency requirements
are indeed in the nature of conditions precedent, the authors are not as confident as the court
that the New York requirements "are precisely the type cited by comment c as an example of
an issue that could have been resolved by the parties via an explicit provision in their agree-
ment." Id. Comment c deals with rules of contract law while the court was dealing with a
statutory provision regarding liability. Comment c provides that "[a]s to all such matters",
meaning rules of contract law designed to fill gaps pertaining to conditions precedent, the
forum will apply the provisions of the chosen law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 187 cmt. c (1988). However, in Northpark, the court looked to comment c to
create a condition precedent, as opposed to filling a gap regarding a condition precedent.
348. Greenbriar, 835 S.W.2d at 724.
349. Id. at 724-25. The court may have oversimplified its analysis in that the whole process
of obtaining a deficiency judgment was at issue as opposed to mere contractual conditions
precedent.
350. Id. at 725-28.
351. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971).
352. Greenbriar, 835 S.W.2d at 725. The court also considered certain facts pertaining to
the original lender and the original note, guaranty and deed of trust. Id. These facts appear
irrelevant, especially in light of the fact that a lender other than the original lender entered into
renewal documents that contained new choice of law provisions relating to the renewal trans-
action between the new lender, the borrower and the guarantors.
353. Id. The court heavily relied on First Commerce Realty Investors v. K-F Land Co.,
617 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.), which under
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With regard to its analysis under Section 187(2)(b), the court recognized
that it must make three determinations: (1) whether Texas had a more sig-
nificant relationship to the transaction and the parties than did New York;
(2) whether Texas had a materially greater interest in the resolution of the
issue than did New York; and (3) whether the application of New York law
would offend a fundamental policy of Texas. 354 In determining the first
prong of this test, the court applied the significant relationship factors set
forth in Section 188. 355 On the Texas side of the equation, the court noted
that the renewal note and modification of the deed of trust were executed in
Texas, the property securing the note was located in Texas, and the borrow-
ers and guarantors were located in Texas.356 On the New York side of the
equation, the court noted that the renewal note was payable in New York,
the lender was located in New York, the original note and deed of trust were
executed in New York, and the original note was negotiated in New
York. 357 These facts, the court concluded, were insufficient to establish that
Texas had a more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties
than did New York. 358
As to the second prong, the court concluded that Texas did not have a
materially greater interest in the determination of whether New York's con-
ditions to obtaining a deficiency judgment should be applicable to the defi-
ciency action brought by the lender. 359 Without in any way discussing why
Texas had or did not have a materially greater interest in the determination
of the factors that were relevant to a deficiency action, the court simply
stated that the action before it involved the payment of a debt and not fore-
closure on the property, an issue in which Texas might have a materially
greater interest. 360
As to the fundamental policy issue, the court concluded that no Texas
fundamental policy of Texas would be implicated, much less offended, by
applying the New York deficiency rules to the deficiency action brought by
the lender. 361 In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to Section 187
and found some sage wisdom in comment g, which suggests that the focus
similar facts held that Louisiana had a reasonable relationship to the transaction. Id. at 807.
However, the test for reasonable relationship is probably not as rigorous as the test for deter-
mining whether a state has a substantial relationship with a transaction; therefore, Greenbriar's
reliance on K-F Land may be somewhat misplaced.
354. Greenbriar, 835 S.W.2d at 725.
355. Id. at 725-26. Generally, § 188 provides that the following contacts are relevant to
determining which state has the most significant relationship to the transaction and parties: (i)
place of contracting; (ii) place of negotiation; (iii) place of performance; (iv) location of the
subject matter of the contract; and (v) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion and place of business of the parties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188
(1971).
356. Greenbriar, 835 S.W.2d at 726.
357. Id.
358. Id. While the authors agree with the court's determination, the factors pertaining to







should be on whether the law in question is part of a state policy so funda-
mental that the courts of that state will refuse to enforce an agreement con-
trary to that law, regardless of the parties' original intention and regardless
of the fact that the agreement would be enforceable in another state con-
nected with the transaction. 362 Although the deficiency laws in Texas and
New York were clearly different, the court simply concluded that the defi-
ciency laws in Texas were not such a fundamental state policy that the Texas
courts would refuse to enforce an agreement contrary to those rules, despite
the parties' intentions.363
V. HOMESTEAD
The constitutional and statutory homestead rights accorded to Texas resi-
dents are continually guarded by the judiciary. Indeed, one court has stated
that "we must uphold and enforce the Texas homestead laws even though in
so doing we might unwittingly assist a dishonest debtor in wrongfully defeat-
ing his creditor. ' 364 Accordingly, it should surprise no one that transactions
designed to avoid homestead rights are closely scrutinized and rarely prevail.
Consistent with these principles, several cases decided during the Survey pe-
riod make clear that sham sales of homesteads to avoid the prohibition of
liens on homesteads, other than liens for purchase money, taxes and home
improvements, will not be tolerated or upheld by Texas courts.3 65 Similarly,
Texas courts have developed, and Survey cases continued to condone, a pa-
ternalistic policy that upholds, even in the face of a representation by an
owner that the mortgaged property is not the owner's homestead, an owner's
claim that any lien, other than a constitutionally permitted lien, is invalid
against the owner's homestead, 366 unless (i) the owner does not occupy the
property or uses it in a fashion that makes its status dubious at the time the
mortgage is executed,3 67 or (ii) the lien is created in connection with a simu-
362. Id. (citing DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 680 (Tex. 1990)); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g (1988).
363. Greenbriar, 835 S.W.2d at 726. While it lamented the fact that neither § 187 nor the
cases following that section, including DeSantis, defined "fundamental policy", the court
stated that it could not conceive of a definition that would include the right of a creditor to
obtain a deficiency judgment without first satisfying requirements similar to the New York
requirements. Id.
364. In re Bradley, 960 F.2d 502, 507 (1992) (quoting in part from Cocke v. Conquest, 120
Tex. 43, 35 S.W.2d 673, 678 (1931)).
365. See, e.g., Orozco v. Sander, 824 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. 1992); Firstbank v. Pope, 141 B.R.
115 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992).
366. See, e.g., Exocet Inc. v. W.W. Cordes, 815 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no
writ) (judicial admission by homestead owner that a judgment lien was perfected against his
property did not estop the homestead owner from claiming that such property was his home-
stead); In re Bradley, 960 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1992) (where owner made representation to lender
that mortgaged property was not owner's homestead, but owner in fact occupied a residence
on the mortgaged property and utilized the entire mortgaged property for homestead purposes,
owner was not estopped from denying validity of the lien on the basis that mortgaged property
was owner's homestead).
367. E.g., Gregory v. Sunbelt Say. F.S.B., 835 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ
denied) (where owner represented to lender that mortgaged property was not owner's residen-
tial homestead, owner did not occupy the mortgaged property at the time of execution of the
mortgage and lender loaned funds in reliance on the owner's representation, owner was es-
1993] 1757
SMU LAW REVIEW
lated transaction that has the outward appearance of a sale, but that is in
fact a mortgage,3 68 or (iii) the owner also represents that the secured notes
are valid mechanic's lien notes for improvements, secured by the lien of a
properly executed mechanic's lien contract.3 69 These exceptions to the gen-
eral rule may be rigorously applied by the courts to avoid borrower abuses.
For example, in In re Smith, 370 the homestead owner executed a
mechanic's lien secured by a properly executed mechanic's lien contract and
then used the funds advanced by the lender to pay taxes. The lender was
subsequently taken over by the FDIC and the note was thereafter acquired
by another bank. In holding that the homestead owner was estopped from
denying the validity of the lien, the court noted that the policy behind the
mechanic's lien note exception was to protect lenders who had been induced
to advance funds on the belief that those funds would be secured by the
mechanic's lien. 371 Applying this policy, the court concluded that the FDIC
and the bank that ultimately acquired the failed lender's note had advanced
funds in reliance on the validity of the mechanic's lien and, accordingly, the
homestead owner was estopped from denying the validity of the mechanic's
lien.372 The homestead owner argued that estoppel should not apply be-
cause the original lender was fully aware of the owner's actual use of the
funds prior to funding. Although the court recognized that the original
lender probably would have been denied the use of the estoppel argument
because it had prior actual knowledge regarding the use of the loan proceeds,
the court refused to impute that knowledge to the FDIC or the purchaser of
the failed institution's note. 373
Texas courts have long held that a court may require a partition of the
homestead in connection with a divorce proceeding. 374 In addition, Texas
law permits a court to order in a divorce proceeding that one spouse be
entitled to the homestead estate even if title to the property is held by the
other spouse.375 However, prior to Laster v. First Huntsville Properties
topped from denying validity of the mortgage on grounds that mortgaged property was
owner's residential homestead); In re Nelson, 134 B.R. 838 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) (where
owner disclaimed mortgaged property as being a business or residential homestead and
claimed another property to be his residential homestead and the lender advanced funds in
reliance on representations, owner was estopped from denying validity of lien on grounds that
the mortgaged property was owner's business homestead).
368. But see supra note 365 and accompanying text regarding the courts' close scrutiny of
sales which are in fact disguised mortgages.
369. In re Smith, 966 F.2d 973, 976-77 (5th Cir. 1992).
370. Id. at 973.
371. Id. at 977.
372. Id. at 977-78.
373. Id. at 978; see supra note 366. If the original lender was not entitled to the estoppel
argument, arguably the lien was void at the time of assignment to the FDIC. If so, the court's
holding is incorrect.
374. E.g., Kirkwood v. Kirkwood, 80 Tex. 645, 16 S.W. 428, 429 (1891); Hedtke v.
Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 408, 411, 248 S.W. 21, 22-23 (1923). The Texas Family Code also
provides that the trial court in a divorce proceeding has the right to order a "just and right"
division of a divorcing couple's estate, including the right to order the sale of the homestead
and a partition of the proceeds. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1993).
375. E.g., Hedtke, 248 S.W. at 23; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63.
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Co.,376 the Texas Supreme Court had not squarely addressed the issue of
whether "one ex-spouse who, pursuant to a consent decree of divorce, holds
a future interest in property subject to the homestead right of the other ex-
spouse, can mortgage that [future] interest. ' 377 In Laster, a husband and
wife were divorced and agreed to a decree that awarded the wife a 73.83%
interest in the family residence, the husband a 26.17% interest and the wife
and children the right to use and occupy the residence for an agreed upon
period of time.378 Several years after the divorce, the husband mortgaged
his future interest in the residence to secure the payment of a promissory
note. The husband subsequently defaulted on the note, the mortgagee fore-
closed its deed of trust and then sold the husband's interest in the residence
to a third party. When the wife's and childrens' right to use and occupy the
residence expired, the holder of the husband's interest filed a suit to partition
the residence and the wife answered, claiming that the mortgage was void
because the residence was her homestead at the time the husband executed
the deed of trust and at the time the suit was filed. The trial court denied the
purchaser's writ of partition and held that the purchaser's interest in the
residence was subject to the wife's ongoing homestead right, thereby protect-
ing the wife's continuing homestead right from forced foreclosure. 379 The
court of appeals reversed and the wife appealed to the Texas Supreme Court
to protect her homestead by declaring the mortgage void because it created a
lien against the homestead to secure general indebtedness.380 Although the
wife found some support from a minority of the court,38' a strong majority
concluded that the husband's mortgage was not a lien against a homestead
and therefore was not void under Texas homestead laws. 38 2 The court con-
cluded that through the division of property provisions in the divorce de-
cree, the husband and wife became joint owners of the residence, 383 with the
376. 826 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1991).
377. Id. at 127.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 128.
380. Id. The supreme court noted that the trial court, in its findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, stated that the purchaser of the husband's interest did so subject to the wife's
right of occupancy. Id. Although the court did not indicate the significance of this portion of
the trial court's findings and conclusions, it appears that the court was noting some contradic-
tion between the trial court's conclusion that the purchaser's interest in the residence was
subordinate to the wife's ongoing homestead right.
381. Justices Gammage and Mauzy wrote a dissenting opinion, chiding the majority for (i)
"trouncing the family homestead rights" granted to the wife, (ii) relying on lower court cases
that had not been reviewed by the supreme court and in any event that did not support the
majority's opinion, and (iii) aiding a creditor even though it had ample notice of the wife's
homestead rights. Id. at 134, 136. Notwithstanding the dissenters' chastising comments, the
dissenting opinion was not nearly as persuasive or logical as the majority opinion.
382. Id. at 130.
383. Id. at 129. The court of appeals had concluded that, through the divorce decree, the
husband and wife had become cotenants of the residence. First Huntsville Prop. Co. v. Laster,
797 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ granted). The supreme
court disagreed with this portion of the court of appeals opinion, concluding that the husband
and wife could not have become cotenants since the wife enjoyed possession of the residence to
the exclusion of the husband. Laster, 826 S.W.2d at 129 (relying on Reed v. Turner, 489
S.W.2d 373, 381 (Tex Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.); LeBus v. LeBus, 269 S.W.2d
506, 510 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e)).
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wife's homestead interest in the residence being akin to a life estate and the
husband's interest being akin to a future interest held by a remainderman in
the fee simple estate.384 The court further concluded that Texas law permits
the holder of a future interest in property to mortgage that interest free of
homestead constraints, unless the interest is impressed with the homestead
character. Such an interest may be impressed with the homestead character
only if the holder has the present right to possess the property. 385 From
these principles, the court concluded that because the husband held no pres-
ent right to possess the residence, the husband's future interest was not im-
pressed with the homestead character, thereby entitling the husband to
mortgage his future interest in the residence free of homestead
constraints. 386
The court next considered whether the wife's homestead interest invali-
dated the mortgage executed by the husband. According to the court, Texas
law generally provides that a party's homestead rights with respect to prop-
erty will not protect a non-possessory future interest in that property held by
another party. 387 Accordingly, the court concluded that the homestead
rights exclusively retained by the wife could not invalidate the mortgage cre-
ated by the husband against his future estate in the residence. 388
The court then turned to the question of whether the wife's remaining
homestead rights in the property prevented the forced sale and partition of
the residence sought by the purchaser of the husband's interest. The court
noted that long established Texas case law permits a court to order a just
and right division of a divorcing couple's estate, which includes the ability to
order the sale of the homestead and to partition the resulting proceeds. 389
Although this judicial right was not exercised at the time of the decree, the
court concluded that under the decree the husband and wife merely post-
poned the partition of the homestead for an agreed-upon period of time.390
The court held that with the expiration of the agreed-upon period of the
wife's occupancy, the residence became subject to an order of forced sale and
partition of proceeds just as if that order had been issued at the time of the
divorce. 391 The court concluded that prohibiting the partition and sale of
384. Laster, 826 S.W.2d at 129.
385. Id. at 130. The court also observed that if a remainderman holds a present right to
possession of the property sufficient to establish a homestead interest and continues so to oc-
cupy the property, the homestead character will be impressed upon the property when the
remainderman receives fee simple title and the homestead character will relate back to the date
the remainderman began occupying the property as a homestead. Id. 130 at n.2 (citing W.R.
Thompson & Sons Lumber Co. v. Clifton, 132 Tex. 366, 124 S.W.2d 106, 107 (1939)).
386. Id.
387. Id. (relying on Johnson v. Prosper State Bank, 125 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1939), aff'd, 134 Tex. 677, 138 S.W.2d 1117 (1940)).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 131; see cases cited supra notes 374 and 375.
390. Laster, 826 S.W.2d at 131. Although the court does not provide specific reference to
evidence of the husband's and wife's agreement, the facts reflect that the divorce decree pro-
vided that upon termination of the agreed upon period of the wife's occupancy, the husband's
and wife's interests in the residence would be determined in accordance with their interests set
forth in the decree.
391. Id. at 132.
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the residence merely because the partition would take place after the expira-
tion of the agreed upon occupancy period as opposed to the time of the
divorce would be manifestly unjust to the husband's rights in the resi-
dence. 392 Moreover, the court concluded that its decision to permit the par-
tition and sale of the residence would not in any way divest the wife of her
homestead rights because those rights would carry over to the partition pro-
ceeds, thereby according the partition proceeds the same protections against
forced sale as would be accorded the proceeds of any other type of sale of her
homestead interest. 39 3
The Texas constitution generally protects the homestead of a family or
single adult from forced sale for the payment of debts, except to satisfy liens
securing purchase money, certain tax debts or properly documented and cre-
ated home improvement debts. 394 This constitutional right is aggressively
guarded by the courts, even in the muddled arena of division of property in
divorce proceedings. For example, in Heggen v. Pemelton,395 the Texas
Supreme Court addressed a trial court's ability to impose an equitable lien in
favor of one divorcing party against the separate property homestead of the
other divorcing party. In Heggen, the husband was granted a divorce, the
wife was awarded her separate property homestead and the husband was
awarded $150,000 for his interest in the homestead and the right to reim-
bursement for his share of any community funds used to improve the home-
stead.396 In addition, the trial court imposed an equitable lien on the
homestead in favor of the husband in order to ensure its just and right divi-
sion of the marital estate. 397 The wife appealed, seeking to remove the equi-
table lien on the grounds that it was an invalid lien against the homestead
under the Texas constitution. The appeals court upheld the trial court and
the wife appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. 398
The supreme court had little difficulty reversing both the trial court and
the appeals court.399 Recognizing the general prohibition against forced sale
of a homestead to satisfy debts other than liens for purchase money, certain
taxes and properly documented home improvements, the court concluded
that the validity of the equitable lien depended on whether the lien fit into
392. Id. at 131.
393. Id. at 132. Presumably the court was referring to the protection afforded by TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993), which generally provides that the pro-
ceeds from the sale of a homestead are protected from seizure by creditors for a period of six
months. See infra notes 413-418.
394. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
395. 836 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1992).
396. Id. at 146.
397. Id. Regarding a court's broad discretionary right to make a just and right division of
marital property in a divorce proceeding, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1993)
and supra note 374.
398. Heggen, 836 S.W.2d at 145-46.
399. In addition to denying the lien on homestead grounds, the court also concluded that
the lien was improper because a trial court may not impose a lien on a divorcing party's
separate real property merely to ensure a "just and right division" of the marital estate. Id. at
148 (relying on, e.g., Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620, 627 (1935); Eggemeyer v.
Eggemeyer, 623 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.)).
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one of the permitted categories. 4° ° Based on the record, however, the court
was unable to determine whether the equitable lien fit into any of the permit-
ted lien categories, and therefore remanded the case to the trial court to
further develop the facts and make that determination.
Justices Cornyn and Cook concurred in the judgment, but not the opin-
ion. Relying on Laster v. First Huntsville Properties Co. 40 1 and other cases,
the concurring justices opined that the homestead right of a divorcing party
should yield to a trial court's power to partition community property in a
divorce proceeding. 40 2 Moreover, the concurring justices felt that the major-
ity opinion was problematic in that it failed to consider the effect of a divorce
on a homestead, resulting in an unnecessarily overbroad opinion.4 0 3 The
authors also see some logical inconsistency between Laster and Heggen. For
example, is it logical that a divorcing party be exposed to a different risk
merely because the court awards a divorcing party dollars from the other
divorcing party for his/her interest in the community homestead as opposed
to ordering a sale of the homestead and a partition of the proceeds? The
authors think not, yet the risk is clearly different since the proceeds resulting
from a sale are readily obtainable while recovery of a judgment against a
divorcing party who fails to pay its monetary obligations is far more
problematic.
During the Survey period several cases concerning the business homestead
arose, and one case is particularly worthy of discussion. In In re Webb, g40
the Fifth Circuit reviewed a district court's decision to overturn a bank-
ruptcy court determination that a non-contiguous lot used in the operation
of the debtor's business was not part of the debtor's business homestead be-
cause the non-contiguous lot was not "essential to and necessary for" the
debtor's business.4 0 5 The not "essential to and necessary for" standard
arises out of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Ford v. Aetna Insurance
Co. ,406 where the court held that the business homestead exemption could
extend to two non-contiguous lots if those lots are used for the operation of
400. Id. Interestingly, the court's opinion does not discuss or cite Magill v. Magill, 816
S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied), where the court permitted a
lien to be placed against a divorcing party's separate property homestead in order to secure the
other divorcing party's right of reimbursement for the value and nature of improvements that
enhanced the value of the home, even though there was evidence that the improvements were
made by the divorcing parties through their own efforts as opposed to being performed pursu-
ant to a written contract signed by both the husband and wife and otherwise complying with
the constitutional requirements. Presumably, Magill would not pass muster under Heggen,
which specifically states that an equitable lien may be imposed on a homestead in favor of a
divorcing party to secure only a reimbursement claim that satisfies the constitutional strictures
pertaining to homesteads, including the requirement that any lien for work and materials relat-
ing to home improvements must be contracted for in writing, with the consent of both spouses.
Heggen, 836 S.W.2d at 148. See also Falor v. Falor, 840 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1992, no writ).
401. 826 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1991).
402. Heggen, 836 S.W.2d at 149-50.
403. Id. at 150-51.
404. 954 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1992).
405. Id. at 1104.
406. 424 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. 1968).
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the business of a head of a family and both lots are necessary to and essential
for such business, as opposed to merely being used as an aid to the busi-
ness.4 0 7 The Webb court applied the standard announced in Ford and con-
cluded that the bankruptcy court's determination was correct.4 0 8 In so
holding, the Webb court approvingly cited one commentator's conclusion
that the Ford standard should not require a showing that the business would
perish without the non-contiguous lot.4°9 Rather, the test focuses on two
elements: purpose and space. 41 0 Accordingly, "purpose" should be satisfied
"if the activity conducted on the lot is required to carry out the purpose of
the business", and "space" should be satisfied unless the activity "could as
well be conducted on one lot as two."'4 11
The commentator's conclusions are, with one exception, consistent with
Ford. A close reading of Ford reflects that the court focused on whether the
activity on the non-contiguous lot in question was necessary to the operation
of the business and whether both lots were actually used in the operation of
the business.4 12 While space needs may be one relevant fact as to whether
the lot at issue is necessary, the issue of space should not be considered a
separate prong of the Ford test. In addition, it appears that the issue of
space should not be static in nature. Consider, for example, a situation
where an owner uses, and due to lack of available storage space needs, a non-
contiguous lot to store his business inventory, but due to temporary declin-
ing business conditions, the inventory on that lot could, until an upswing in
business conditions occurs, be stored on the primary business homestead lot.
Under these circumstances and analysis, Ford does not require a conclusion
that the owner should be denied the right to claim the non-contiguous lot as
part of its business homestead merely because of the temporary interruption
in the space requirements of an essential element of the owner's business.
Section 41.001(c) of the Texas Property Code4 13 generally provides that
proceeds from the sale of a homestead are not subject to seizure for a credi-
tor' claim for the six month period following the date of sale. During the
Survey period, several homestead owners attempted to argue that Section
41.001(c) provided a separate and distinct exemption for the proceeds from
the sale of a homestead. In In re Evans,41 4 the homestead owner sold his
rural homestead and reinvested a portion of those proceeds in a new urban
homestead. Following the purchase of the urban homestead and within six
months after the sale of the rural homestead, the owner filed for bankruptcy
407. Id. at 616.
408. Webb, 954 F.2d at 1108.
409. Id.
410. Id. (quoting Recent Decisions, Business Homestead-Non-Contiguous Lots, 22 SW.
L.J. 694, 695-96 (1968)).
411. Id.
412. See Ford, 424 S.W.2d at 614 ("[the business owner] testified that both lots were neces-
sary ... for use in the exercise of his ... business, and that both were actually used in such
business"); Id. at 616 ("since the [business owner] adduced evidence ... to support [his] con-
tention that both lots were actually and necessarily used as a place for the operation of the...
business, no abuse of discretion by the trial court was shown").
413. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
414. 135 B.R. 261 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991).
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protection and claimed that Section 41.001(c) protected from the claims of
creditors the portion of the proceeds from the sale of the rural homestead
that was not used to purchase the urban homestead. The court concluded
that the purpose of Section 41.001(c) was to allow a homestead claimant six
months within which to purchase a new homestead 41 5 and that the proceeds
had the homestead character of the rural homestead which was abandoned
upon the sale thereof.41 6 The court further concluded that because under
Texas law there can be but one homestead, 4 17 the acquisition of the urban
homestead constituted an abandonment of all right in the remaining pro-
ceeds from the sale of the rural homestead.41 8
In a similar case, In re England,41 9 the homestead owners sold their resi-
dential homestead for cash and a sizable note, moved to another property
owned by them and then designated that property as their new homestead.
Within six months after the sale of the residential homestead, the debtors
filed for bankruptcy protection and sought to protect the note received in
connection with the sale under the provisions of Section 41.001(c). Re-
jecting the owner's argument, the court held that, following the designation
of the new homestead, Section 41.001(c) no longer protected the note re-
ceived as part of the proceeds from the sale of the residential homestead. 420
Concluding that the purpose of Section 41.001(c) was to provide a home-
stead owner a reasonable period of time to acquire a new homestead with the
proceeds from the sale of a prior homestead, the court held that the six-
month protection period could not be claimed by a party who, at the same
time, claimed homestead rights in another property pursuant to Section
41.002.421
Texas law places the burden on the homestead claimant to establish the
415. Although the court provided no authority for its conclusion, at least one Texas case
substantiates the court's conclusion. Taylor v. Mosty Bros. Nursery, Inc., 777 S.W.2d 568(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ) ("The six-month provision was enacted in order that
the proceeds might be reinvested in another homestead."). However, it should be noted that
the Taylor case relied on Ingram v. Summers, 29 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1930,
writ dism'd), which when addressing a predecessor statute to § 41.001(c), stated that "[tlhe
Legislature evidently realized that conditions might and probably would arise when . . . the
homestead should be sold, and if the proceeds of such a sale was [sic] in no way protected, then
the beneficent provisions of our Constitution would be ... lost." This statement obviously
does not go as far as the statement made by the Taylor court.
416. Evans, 135 B.R. at 264. The court's conclusion is consistent with the Texas Supreme
Court's holding in Laster v. First Huntsville Properties Co., 826 S.W.2d 125, 132 (Tex. 1991),
that upon the sale of the homestead, the owner's homestead rights carry over to the proceeds
of the sale.
417. Evans, 135 B.R. at 264 (citing e.g., Silvers v. Welch, 127 Tex. 58, 91 S.W.2d 686(1936); Rockett v. Williams, 78 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935, writ dism'd
w.o.j.)).
418. Id. at 263. The court concluded that to hold otherwise would "not only ... further
the generous provisions of the Texas homestead laws but also ... [would] create windfalls for
debtors who reinvest sale proceeds into homesteads of lesser value." Id.
419. 141 B.R. 495 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
420. Id. at 498-99.
421. Id. at 498. The court actually concluded that an exemption could not be claimed, at
the same time, under both subsections (a) and (c) of § 41.001 of the Texas Property Code. The
author's believe that the reference to § 41.001(a) was in error and that the court actually meant
to refer to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993), which is the section
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homestead character of the property,422 which generally requires a combina-
tion of overt acts of homestead use and intent on the part of the owner to
claim the property as a homestead.423 However, investigation of intention is
not necessary and the requisite intent will be presumed when the homestead
claimant displays that the property is actually put to homestead use. 424 The
Fifth Circuit, in In re Bradley,425 applied each of these principles to uphold
the debtor's claim for homestead property. In Bradley, the homestead
claimants acquired property from a partnership of which they were partners.
During the period that the partnership owned the property, the homestead
claimants occupied 15 acres of the 129 acres for homestead purposes and the
remainder of the acreage was to be developed in accordance with the part-
nership agreement. None of the acreage was developed and immediately fol-
lowing the homestead claimants' acquisition of the entire property, the
homestead claimants began and continued to use the entire property as their
home and ranch. Thereafter, the homestead claimants borrowed a substan-
tial sum of money and granted a deed of trust lien against approximately 124
acres of the property to secure repayment of the loan. Several years later the
homestead claimants filed for bankruptcy protection and claimed that the
lien against the 124 acres was invalid as that property constituted a part of
their rural homestead. The bankruptcy court rejected the claim for home-
stead, reasoning that the 114 acre portion of the property was vacant and
that the claimants had executed a disclaimer in which they represented to
the lender that the 114 acres were not part of their rural homestead. 426
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court, holding that,
notwithstanding the existence of the homestead disclaimer, the claimants'
evidence of occupancy of the residence and farming and ranching of the re-
mainder of the property was sufficient to establish as a matter of law the
homestead character of the entire property.427 As to the bankruptcy court's
under which the owners claimed the homestead exemption as to the property to which they
relocated. See England, 141 B.R. at 496.
422. Eg, Lifemark Corp. v. Merritt, 655 S.W.2d 310, 314 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e).
423. Gregory v. Sunbelt Say. F.S.B. 835 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ
denied) (citing Burk Royalty Co. v. Riley, 475 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. 1972); Sims v. Beeson,
545 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
424. See Youngblood v. Youngblood, 124 Tex. 184, 76 S.W.2d 759, 761 (1934); Lifemark
Corp. v. Merritt, 655 S.W.2d 310, 315 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ refd
n.r.e.). But see infra note 428, which discusses a limited situation in which the question of
intent should not be presumed, notwithstanding the owner's established usage of the property
for homestead purposes.
425. 960 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1992).
426. Id. at 508.
427. Id. The court observed that Texas courts have routinely held that farming and ranch-
ing purposes, coupled with occupancy of the property, is sufficient to establish the rural home-
stead character of the property. Id. (citing Fajkus v. First Nat'l Bank, 735 S.W.2d 882, 884
(Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied); Clark v. Salinas, 626 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1981, writ refd n.r.e.)). In a subsequent decision, In re Kennard, 970 F.2d
1455, 1458-59 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit reached a similar result, concluding that an
improper designation of homestead knowingly made by the owner did not estop the owner
from claiming that another tract of land was the owner's actual homestead where, at the time
of the improper designation, the house on the land originally designated by the owner as his
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supporting reasoning that the property was vacant and the existence of the
non-homestead affidavit, the court concluded that these matters were irrele-
vant because they addressed the issue of intent, which became presumed
upon the claimant's showing of the homestead character of the property.428
The issue of whether a claimed homestead is rural or urban can be signifi-
cant in some cases, since a family's rural homestead may be up to 200 acres
of land,429 while an urban homestead is limited to one acre of land. 430 For
example, in Bradley, the 129 acres of home and ranch land that the owners
sought to protect as their rural homestead was located within the city limits
of Southlake, Texas, but was not served by water or any other municipal
utility at the time that the owners began using the property as a homestead.
The lienholder claimed that because the property was located within the lim-
its of a city, the owners should be permitted to claim only an urban home-
stead. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, 431 relying on Section 41.002(c) of the
Texas Property Code,432 which generally provides that a homestead is to be
considered rural if the homestead is not served by municipal utilities and fire
and police protection at the time the homestead designation is made.433
Based on the facts in the record, the court concluded that the claimed rural
homestead satisfied the requirements of Section 41.002(c). 4 34
An interesting feature of Bradley appears in footnote 18 of the opinion,
where the court recognized that at least one commentator has suggested that
Section 41.002(c) may be unconstitutional because the homestead exemption
under the Texas constitution provides that a rural homestead is one not lo-
cated in a city, town or village,435 and Section 41.002(c) contains no such
homestead was neither owned nor occupied by the owner and the owner actually and openly
occupied the non-designated tract as his homestead.
428. Bradley, 960 F.2d at 508. See also, Kennard, 970 F.2d 1455 ("investigation of inten-
tion need not be made when the land is actually put to homestead uses") (quoting Lifemark
Corp. v. Merritt, 655 S.W.2d 310, 314 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd
n.r.e)). The Bradley court noted that under certain circumstances evidence of objective intent
may be required notwithstanding the owner's showing of homestead usage. 960 F.2d at 508.
The court provided several examples. First, if an owner owns several two hundred acre tracts
of land and uses them all for homestead purposes, the owner would be required to produce
evidence of which two hundred tract of land the owner intended to be a homestead. Second, if
a claimant owned a tract of land in excess of two hundred acres and used the entire tract for
homestead purposes, the claimant would be required to produce evidence of which two hun-
dred acres within the tract that the owner intended to be a homestead. Id. at n.9.
429. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(b) (Vernon Supp.
1993).
430. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(a) (Vernon Supp.
1993).
431. 960 F.2d at 51L.
432. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
433. The Fifth Circuit notes that § 41.002(c) may not displace (and the authors believe that
§ 41.002(c) should not displace) the traditional common law approach as to the nature and
characteristics of a rural homestead. Bradley, 960 F.2d at 511, 512 n. 18. TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993) provides that "[a] homestead is to be considered rural,
if..." it meets the requirements of that section, but in no way indicates that a homestead will
be considered a homestead only if it meets the requirements of that section. See the discussion
concerning the common law character of a rural homestead in In re Mitchell, 132 B.R. 553,
557 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
434. Bradley, 960 F.2d at 511-12.
435. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (emphasis added).
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requirement. 436 The commentator argues that Section 41.002(c) constitutes
a definition of rural homestead contrary to that provided in the Texas consti-
tution, thereby resulting in a possible abuse of authority by the Texas legisla-
ture. 437  The court quickly dismissed the commentator's concern,438
observing that the terms city, town and village are not defined in the Texas
Constitution and in such a case the legislature is permitted to provide a defi-
nition that constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the constitutional lan-
guage and does not do violence to the plain meaning and intent of the
constitution. 439 In the Fifth Circuit's opinion, Section 41.002(c) is a reason-
able interpretation of the constitution and does not do violence to the plain
meaning and intent of the constitution and accordingly is a proper exercise
of authority by the legislature.440
The homestead exemption provided under the Texas constitution runs in
favor of a family and a single adult person." 1 The constitution does not,
however, provide a definition for family. In applying the homestead exemp-
tion, Texas courts hold that the family relation is one of status and that
status will be attained if the head of the family is legally or morally obligated
to support at least one other family member and such other family member
must depend on this support." 2 Moreover, Texas courts have expressly rec-
ognized that a family may exist even if the head of household is an unmar-
ried person." 3 The single adult person (other than an unmarried head of
436. Bradley, 960 F.2d 511 n. 18 (citing McSwain, The Texas Business Homestead in 1990,
42 BAYLOR L. REV. 657, 661 (1990)). At least one court has recognized this concern and
accordingly treats § 41.002(c) as a rebuttable presumption. In re Mitchell, 132 B.R. 553, 568
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
437. McSwain, supra note 436, at 661.
438. Bradley, 960 F.2d at 511.
439. Id. at 511, n.18 (citing Swearingen v. City of Texarkana, 596 S.W.2d 157, 160 n.l
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Swearingen relied on San Antonio Con-
servation Society, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 455 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1970), but this case
provides no inferential support for the cited principle since it does not involve any issue of
constitutionality.
440. Bradley, 960 F.2d at 511. The authors agree with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that
§ 41.002(c) is constitutional. As stated by the Fifth Circuit, the constitution does not define a
city, town or village, thereby leaving the courts in a position of having to provide an interpreta-
tion of the intent of the constitutional provision. Id. at 512. Texas cases have held that where
a rural homestead is brought within a city's boundaries through an extension of the city's
corporate lines, the mere fact that the rural homestead is within the city's boundaries will not
cause the homestead to lose its rural character. Laucheimer v. Saunders, 97 Tex. 137, 76 S.W.
750 (1903); Wilder v. McConnell, 91 Tex. 600, 45 S.W. 145 (1898). In addition, several courts
have expressly recognized that a rural homestead may be located within the corporate limits of
a city, town or village and that an urban homestead may located outside the corporate limits of
a city, town or village. Jones v. First Nat'l Bank of McAllen, 259 S.W. 157 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1924, opinion adopted); Commerce Farm Credit Co. v. Sales, 288 S.W. 802 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1926, holding approved); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Ford, 417 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 424 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. 1968); In re Moody, 77
B.R. 580, 592 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987). The addition of § 41.002(c) appears in keeping with
the foregoing judicial determinations concerning the character of rural homesteads.
441. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
442. E.g., Roco v. Green, 50 Tex. 483 (1878); Henry S. Miller Co. v. Shoaf, 434 S.W.2d
243, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
443. E.g., Renaldo v. Bank of San Antonio, 630 S.W.2d 638, 689-40 (Tex. 1982); Woods v.
Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 19 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1929).
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household) was not entitled to a homestead exemption until 1973, when both
the Texas constitution and the Texas Property Code were amended to pro-
vide the homestead exemption to single adults. Section 41.002(b) of the
Texas Property Code, which implemented the homestead protection for sin-
gle adult persons, limits a single adult person's rural homestead to 100 acres,
unless that person is not otherwise entitled to a homestead exemption. 4 " In
In re Hill,4 4 5 the creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding argued that the addi-
tion of the single adult person as a proper homestead claimant changed the
definition of family recognized by the courts to exclude a family unit in
which the head of household was an unmarried person. On this basis, the
creditor argued that Section 41.002(b) limited the rural homestead that
could be claimed by the debtor, an unmarried head of household, to 100
acres. The bankruptcy court disagreed, the district court affirmed and the
creditor appealed to the Fifth Circuit.446 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the
bankruptcy court and district court, holding that Section 41.002(b) in no
way changed the judicial definition of family that had been consistently ap-
plied for many years by the Texas courts.44 7 According to the court, the
plain language of Section 41.002(b), which applies the 100 acre limitation to
"a single adult person, not otherwise entitled to a homestead,4 48 is clear evi-
dence of the legislature's intent to preserve the judicial definition of
family. 449
VI. LANDLORD AND TENANT
Several landlord-tenant cases decided during the Survey period serve as
thoughtful reminders that a lease instrument, unless ambiguous, will be in-
terpreted in accordance with the intention of the parties as expressed within
the four corners of the lease.450 Some other cases also serve as a reminder of
the need to draft contractual documents clearly, concisely and unambigu-
ously, failing which at least one party will likely be unhappy with the result.
For example, in Towers of Texas, Inc. v. J & J Systems,451 a ground lease
provided that the lessee would have the exclusive use of the mountain top
444. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
445. 972 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1992).
446. Id, at 118.
447. Id. at 120.
448. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993)).
449. Id.
450. E.g., Duracon v. Price, 817 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied)
(where lease obligated tenant and each assignee to pay for rents and ad valorem taxes, but also
provided that neither the tenant nor any assignee of the lessee's interest would have personal
liability under the lease, lease unambiguously relieved tenant and any assignee of tenant from
any personal liability for payment of rents and taxes); Wadsworth Properties v. ITT Employ-
ment and Training Systems, Inc., 816 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991,
writ denied) (where landlord believed that lease was intended to give tenant right to terminate
the lease if, during a specific period of time, a third-party funding commitment to tenant was
terminated, but lease [without reference to a period of time] expressly gave tenant right to
terminate the lease upon termination of the third-party funding commitment, court concluded
that lease unambiguously gave tenant right to terminate the lease if, at any time during the
term of the lease, the third-party funding commitment was terminated).
451. 834 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1992).
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space described in the lease in order to construct and operate a radio trans-
mission tower and prohibited the ground lessor from leasing any space on
top of the mountain for any purpose. The lease described the mountain top
space by geographical coordinates; however, the actual location of the geo-
graphical coordinates was a single point that was located on an inaccessible
area on the side of the mountain and that was not a feasible site for construc-
tion of a transmission tower. Apparently not understanding the specific
mountain area described in the lease and believing that it had the exclusive
right to construct and operate a transmission tower on the mountain top
area owned by the ground lessor, the ground lessee constructed a radio
tower on top of the mountain and not on the specific mountain space de-
scribed in the ground lease. Thereafter, the ground lessee assigned its inter-
est under the lease to a third party, who apparently failed to have the
geographical coordinates specifically located and accepted the assignment on
the belief that the ground lease granted the ground lessee the exclusive right
to construct and operate a transmission tower on the top of the mountain.
However, much to the surprise of the assignee, the ground lessor erected and
began to operate a transmission tower very near to the location of the as-
signee's transmission tower. Understandably chagrined (but perhaps being
somewhat embarrassed for failing to verify the location of the geographical
coordinates set forth in the ground lease), the assignee brought suit for dam-
ages and breach of lease and asserted that the ground lease gave the lessee
the exclusive right to use the mountain top to operate a transmission tower.
The trial court found the lease ambiguous but resolved the ambiguity in
favor of the assignee.452 The appellate court reversed, concluding that the
reference in the lease to space on top of the mountain violated the statute of
frauds, thereby leaving an unambiguous description of the leased space es-
tablished by the geographical coordinates. 45 3 On appeal, much to the satis-
faction of the assignee, the Texas Supreme Court summarily reversed the
appellate court, holding that the lease was ambiguous because the geographi-
cal coordinates described a single, inaccessible point on the side of the moun-
tain, while the purpose of the lease was to grant an accessible and
appropriately sized area on top of the mountain for the purpose of construct-
ing and operating a radio transmission tower. 454
Several cases were decided during the Survey period concerning a com-
mercial landlord's liability for personal injury occurring on the leased prem-
ises. 455 In Brownsville Navigation Dist. v. Izaguirre,456 the Texas Supreme
Court considered whether ground, which becomes soft and muddy due to
452. Id. at 2.
453. Id. One wonders if, following the appellate court's determination, the assignees be-
came somewhat concerned about whether they had ownership of their transmission tower
since, according to the appellate court, the tower was not located on land covered by the lease.
454. Id.
455. E.g., Hernandez v. Kasco Ventures, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1992, no writ) (a landlord who relinquishes control of the leased premises is not liable for
personal injuries to tenant's employees caused by defects in leased premises, unless the defect
arises out of landlord's failure to make repairs as required by the lease).
456. 829 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. 1992).
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rain, could constitute a dangerous condition for which a landlord could be
liable under Texas law. In Izaguirre, the support legs of a trailer that was to
be loaded were lowered on a wooden board because the ground had become
soft and muddy due to a rainfall. An employee of the lessee, a company that
operated a warehouse business on the leased property, was working inside
the trailer when the wooden board beneath the support legs broke, the trailer
fell to one side and the cargo shifted, crushing and killing the employee. The
employee's estate sued Brownsville Navigation District, the owner of the
property upon which the accident occurred, alleging that the owner was lia-
ble for the employee's death because the owner (but not the lessee) knew of a
dangerous natural condition on the leased premises, and failed to disclose
that condition to the lessee. The trial court found in favor of the employee,
the appeals court affirmed and the owner appealed to the Texas Supreme
Court.
4 5 7
The supreme court recognized the general rule that a lessor of land does
not have liability to his lessee or others for injury arising out of a dangerous
condition on the leased premises that existed at the time the lessee took pos-
session of the leased premises.4 58 However, the court of appeals upheld the
judgment against the owner based upon an exception to the general rule that
generally provides that if (i) a lessor of land knows of or has reason to know
of, and hides or fails to disclose to his lessee, any condition on the leased
premises that involves unreasonable risk of physical harm, (ii) the lessor has
reason to believe that the lessee would not realize or discover the condition
or risk posed by such condition, and (iii) the lessee does not know and does
not have reason to know of the condition or the risk, then the lessor is liable
to the lessee and his invitees and guests for any physical injury incurred by
them as a result of the condition.4 59
Applying these rules to the facts, the supreme court reversed the appeals
court, concluding that the ground, in its soft and muddy condition, was like
any other ordinary wet dirt and could not constitute a condition that in-
volves unreasonable risk of physical harm or a condition of which the lessee
would not have known.46°
457. Id. at 160.
458. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 356 (1965)).
459. Id. at 160-61 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358(1) (1965)). The ap-
peals court also concluded that the owner incurred liability as a result of failing to advise the
deceased or his employer of a prior, similar accident which occurred on the property. Accord-
ing to the supreme court, the court of appeals imposed liability based on the testimony of an
employee of the owner who stated that if he had known of the prior accident, he would have
disclosed same to the employer. Id. The owner's employee further testified that his testimony
was his personal opinion and not the policy of his employer. The supreme court concluded
that the owner's employee's testimony was merely a personal opinion that did not impose a
duty on the employer or a basis for imposing liability on the owner for failure to warn. Id.
460. Id. Justices Doggett, Mauzy and Gammage dissented, with Justice Doggett writing
the dissenting opinion. Id. at 161-63. The dissent ridiculed the majority for "dazzling" the
dissent with the court's agricultural knowledge, exhibited by the majority's conclusion that the
ground was "plain dirt" and just like any other "ordinary dirt" when it became wet. Id. at
162. This astute statement, according to the dissent, failed to recognize the many different
kinds of soils within the State of Texas and the varying characteristics of each kind of soil. Id.
at 163. The dissent also complained that the majority failed to properly apply RESTATEMENT
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The plaintiffs also asserted that the owner had liability under Sections 360
and 361 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS4 61 because the owner
had retained control over the leased property pursuant to provisions in the
lease.462 The court disagreed, concluding that no provision in the lease gave
the owner the right to control the lessee's operations conducted on the
property.46 3
Texas courts have followed the rule that a purchaser or assignee of a
lessee's entire interest under a lease becomes obligated under the lease for the
remaining term thereof, whether or not the assignee expressly assumes the
obligations of the tenant under the lease, even when the assignee thereafter
assigns its interest under the lease to a third party.464 In a concurring opin-
ion written over fifty years ago in Stark v. American National Bank,465 an
appeals court justice urged the Texas Supreme Court to re-examine the
Texas rule regarding the liability of an assignee of a leasehold estate and
consider adopting a "rule of decision promulgated in keeping with the great
weight of authority and which it is believed is more consistent with the prin-
ciples of justice. ' 466 The authors are not aware of any Texas Supreme Court
decision that re-examines the rule of law recognized in Stark. However, in
the Survey case Armstrong Forest Products v. Redempco, Inc. ,467 the Texar-
kana appeals court either nimbly avoided or elected to walk over the rule
recognized in Stark.
In Redempco, the owner of property entered into a ground lease with a
third party. The lessee then assigned the leasehold estate to another party.
In connection with the assignment, the original lessee sold certain personal
property and took back a promissory note secured by a deed of trust exe-
cuted by the assignee and covering the leasehold estate. The first assignee
OF TORTS § 358(1) (1965) by concentrating on the condition and not whether the deceased or
his employer were aware of the risk that was involved. Id. The dissenters' opinion begs the
question, since the inquiry under § 358(1) first requires the existence of a condition which
involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm and this was found by the majority not to have
existed.
461. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 360-61 (1965), which generally provide that a
landlord who leases part of his property and retains control over any other part that his lessee
is entitled to use or that is necessary to the safe use of the leased property is subject to liability
to his lessee and others upon the land with the consent of the lessee or sublessee for physical
harm caused by conditions upon the property under the landlord's control, if the landlord
could have discovered the condition by the exercise of reasonable care and could have made
the condition safe.
462. The plaintiff also argued that the owner retained control over the property because the
owner, a governmental authority, had the regulatory authority to enact ordinances governing
the property and its uses. The court agreed that it was possible for the owner to regulate the
lessee's operations, but concluded that the owner was immune from liability for its discretion-
ary exercise of its regulatory power under § 101.021 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies
Code. Izaguirre, 829 S.W.2d at 161.
463. Id.
464. E.g., Carter v. Stovall 291 S.W.2d 411,413 (Tex Civ. App.-Amarillo 1956, writ refd
n.r.e); Waggoner v. Edwards, 83 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935, writ ref d).
But see, Armstrong Forest Products v. Redempco, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1991, writ denied).
465. 100 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, writ ref'd).
466. Id. at 212-13.
467. 818 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied).
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then assigned the leasehold estate (and the personal property) to another
party, who took subject to the existing note and deed of trust and who also
executed a deed of trust covering the leasehold estate to secure payment of
the prior promissory note. The second assignee defaulted on the note, the
second deed of trust was foreclosed and the defendant purchased the lease-
hold estate at the foreclosure sale without expressly assuming the obligations
of the lessee under the lease. Subsequently, the defendant purchaser sold
and assigned the leasehold estate to a third party and in connection there-
with took back a note secured by a deed of trust lien against the leasehold
estate. Thereafter, the assignee defaulted and the defendant foreclosed
against the leasehold estate. Subsequently, the defendant again assigned the
leasehold estate to yet another party, and in connection therewith received a
note, secured by a deed of trust against the leasehold estate. 468 Several years
later, the lessor under the lease declared the lease to be in default, terminated
the lease on account of the default and then brought suit against the defend-
ant and others seeking payment of rentals which had accrued, but which
were not paid, after the defendant had sold the leasehold estate.
The trial court found that the defendant had not assumed any obligations
under the lease and that the defendant had not become an assignee of the
lease by purchase of the leasehold estate at the foreclosure sale.469 The les-
sor appealed, but without success. Without citing any precedential support
or the rule recognized in Stark, the appeals court upheld the judgment of the
trial court, stating that the defendant had not executed a document assum-
ing the obligations of the lessee under the lease and that certain answers
made by the lessor in requests for admissions were probative evidence sup-
porting the trial court's conclusion that the defendant had not assumed the
obligations of the lessee under the lease. 470 The lessor argued that under
Amco Trust, Inc. v. Naylor,471 the defendant, as a matter of law, was an
assignee under the lease and therefore liable for the payment of all rents
accruing from and after the date of assignment.4 72 In Naylor, the Texas
Supreme Court concluded that a mortgagee, who as a mortgagee in posses-
sion, took possession of property covered by a lease that had been assigned
to the mortgagee as additional collateral, did not become an assignee of the
lease and therefore was not liable to the lessor for rentals due thereunder.4 73
In so concluding, the court specifically noted that the mortgagee did not
possess the property by reason of the foreclosure of its lien or by acquiring
the entire leasehold interest in any other manner.4 74 The defendant argued
468. Several subsequent assignments occurred, but are not relevant to the issues of the case.
469. Redempco, 818 S.W.2d at 449.
470. Id. at 449-50. The facts show that the lessor had answered certain requests for admis-
sions to the effect that the lessor did not have a document in its possession pursuant to which
the defendant purchaser assumed the lease obligations, that the purchaser had not orally as-
sumed the lease and that the lessor had permitted the purchaser to possess the premises with-
out requiring the purchaser to execute an assumption agreement.
471. 159 Tex. 146, 317 S.W.2d 47 (1958).
472. Redempco, 818 S.W.2d at 450.




that by negative inference, the Texas Supreme Court had stated that if the
mortgagee had foreclosed its lien, the mortgagee would have become the
assignee of the lease and liable for the payment of rent thereunder. 475 With-
out agreeing or disagreeing with the defendant's argument, the appeals court
noted that the original deed of trust lien against the leasehold estate re-
mained outstanding and that the defendant therefore had not acquired the
entire interest of the leasehold estate.476 The authors have some difficulty
with the court's conclusion that the prior deed of trust constituted a reserva-
tion of a portion of the leasehold estate that destroys the ability to have an
assignment of the lease. If the court's conclusion is correct, logic dictates
that a holder of a leasehold estate who burdens that estate with a third party
lien is also barred from making an effective assignment of the leasehold es-
tate to a third party. This is not the law in Texas.
Several other landlord-tenant cases were decided during the Survey pe-
riod, none of which are significant, but some of which serve as helpful re-
minders. For example, the courts continue to hold that although clauses
that prohibit assignment of a lease are generally enforceable in Texas, those
clauses may not be enforceable in a bankruptcy proceeding, 477 that a waiver
between a landlord and tenant as to insured claims effectively destroys an
insurer's subrogation claim,478 that if a tenant holds over beyond the term of
its lease and such holdover is prohibited under the terms of the lease, the
landlord is entitled to the reasonable value of the use of the premises for the
holdover period,479 and that a lease contract must state its duration or pro-
vide a certain time for expiration, failing which any person occupying prem-
ises covered by the lease is merely a tenant at will.480
VII. CONVEYANCING
Several cases decided during the Survey period affirmed time honored
475. Redempco, 818 S.W.2d at 450.
476. Id.
477. E.g., In re Office Products of America, Inc., 140 B.R. 407, 409 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1992).
478. E.g., Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. First Tape, Inc., 817 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (general rule is that release between insured and offend-
ing party prior to loss destroys insurance company's rights to subrogation). In First Tape, the
original lessee had assigned its leasehold interest to a third party, but the original lessee, pursu-
ant to the terms of the lease, remained liable for the performance thereof. Following the as-
signment, the building was substantially damaged by fire and the insurance company sought to
collect from the original lessee, claiming that the current lessee under the lease, but not the
original lessee, could take advantage of the release of claims caused by casualty. The appeals
court disagreed, concluding that since the original lessee was still liable under the lease, the
original lessee should be entitled to the benefits as well. Id.
479. E.g., Winters v. Arm Refining Co., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991, writ denied) (citing Stewart v. Breese, 367 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1963, writ dism'd w.o.j.)).
480. E.g., Virani v. Syal, 836 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ de-
nied) (citing Holcombe v. Lorino, 124 Tex. 446, 79 S.W.2d 307, 310 (1935)). But cf, Atlas
Petroleum Corp. v. Galveston, H. & S.A. R. Co., 5 S.W.2d 215, 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1928, writ ref'd) (where the court held that if a lease is for a term not stated, the implied term
will be one year). Although Atlas Petroleum has not been expressly overruled, the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Holcombe should control.
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principles relating to deeds.48 ' For instance, Survey cases confirmed that in
Texas the recording of a deed is not essential to an effective conveyance, 48 2
for effective delivery of a deed, the deed must be placed in the control (but
not necessarily physical possession) of the grantee with the intent that the
deed become operative as a conveyance, 48 3 a forged deed will not convey
title, even to an innocent purchaser who obtains a deed for value and with-
out knowledge of the fraud,48 4 a correction deed relates back to the date of
the agreement that it purports to express more accurately, 48 5 and a deed, if
unambiguous, will be governed by the intent of the grantor and grantee as
evidenced within the four corners of the deed. 48 6
Although not a significant case, Buccaneer's Cove, Inc. v. Mainland
Bank,4 7 demonstrates several points: first, a correction deed is probably a
misnomer because it may create an ambiguity as opposed to correcting a
mistake, and secondly, the need for careful drafting on the part of the practi-
tioner. In Buccaneer's Point, a mortgagee foreclosed its deed of trust lien.
At the time of the foreclosure, the unpaid debt secured by the mortgage was
approximately $925,578. However, the substitute trustee's deed to the
lender reflected a bid price of approximately $1,133,409. When the bor-
rower discovered the bid price, the borrower filed suit seeking payment of
the difference between the consideration recited in the deed and the out-
standing debt. Understandably in a panic, the substitute trustee shortly
thereafter executed a correction deed reflecting a bid price of the unpaid
debt. Both parties filed a motion for summary judgment and much to the
relief of the substitute trustee, the trial court granted the lender's motion.48 8
481. Specific discussion of cases concerning mineral deeds and mineral reservations have
been omitted, as those cases are more appropriately addressed in the article entitled Oil, Gas
and Mineral Law in this Survey edition. For the reader's convenience, however, we note two
significant mineral deed interpretation cases that were decided by the Texas Supreme Court
during the Survey period. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991) (rejecting a prior rule
of interpretation announced in Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984), wherein the
court had held that where the granting clause conflicted with the future interest clause, the
granting clause controlled because it was a key expression of intent, while the future interest
clause was a mere redundancy of other provisions in the mineral deed); Jupiter Oil Co. v.
Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991).
482. Eg., Rogers v. Shelton, 832 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, writ denied)
(where a valid deed was delivered to grantee in 195 1, but recording was delayed until 1985, the
delay in recording did not affect effectiveness of conveyance).
483. E.g., Bellaire Kirkpatrick J.V. v. Loots, 826 S.W.2d 205, 213 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1992, writ denied) (where grantor delivered deed to grantee with the express intention of not
conveying the property, the deed was not an effective conveyance); Cecil v. Smith, 821 S.W.2d
375, 378 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, no writ) (where deed was never placed within the control of
the grantee, the deed was not delivered and therefore not an effective conveyance).
484. E.g., Bellaire Kirkpatrick, 826 S.W.2d at 210 (where party was conveyed property
pursuant to a forged deed, the deed did not convey effective title, even though the grantee paid
value for the property without knowledge of the forgery).
485. E.g., Buccaneer's Cove, Inc. v. Mainland Bank, 831 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
486. E.g., Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991); State v. Brazos River Harbor
Navigation Dist., 831 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied); White
v. White, 830 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
487. 831 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
488. Id. at 583.
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The substitute trustee's elation and relief were short lived, however, as the
appellate court reversed the trial court, concluding that the existence of the
original trustee's deed and the correction deed resulted in two deeds reflect-
ing contradictory evidence and a factual dispute, thereby making summary
judgment inappropriate. 48 9 The court accordingly remanded the matter to
the trial court for determination by the trier of fact.490
Although the Texas Property Code provides, and Texas law has long rec-
ognized, that liens and conveyances that are not acknowledged, sworn to or
proved and filed for record as required by Texas law will be void as to subse-
quent purchasers of the property for value and without notice of the preex-
isting conveyance or lien, several Survey cases show that section of the Texas
Property Code does not provide a safe haven for all subsequent purchasers
who purchase property for value and without notice of the preexisting lien or
conveyance. 491 For example, in Bellaire Kirkpatrick Joint Venture v.
Loots,4 9 2 the owners of a parcel of property engaged a representative to aid
them in selling the parcel. The representative in turn enlisted the services of
another party who was familiar with the Texas real estate market. At the
suggestion of this third party, the representative requested the owners to
convey the property to the representative for the purpose of facilitating a sale
to a third party and not with the intent of conveying the property to the
representative. The broker engaged by the representative promptly located a
purchaser, which must have caused the representative to be pleasantly
pleased with himself for making such an astute broker selection. Any plea-
sure realized by the representative quickly dissapated, however, because the
broker forged a deed in the name of the representative, conveyed the prop-
erty to a company controlled by the broker, caused that company to sell the
property to the prospective purchaser and absconded with the proceeds of
sale. In an attempt to preserve what it thought to be title to the property,
the purchaser brought a trespass to try title action. 493 The trial court ruled
that even though the plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser for value and with-
out knowledge of the owners' claim to title of the property, the purchaser
did not obtain title to the property because the deed from the representative
to the company controlled by the broker was a forgery.494
On appeal, the court agreed with the judgment of the trial court, but dis-
agreed with the trial court's determination that the plaintiff was a bona fide
489. Id. at 584.
490. Id.
491. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993). See Hawley v. Bullock, 29
Tex. 216 (1867); Watson v. Chalk, II Tex. 89 (1853).
492. 826 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
493. In a trespass to try title action where the defendant has possession of the property, the
plaintiff must show title superior to the defendant's through (i) adverse possession, (ii) title
originating from the sovereign and, through a chain of title, resting with the plaintiff, and (iii) a
superior title in himself emanating from the same source from which the defendant obtained
title. Land v. Turner, 377 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tex. 1964); Robbins v. Amoco Prod. Co., 952
F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1992).
494. Bellaire Kirkpatrick, 826 S.W.2d at 209. Under Texas law, a forged deed is void, ab




purchaser. The appellate court held that because a forged deed is void and
conveys no title, the plaintiff did not purchase the property and therefore
could not qualify as a bona fide purchaser. 495
In the second bona fide purchaser case, Park Central Bank of Dallas v.
JHJ Investments Co. of Little Elm,496 an individual purchased several par-
cels of property and shortly thereafter formed a partnership.4 97 The partner-
ship requested its attorney to prepare a deed to transfer the parcels to the
partnership. Apparently the deed was never prepared, but the partnership,
believing that it had been transferred the property, paid from funds main-
tained in a partnership bank account the mortgage, real estate taxes and
maintenance expenses incurred in connection with the ownership of the
property. In addition, each partner of the partnership was assessed their pro
rata share of the property expenses and, for federal tax purposes, reported its
ownership interest in and income generated by the partnership. Approxi-
mately ten years after the formation of the partnership, a lender obtained a
judgment against the individual who originally purchased the property, and
filed an abstract of judgment and notice of sheriffs sale. When the individ-
ual received the notice of sale, he checked the real property records and
found that the property had never been transferred to the partnership as
requested ten years earlier. To correct the supposed error, the individual
executed a deed in favor of the partnership and recorded the deed in the
appropriate real property records. Thereafter, the bank foreclosed its judg-
ment lien against the property and the partnership brought suit claiming
superior title to the property.4 98 The trial court found that the bank had no
right, title or interest in the property and ordered the bank to execute a deed
conveying the property to the partnership. 499
The bank appealed, claiming that it was a creditor entitled to protection
under the bona fide purchaser provisions set forth in Section 13.001 (a) of the
Texas Property Code,500 and that the partnership did not acquire equitable
title to the property. 50 1 The appellate court agreed that the bank was a cred-
itor under Section 13.001(a), but held that the bank was not entitled to rely
on the protection of Section 13.001(a) because the section applies only to an
495. Bellaire Kirkpatrick, 826 S.W.2d at 209.
496. 835 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ).
497. The facts do not indicate who the partners of the partnership were. Presumably the
individual was one of the partners since the partnership bore his individual initials.
498. There were several events that occurred prior to the bank's foreclosure, but none are
important to the outcome of the case.
499. JHJ Investments, 835 S.W.2d at 813.
500. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993), which provides:
A conveyance of real property or an interest in real property or a mortgage or
deed of trust is void as to a creditor or to a subsequent purchaser for a valuable
consideration without notice unless the instrument has been acknowledged,
sworn to, or proved and filed for record as required by law.
501. The bank also argued that it had no notice of the partnership's claim to ownership
before the bank's lien attached to the property. The court summarily dismissed this argument,
stating that the bank's knowledge (or lack thereof) of the partnership's claim was irrelevant to
the disposition of the case. JHJ Investments, 835 S.W.2d at 814.
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instrument that conveys an interest in writing.50 2 The court reasoned that
through its payments in respect of the property the partnership held equita-
ble title to the property as opposed to an interest conveyed by a writing. 50 3
Moreover, because of the bank's status as a judgment lien creditor, the court
did not view the result of the case as unfair, noting that if a judgment lien
creditor's lien fails to attach, he loses nothing because his judgment contin-
ues to exist without impairment. 5° 4 Several aspects of this case are worthy
of discussion. First, if the partnership had received a deed prior to the time
the judgment lien attached and had failed to file the deed of record, the
lender probably would have prevailed under Section 41.003(a). 50 5 Second,
the holding of this case, as well as cases upon which it relies, addresses
claims made by judgment lien creditors as opposed to the rights of an inno-
cent mortgagee or purchaser of land for value without notice of a claim of
equitable title being held by a party other than the mortgagor or grantor.
The rights of such a purchaser or mortgagee should prevail under the com-
mon law. 506
The doctrine surrounding strips and gores has been a fruitful source of
litigation in past years. During the Survey period, one strip and gore case,
State v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist.,507 was decided. In this case,
the State and a navigation district butted heads over which of them owned a
narrow strip of land adjacent to a patent granted by the State many years
502. Id. (citing Texas American Bank/Levelland v. Resendez, 706 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ)).
503. Id.
504. Id. at 815 (citing Resendez, 706 S.W.2d at 346). Certainly the lender may have had
different feelings about this observation, if the individual, without the property in which the
partnership held equitable title, had few assets with which to satisfy the judgment.
505. See TPEA No. 5 Credit Union v. Solis, 605 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980,
no writ) (judgment creditor prevailed over buyer who, at the time of payment of purchase
price, received a deed but failed to record same prior to attachment of the judgment creditor's
lien).
506. See, e.g., Johnson v. Darr, 114 Tex. 516, 272 S.W. 1098, 1101 (1925) (bona fide pur-
chasers for value are protected against equitable title by doctrine of estoppel, not registration
statutes); Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 157 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1941, writ ref'd) (rights of holder of equitable title to real property became inferior to rights of
an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value without notice by allowing naked legal title to
remain in another).
507. 831 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied). Brazos River also
involved the issue of whether a call in a deed constituted a meander line or a true boundary
line. If the call constitutes a meander line, the natural object or monument (i.e., a river or
stream) will control over specific calls and distances. Id. at 542 (citing Howland v. Hough, 570
S.W.2d 876, 882 (Tex. 1978)). Thus, the meander lines that follow the natural object are not
to be considered boundaries, but they are to follow the general course of the natural object,
which will constitute the real boundary. Id. (citing Stover v. Gilbert, 112 Tex. 429, 247 S.W.
841 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, opinion adopted)). A call in the deed at issue in Brazos River
provided in part "[iun the County of Brazoria on the Gulf Coast ... [b]eginning at a Cedar
post.., to a post marked 'GM' on the West side and 'B' on the East side about 30 ys. from
tide water." Id. at 544. The grantee argued that the reference to the Gulf Coast placed the
property on the shoreline of the Gulf of Mexico and that the call of 30 ys. from tide water was
therefore a meander line. The appellate court disagreed that the term "Gulf Coast" as gener-
ally used in Texas refers to a large geographical region of the State generally along or near the
Gulf of Mexico. Id. The court therefore concluded that it could not infer a border along the
shore or that the call parallel to the shore was a meander line. Id.
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before. The trial court found in favor of the navigation district and the State
appealed. On appeal, the navigation district argued that the strip of land, if
not specifically conveyed by the patent,508 constituted a strip and gore that
should be included in the grant of patent under the strip and gore doctrine.
Although the court recognized that the strip and gore doctrine presumes
that, absent an express reservation, a grantor does not intend to reserve a fee
in a strip of land adjoining land conveyed by him if the strip ceases to be of
use to him,5° 9 the court concluded that the strip and gore doctrine was not
applicable to the case before it because the strip of land adjoined other state-
owned beaches and submerged land.5 i0
VIII. EASEMENTS AND LATERAL SUPPORT
Easements may be created in a number of ways, including by specific in-
strument, prescription, implication, necessity, dedication, or statute. Cases
decided during the Survey period touch upon most every way to create an
easement and therefore constitute a good summary of the laws relating to
creation of easements.
In Johnson v. Dale,511 a property owner encumbered its property with an
oil and gas lease and in connection therewith granted the lessee the right to
use a road that crossed an adjoining property owner's land for the purpose of
accessing oil wells on the lessor's land. 51 2 The adjoining landowner objected
to the ongoing use of the road by the lessor and blocked access to the road.
Apparently, the lessee and at least one other party who was the owner of real
property in the vicinity of, but not adjacent to, the land upon which the road
was located filed a declaratory action seeking a determination that they had
an easement right to use the road.51 3 The easement claimants argued that
they were entitled to an easement over the road by reason of an easement
granted under a deed to the lessor's predecessor in title. They further argued
that they were entitled to an easement under alternate grounds of prescrip-
tion, implication and necessity. The trial court agreed with the easement
claimants in all respects and the owner of the land upon which the road was
508. See supra note 507, describing the navigation district's argument that the true bound-
ary line was the shoreline and therefore the strip of land was specifically included in the grant
of patent.
509. Brazos River, 831 S.W.2d at 544 (citing Strayhorn v, Jones, 157 Tex. 136, 300 S.W.2d
623 (1957)).
510. Brazos River, 831 S.W.2d at 544. Practioners interested in the Texas Open Beaches
Act, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1.012 (Vernon 1978) may want to refer to the decision in
Hirtz v. State of Texas, 773 F. Supp. 6 (S.D. Tex. 1991), vacated, 974 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1992).
The authors, however, find the case somewhat confusing and the holdings elusive.
511. 835 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no writ).
512. Thus, the oil & gas operator's right to use the road was dependent on the lessor's right
to use the road on the adjacent property. The lessor's purported right to use the road
originated from a deed executed in 1956 by the adjoining landowner's predecessor in title to
the lessor's predecessor in title.
513. The facts are not clear from the appellate court opinion, but are reasonably inferable
from the synopsis provided by the publisher. It is possible, however, that the owner against
whom the easement was claimed filed the declaratory action seeking a determination that the




The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment that the easement
claimants were entitled to an easement granted under a prior deed.515
Although the deed granted an easement, the specific location of the easement
was not the road or even located on the land upon which the road was lo-
cated. 5 16 The easement claimants argued that the description of the deed
was in error and could not possibly have been correct because the easement,
as described in the deed, could not be extended by a straight line over the
lessor's property to the highway to which the easement was to attach. The
court, however, determined that the easement description in the deed was
unambiguous and therefore the court could not consider extrinsic evidence
to contradict the description. 517 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial
court's determination that the deed granted the parties a right-of-way ease-
ment over the road located on the appellant's land.5 18
Although the appellant won the battle regarding easement by deed, he lost
the war. The appeals court concluded that the lessor had an easement by
prescription, implication and necessity and that the other landowner whose
land was not adjacent to the appellant's land had an easement by prescrip-
tion.519 As to easement by prescription, the court noted that under Texas
law, a person acquiring an easement by prescription must show open, notori-
ous, continuous, exclusive, and adverse use of the land for the easement pur-
pose for ten years.5 20 The court observed that although the evidence did not
establish the date that the lessor or other landowners began using the road,
the lessor and adjoining landowners each testified that they, their families
and others had continuously used the road for over fifty years.52 1 In addi-
tion, a forty-plus-year-old aerial photograph showed that the road was on
the ground, and a thirty-plus-year-old aerial photograph showed that the
road connected the lessor's property to a public highway by a county road.
The court concluded that these facts "raised a rebuttable presumption that
the use [of the road] was non-permissive, under a claim of right, and thus
adverse."15 22 Observing that the trial court impliedly concluded that the ap-
pellant had not rebutted the presumption, 52 3 the court upheld the trial
court's determination that the lessor and other landowner acquired an ease-
514. Johnson, 835 S.W.2d at 218.
515. Id.
516. The location of the easement described by the deed was actually on another adjoining
landowner's property who was not a party to this litigation.
517. Id. (citing Smith v. Sorelle, 126 Tex. 353, 87 S.W.2d 703, 705 (1935); Coffee v. Manly,
166 S.W.2d 377, 380-81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1942, writ ref'd)). Cf supra note 451, a
case in which a lease discussed a specific locatable point by geographical coordinates, but was
found to be ambiguous by the Texas Supreme Court because the location would frustrate the
purpose of the lease.
518. Johnson, 835 S.W.2d at 218.
519. Id. at 220.
520. Id. at 218 (citing Brooks v. Jones, 578 S.W.2d 669, 673 (Tex. 1979)).
521. Id.




ment to use the road by prescription. 524
As to the implied easement, the court stated that an implied easement will
exist if the use of the claimed easement is (i) apparent and exists at the time
of the severance of the dominant estate (in this case, the lessor's land) from
the servient estate (in this case, the land upon which the road was located),
(ii) continuous enough to show that the parties intended the easement to
pass to the dominant estate, and (iii) reasonably necessary to the comfortable
use of the dominant estate. 525 The court concluded that it was clear from
the evidence that the lessor's land was conveyed to his predecessors as part
of an overall tract, which included the land upon which the road was lo-
cated, and that at the time of that conveyance the road existed and was the
only practicable means of access to the lessor's and the other owner's
land.526 Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court's determination that
an implied easement existed in favor of the lessor.527
In Boland v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,528 a landowner had granted an
easement to a pipeline company to construct over her land an initial pipeline
and any additional pipelines along routes selected by the company. Pursu-
ant to the easement agreement, the pipeline company constructed an initial
pipeline and two subsequent pipelines in different locations on the easement
tract. The company wanted to construct a fourth pipeline in another loca-
tion on the easement tract, but the landowner refused to allow the company
to enter the land. The pipeline company sought and was granted injunctive
relief and the landowner counterclaimed, requesting injunctive relief and
damages. The trial court found that the easement granted a multiple line,
524. Id.
525. Id. (relying on Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 207 (Tex. 1962)).
The court's requirement that the easement be reasonably necessary for the comfortable use of
the dominant estate is contrary to Drye and the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Mitchell v.
Castellaw, 151 Tex. 56, 246 S.W.2d 163, 168 (1952), wherein the court adopted a strict neces-
sity standard as to implied easements. The Mitchell court noted, however, that even the strict
necessity standard is not "hopelessly inelastic for sensible application to varying sets of facts."
Id.
526. Johnson, 835 S.W.2d at 219. As to the necessity issue, the court did not disregard the
fact that there was an alternative route over which the lessor and other landowners could
access their respective properties from a public road. Id. However, the court also noted that
the other route of access did not exist at the time the dominant estate was severed from the
servient estate and there was no evidence of alternative means of access at that time. Id. The
court also noted that the alternative means of access was not used under a claim of fight and
depended on the permission of the owners of the property over which the alternative route was
located. Id. Given these facts, the Johnson court's determination of necessity was probably
correct, even under the proper standard of strict necessity adopted by the Texas Supreme
Court in Mitchell, 151 Tex. 56, 246 S.W.2d 163, 168 (1952).
527. Johnson, 835 S.W.2d at 219. On the basis of its findings regarding necessity, supra
note 526, and relying on Koonce v. Brite Estate, 663 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex. 1984), the Johnson
court also concluded that the lessor was entitled to an easement by necessity. Johnson, 835
S.W.2d at 220. The court specifically found that the other landowner was not entitled to an
implied easement because there was no evidence that his land was ever in unity of title with the
land upon which the road was located. Id. (relying on Estate of Waggoner v. Gleghorn, 378
S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1964); Ulbricht v. Friedsam, 159 Tex. 607, 325 S.W.2d 669, 676 (1959)).
The court did not specifically state whether the other owner was entitled to an easement by
necessity, but its disposition of the case seems to indicate that it concluded that the other
landowner was not so entitled. See id. at 220.
528. 816 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
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perpetual right-of-way easement in favor of the grantee and the landowner
appealed. 529 On appeal, the landowner cited Houston Pipe Line Co. v.
Dwyer,530 for the proposition that the location where the company could lay
additional lines became fixed and certain at the time the initial line was in-
stalled.53 1 The Fort Worth court of appeals disagreed, distinguishing Dwyer
on the basis that the easement grant at issue in Dwyer was limited to one
pipeline, while the easement before the court permitted multiple pipelines
over routes selected by the company.532 Concluding that the contract was
unambiguous, the court determined that as a matter of law the clear inten-
tion of the parties as expressed by the contract permitted the construction of
multiple pipelines over the areas on the easement tract designated by the
company. 53 3 This case should serve as a reminder to practitioners to explain
to their clients the ramifications of granting blanket easements with no ex-
press limitations on usage.
At times an express unambiguous easement granted by a written instru-
ment may grant more rights than apparent on its face. For example, in
Grimes v. Corpus Christi Transmission Co. 534 the landowner granted to the
State of Texas an easement for the purposes of "opening, constructing, and
maintaining a permanent road."' 535 The defendant, a natural gas transmis-
sion company, recognized by at least one state agency as an intrastate gas
utility,5 36 laid a high pressure gas line beneath the road constructed by the
state on the easement area granted by the landowner. The landowner filed
suit against the pipeline company for trespass, or in the alternative, an un-
constitutional taking, claiming that the express purpose of the easement was
for a road and that all other purposes were outside the grant. The utility
company argued that, as a company transporting gas for public consump-
tion, it had the statutory authority to lay its lines along all public high-
ways. 537 The trial court found in favor of the transmission company and the
landowner appealed. 538
Although the appellate court agreed with the landowner's theory that the
scope of an express purpose easement may not be expanded beyond the ex-
press purpose, 539 the court found that the scope of the express purpose of the
easement was not expanded by permitting the installation of the gas pipe-
529. Id. at 844.
530. 374 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1964).
531. Id. at 666.
532. Boland, 816 S.W.2d at 845.
533. Id.
534. 829 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
535. Id. at 336.
536. Id. at 339. The company was designated as a "gas utility" by the Railroad Commis-
sion of Texas, was granted a permit to lay gas lines and, according to the Railroad Commis-
sion's legal division, was an intrastate gas utility pursuant to TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts.
1446e and 6050 (Vernon 1962).
537. The utility company relied on TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1436b § I (Vernon
1980).
538. Grimes, 829 S.W.2d at 336.
539. Id. at 337 (citing Coleman v. Forister, 514 S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tex. 1974), appeal after
remand, 538 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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line. 54° The court stated that Texas law recognizes that easements in city
streets include the rights necessary to allow the municipality to do those
activities incident to maintaining those streets, including laying sewer, gas
and water pipelines. 541 In addition, observed the court, the phrase "street
purposes" as used in an easement includes the laying of gas lines.542 These
attendant rights, according to the court, are identical whether the municipal-
ity owns the fee estate or an easement obtained by condemnation, deed, dedi-
cation or prescription. 543
Phillips Natural Gas Co. v. Cardifi34 is an interesting case involving the
scope and terms of an easement granted by a written instrument and a public
utility's ability to enlarge the scope of an easement granted by written instru-
ment. In Cardiff, a landowner granted a pipeline company an easement for
the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating a pipeline solely for
the purpose of transporting crude oil. The easement holder constructed the
pipeline and subsequently sold its easement right and the pipeline to a public
gas utility. Following the purchase, the purchaser attempted to negotiate an
amendment to the easement with the landowner in order to permit the use of
the easement to operate a pipeline to transport gas. The landowner refused
to amend the easement, so the utility filed a condemnation action to acquire
the right to transport natural gas through the pipeline constructed in the
easement area. The trial court signed a condemnation order and writ of
possession granting the utility the immediate right to commence using the
pipeline to transport natural gas.545 Subsequently, the trial court granted
the landowner's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that under the
terms of the easement agreement, the utility abandoned the easement on or
prior to the date it obtained the condemnation order, that the pipeline con-
structed on the easement area had been forfeited to the landowner and that
the utility's condemnation of only the right to transport gas through the
pipeline was an improper taking. 546 Not surprisingly, the landowners
promptly amended their complaint, alleging trespass, and a jury trial re-
sulted in a substantial award to the landowners. 547 The utility appealed.
On appeal, the utility argued that the easement had not been abandoned
under the terms of the easement instrument. 548 The court looked to the
540. Id.
541. Id. (relying on Hill Farm, Inc. v. Hill County, 436 S.W.2d 320, 323 (Tex. 1969)).
542. Id. (relying on Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Shell PipeLine Corp., 591
S.W.2d 798, 799 (Tex. 1979)).
543. Id. (relying on City of San Antonio v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 388 S.W.2d 231, 232(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Houston v. Fox, 429 S.W.2d
201, 203 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 444 S.W.2d 591(Tex. 1969)). With the court's conclusion that the grant of the easement included the right to
lay the pipeline, the issue of whether the installation of the pipeline constituted an unconstitu-
tional taking became moot.
544. 823 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
545. Id. at 316.
546. Id. The utility promptly amended its original petition in condemnation to obtain the
pipeline and the right to use the pipeline to transport natural gas. Id.
547. Id.
548. Id. The landowner argued (and the trial court had agreed) that under the common
law a change in the permitted use of the express easement resulted in an abandonment of the
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express terms of the easement instrument and concluded that the easement
would be deemed abandoned if the pipeline was not operated for the express
purpose stated in the instrument for twenty-four consecutive months. 549
The undisputed facts showed that the maximum number of consecutive
months that the pipeline had not been operated before the issuance of the
condemnation order was seven. Accordingly, the court concluded that at
the time the condemnation order was issued the easement had not been
abandoned.5" 0 The court then also noted that the condemnation order did
not attempt to abandon the easement, but only enlarged the scope of the
easement by permitting the transportation of natural gas through the pipe-
line. Citing case law for the principle that, under Texas law, the scope of an
easement may be increased through condemnation proceedings 551 and that
such a condemnation action does not result in an abandonment of the ease-
ment,55 2 the court reversed the trial court's finding that the easement had
been abandoned and that the condemnation of only the right to use the pipe-
line was an improper condemnation. 553
IX. LANDOWNER'S RIGHT TO LATERAL AND SUBJACENT
SUPPORT
In Texas, an owner of land has the absolute right to lateral and subjacent
support of adjoining land.554 There were several lateral support cases de-
cided during the Survey period, one of which is noted below 555 and another
of which is Vecchio v. Pinkus.556 In Vecchio, the court addressed the issue of
whether an owner could be held liable for a prior owner's excavations that
removed the lateral support for adjacent land and caused the adjacent land
to slide and collapse. 557 The Vecchio court stated that it was unable to locate
any Texas cases addressing the specific issue, but observed that several other
jurisdictions had addressed the issue and concluded that an owner could not
be held liable for a prior owner's acts causing the removal of lateral or subja-
easement. Id. at 317. The appellate court quickly disposed of that argument by concluding
that the easement instrument contained terms regarding abandonment and therefore, under
Texas law, controlled over the common law. Id. (relying on Kothe v. Harris County Flood
Control Dist., 306 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1957, no writ)). Although the
Kothe case does not properly support the court's statement, the case of Harris v. Windover,
294 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. 1956) does provide proper support.
549. Phillips, 823 S.W.2d at 318.
550. Id.
551. Id. (citing, e.g., Brazos River Conservation & Reclamation Dist. v. Allen, 171 S.W.2d
842, 846 (Tex. 1943)).
552. Id. at 317-18 (citing City of San Antonio v. Ruble, 453 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Tex. 1970)).
553. Id. at 318-19. The court also concluded that the landowner's condemnation damages
should date from the date of the issuance of the condemnation order and remanded the case to
the trial court for a determination of the condemnation damages. Id. at 318.
554. Carpentier v. Ellis, 489 S.W.2d 388, 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Whitehead v. Zeiller, 265 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, no
writ).
555. Corley v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 821 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, writ denied) (an easement holder is entitled to the same right to naturally necessary
lateral and subjacent support as is accorded to a fee owner).
556. 833 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
557. Id. at 302.
1993] 1783
SMU LAW REVIEW
cent support to adjoining land. 558 The court elected to follow these jurisdic-
tions and accordingly affirmed the trial court's granting of summary
judgment in favor of the subsequent landowner. 559
X. COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND
Under Texas law, a covenant will run with the land if (i) the covenant
touches and concerns the land, (ii) the covenant is related to a thing in exist-
ence or specifically binds the parties and their assigns, (iii) the parties to the
covenant intend that the covenant run with the land, and (iv) the successor
to the burden of the covenant has notice thereof.56° During the Survey pe-
riod, courts were twice presented with the issue of whether a particular
agreement constituted a covenant running with the land. One of these cases
is noted below 56' and the other case is Wimberly v. Lone Star Gas Co. 562 In
Wimberly, the owner of a tract of land entered into an agreement with a
public utility pursuant to which the utility could, so long as it operated a
specific compressor station, use water from the landowner's water well in
connection with that compressor station. 563 The owner of the land then sold
the property, and the evidence showed that the purchasers read the water
contract and supplied water for twenty-four years to the utility, at which
time the purchasers terminated the water contract. The utility sued to en-
force the contract, and the trial court granted the utility's motion for sum-
mary judgment, permanently enjoining the landowners from stopping the
flow of water from the property for the utility's use. 564
On appeal, apparently not embarrassed by the fact that they had honored
the water contract for nearly twenty-five years, the landowners asserted that
the water agreement was personal in nature, did not run with the land, and
accordingly, was not binding upon them. First, the landowners contended
that the water agreement did not confer a benefit to their land. The court
summarily stated that the definition of a covenant running with the land
does not include such a requirement, but does require that the covenant
touch the land.565 Clearly, the court stated, the requirement that water be
558. Id. (citing Keck v. Longoria, 771 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989); Platts v.
Sacramento N. Ry., 253 Cal. Rptr. 269, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Lee v. Takao Bldg. Dev.
Co., 220 Cal. Rptr. 782, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Spoo v. Garvin, 32 S.W.2d 715, 716 (Ky.
1930)).
559. Id. One justice dissented, stating that he would hold that the duty of lateral support
to adjoining land runs with the ownership of the land, reasoning that a purchaser has the
ability to inspect the property for defects prior to purchase and therefore should assume the
risk of those defects. Id.
560. Inwood N. Homeowner's Ass'n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1987).
561. Dryden v. Calk, 771 F. Supp. 181 (S.D. Tex. 1991). Dryden is not a good example of
a covenant running with the land case as it was more appropriately decided on other grounds.
562. 818 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
563. Subsequently, the public utility drilled a second water well on the landowner's prop-
erty and the water agreement was amended to permit the utility to use the water from the
second well.
564. Wimberly, 818 S.W.2d at 869.
565. Id. at 871.
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supplied from the land touched the land.566 Secondly, the landowners ar-
gued that the parties could not have credibly intended that the water agree-
ment continue for an indefinite period of time with the price to remain fixed.
The court disagreed, stating that the clear terms of the contract provided
that it would be binding on the parties' successors and assigns. 567 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that the water agreement constituted a covenant
running with the land and was enforceable against the landowners.5 68
XI. MECHANICS' LIENS
The relation-back doctrine applicable to mechanics' liens has been a fruit-
ful source of litigation over the years. The Survey period contained one in-
teresting relation-back doctrine case. In Valdez v. Diamond Shamrock
Refining and Marketing Co.,569 the owner of a 7.9 acre tract of land con-
tracted with a general contractor to construct improvements on 7.1 acres of
that land. Shortly thereafter, the contractor entered into a subcontract with
a subcontractor to perform work on the 7.1 acres. Following commence-
ment of work by the subcontractor, the owner filed a replat of its land, show-
ing one 7.1 acre tract and one .8 acre tract. Within several months after
replatting the property, the owner sold the .8 acre tract to a third party. The
subcontractor performed no work on the .8 acre tract and at the time of
purchase by the third party, the .8 acre tract was unimproved. Approxi-
mately five weeks after the purchase, the subcontractor filed a lien against
the property and forwarded all proper notices to the owner of the 7.1 acre
tract and the contractor. Subsequently, the subcontractor filed suit against
the contractor and the owner of the 7.1 acre tract. The subcontractor was
awarded a lien against the entire 7.9 acres, and then sought to foreclose its
lien against the .8 acre tract. The trial court ordered judgment in favor of
the owner of the .8 acre tract and the subcontractor appealed.5 70
On appeal, the subcontractor argued that the relation-back doctrine enti-
tled the subcontractor to a lien against the .8 acre tract because it was part of
the 7.9 acre parcel when the subcontractor commenced its work. Accord-
ingly, under the subcontractor's argument, the subdivision of the 7.9 acre
tract and the subsequent sale of the .8 acre tract were irrelevant under the
relation-back doctrine.
The appellate court agreed that, under the relation-back theory, the date
of perfection of a properly perfected mechanic's lien relates back to the in-
566. Id.
567. Id. The court acknowledged that the landowners could have argued as a defense that
the contract was unconscionable, but provided the court with no authority that would require
the utility to plead that the contract was not unconscionable. Id.
568. Id. The landowners attempted to argue that the utility was in breach of the covenant
because it was using some of the water for a residence located near the compressor station.
The court recognized, however, evidence that established that the residence was used in con-
nection with and necessary to the operation of the compressor station and was therefore per-
missible under the terms of the water agreement. Id. at 871-72.
569. 820 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ granted).
570. Valdez, 820 S.W.2d at 956.
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ception of the lien.57' The court concluded, however, that under the appli-
cable provisions of the Texas Property Code, a subcontractor is required to
give written notice of its lien claim to the owner of the property against
which the lien is claimed, 572 and in this case the subcontractor had not deliv-
ered the statutory notice to the owner of the .8 acre tract.573 The subcontrac-
tor directed the court's attention to several cases that, according to the
subcontractor, stood for the proposition that the statutory notice is not re-
quired to be given to a subsequent purchaser of the land against which the
lien is claimed. 574 The court regarded the cases cited by the subcontractor
as inapplicable to the instant case, as in each of those cases there had been
sufficient construction on the purchased property to give the purchaser con-
structive notice of potential lien claims, while under the facts before it, the .8
acre tract was vacant and all work had been confined to the 7.1 acre tract.
575
On this basis, the court concluded that the purchaser of the .8 acre tract was
a good faith purchaser for value and without notice of the subcontractor's
right to file a mechanic's lien and, accordingly, took the property free and
clear of the subcontractor's lien claim. 576
Despite the court's dismissal of the constructive notice cases, those cases
are not, in fact, quite so easily distinguishable. At the time of the sale of the
.8 acre tract, the buyer was aware of substantial construction being con-
ducted on the adjoining 7.1 acres and probably knew or at least should have
known that the .8 acre tract was separated from the 7.1 acre tract less than
two months prior to the sale. Because the lien of a subcontractor not only
attaches to the improvements but also to each lot necessarily connected to
the improvements, 577 the purchaser of the .8 acre tract would have been
prudent to assure itself that no liens could attach to the .8 acre tract. More-
over, the buyer had enough constructive notice to make it aware of the po-
571. Id. at 956-57 (citing Diversified Mortgage Inv., Inc. v. Lloyd D. Blaylock Gen. Con-
tractor, Inc., 576 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1978)).
572. Id. at 957 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056(b) (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1991)).
The current version of § 53.056 requires the notice to go to the owner or the "reputed owner"
of the property against which the lien is claimed. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056(b) (em-
phasis added). The "reputed owner" language did not become effective until September 1,
1989 and therefore was not applicable to the issue in Valdez. Presumably, if the "reputed
owner" language had been applicable to the issue in Valdez, the outcome of the case would
have been different.
573. Valdez, 820 S.W.2d at 957.
574. Id. The following cases were cited by the subcontractor: Inman v. Clark, 485 S.W.2d
372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ) (contractor's failure to send notice of
lien to subsequent purchaser of newly constructed improvements was not fatal because newly
constructed improvements provided constructive notice of contractor's right to file lien affida-
vits); Contract Sales Co. v. Skaggs, 612 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ)
(where subcontractor commenced work on improvements prior to sale to purchaser, evidence
precluded the possibility that the owner purchased the property without notice of the subcon-
tractor's potential rights); Wood v. Barnes, 420 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967,
writ refd n.r.e.) (where buyer purchased new improvements before expiration of mechanic's
lien filing period, purchaser took property with constructive notice of mechanics lienholders'
rights to file liens).
575. Valdez, 820 S.W.2d at 957.
576. Id.
577. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.022(a) (Vernon 1984).
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tential for lien claims to be filed. The Texas Supreme Court has granted the
subcontractor's application for writ of error, and will likely address the is-
sues raised here, and perhaps others as well. 578
Unless an owner obtains a bond to pay liens or claims in conformance
with the applicable requirements of Subchapter I of Chapter 53 of the Texas
Property Code,579 the owner is required to withhold from the original con-
tractor, until 30 days after the completion of the work, 10% of the cost of
the work to the owner for the protection of mechanic's lien claimants. 580
Section 53.106(e) of the Texas Property Code makes it clear that completion
of the work means actual completion of the work under the contract, includ-
ing extras or change orders required or contemplated under the original con-
tract, exclusive, however, of repairs and warranty work.58' If the owner fails
to withhold the required retainage, then the claimants, at least to the extent
of the required retainage, have a lien against the improvements and lot or
lots necessarily connected thereto. 582
In TDIndustries, Inc. v. NCNB Texas National Bank,583 the court was
asked to determine if "actual completion of the work required under the
contract" as used in Section 53.106(e) meant actual completion of all of the
work required by the original contract 8 4 The facts show that the owner
engaged a general contractor to perform certain renovation work. At the
time the contractor requested final payment, the owner's architect certified
that 100% of the work required by the contract was complete, despite know-
ing that a pocket door that was required by the original contract had not
been installed. Several months thereafter the pocket door was installed by a
subcontractor and, within 30 days after the installation of the door, the sub-
contractor filed a claim against the retainage that the owner was required to
withhold from the contractor. The retainage, however, had been previously
distributed to the contractor on the 30th day following the architect's certifi-
cation of completion. The subcontractor filed suit to foreclose its mechanic's
lien and the owner countered that the claim was invalid because it had not
been timely filed. The trial court agreed with the owner, and the subcontrac-
tor appealed.585
On appeal, the owner argued that completion of the work, as used in Sec-
tion 53.106(e), really means substantial completion, because under Texas
law substantial completion means full performance by the contractor.5 86
578. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 642 (April 22, 1992). Since the writing of this article, the Texas
Supreme Court has rendered its opinion and has reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.
842 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1992). The Texas Supreme Court found for the subcontractor, holding
that the subcontractor's lien related back to the entire 7.9 acres. As this decision is after the
Survey period, it will be covered more fully in next year's article.
579. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.202-53.203 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1993).
580. Id. § 53.101.
581. Id. § 53.106(e).
582. Id. § 53.105(a).
583. 837 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, no writ).
584. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.106(e) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
585. TDlndustries, 837 S.W.2d at 271.
586. The owner relied on cases that generally hold that if the contractor has substantially
completed the work under the contract, the contractor has completed performance under the
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The court summarily rejected the owner's position, stating that the cases
cited by the owner did not concern the legislative definition of completion of
work under Section 53.106(e). 5 7 Not surprisingly, the court stated that
completion of the work means completion of all work except warranty and
repair work that is specifically excluded under the statute.58 8 The court
found no evidence indicating that the installation of the pocket door was
repair or warranty work,589 and accordingly held that the owner failed to
hold the required retainage for 30 days after completion of the work re-
quired by the contract. 590
In Roland v. General Brick Sales, Inc. ,591 a supplier supplied bricks to an
owner of a residential development. The developer used the bricks on vari-
ous homes within the development, but never paid the supplier. The devel-
oper sold several of the homes and thereafter the supplier sought to foreclose
its liens against the purchasers of the residences 592 and recover attorneys'
fees under Section 53.156 of the Texas Property Code. 593 The trial court
entered judgment in favor of the supplier, allowing foreclosure of the lien
and holding all lot owners jointly and severally liable for payment of the
attorneys' fees. 594 The owners appealed as to the issue of attorneys' fees and
collection costs. On appeal, the lot purchasers argued that, because they
were not owners at the time the bricks were supplied, they were not in priv-
ity of contract with the supplier and therefore could not be liable for the
supplier's attorneys' fees. The court summarily rejected the lot purchasers'
argument, stating that Section 53.156 clearly provides for the recovery of
collection costs and attorneys' fees if the lien is not satisfied within a specific
period of time. 595 Relying on a 1988 Dallas court of appeals decision, 596 the
court concluded that the statute permitted the collection of attorneys' fees
against the owner of the land against which the lien was properly filed and
contract. The cases relied on were Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Housing Auth. of the City of
Victoria, 669 S.W.2d 818, 823 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ re'd n.r.e.); Weissberger
v. Brown-Bellows-Smith, 289 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). The owner, however, may under such circumstances recover from the contractor the
difference between the value of the work as completed and the value of the work as if it had
been fully completed in accordance with the contract. See Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802
S.W.2d 226, 231 (Tex. 1990); Vance v. My Apartment Steak House of San Antonio, Inc., 677
S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex. 1984).
587. TDIndustries, 837 S.W.2d at 272.
588. Id.
589. Id. The facts clearly indicate that installation of the pocket door was work required
by the original contract and the installation did not occur until after the disbursement of the
retainage.
590. Id.
591. 818 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
592. The facts do not make clear whether the supplier filed its lien prior to or after the sale
of the residences to the individual purchasers.
593. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.156 (Vernon Supp. 1993) was amended in 1989, to be
effective September 1, 1989. The Roland court applied the 1984 version since the contract was
executed prior to September 1, 1989. Roland, 818 S.W.2d at 897 n.l.
594. Roland, 818 S.W.2d at 896-97.
595. Id. at 897.




claimed, regardless of whether the owner was a party to the original
contract.
597
As to the issue of joint and several liability, the purchasers argued that the
supplier should be obligated to segregate the attorneys' fees and collection
costs as to each owner and that each owner should be liable for only their
respective segregated portion of attorneys' fees and collection costs. The
court disagreed, holding that joint and several liability for attorneys' fees and
collection costs is appropriate where "the claims arise out of the same trans-
action and are so interrelated that their prosecution or defense entails proof
or denial of essentially the same facts." 598
Under Texas law, a subcontractor performing work on or supplying
materials for a public building is prohibited from asserting a mechanic's lien
against the building.5 99 Though this prohibition can lead to results that
seem inequitable, it is well established. For example, in Heldenfels Brothers,
Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi,6° the city engaged a general contractor to
construct a building on city land and, in connection with that engagement,
the city required the general contractor to provide a statutory payment bond
as required by article 5160 of the Revised Texas Civil Statutes. 6° 1 The gen-
eral contractor delivered to the city bonds that facially appeared to comply
with the statutory requirements, but it was subsequently discovered that the
bonds were fraudulent. The general contractor ultimately abandoned the
project, leaving the subcontractor unpaid and no statutory bond to look to
for payment. The subcontractor sued the city, alleging that the city had
liability for failing to obtain a proper bond as required by article 5160. The
Texas Supreme Court agreed that article 5160 required the city to obtain the
bond from the general contractor for the benefit and protection of subcon-
tractors, but concluded that the subcontractor could not recover against the
city for breach of that obligation because the statute did not provide for
recovery.602
597. Roland, 818 S.W.2d at 897. The court spent far too much time resolving this issue.
Simply stated, Section 53.156 would be non-sensical if it did not permit the collection of attor-
neys' fees against the owner of the property against which a lien is properly filed, because the
attorneys' fees are incurred in foreclosing a lien against that owner's property, not the property
of the prior owner. Perhaps a bit more interesting issue is whether Section 53.156 permits the
mechanic's lienholder to seek recovery of fees against the original owner, to the extent those
fees are attributable to the foreclosure of subsequently sold lots. Under that portion of the
Roland court's decision that resolves the issue of joint and several liability for payment of
attorneys' fees and collection costs, if the attorneys' fees and collection costs related to the
claims of the subcontractor against the various owners are so interrelated that their prosecu-
tion or defense involve essentially the same facts, the prior owner could be exposed to liability
for the fees.
598. Roland, 818 S.W.2d at 898 (quoting Gill, 759 S.W.2d at 705-06).
599. E.g., City of Corpus Christi v. Acme Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 736 S.W.2d 894,
897 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied).
600. 832 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1992).
601. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5160 (Vernon 1987). The current version of article
5160 became effective September 1, 1991. Accordingly, the court used the version of article
5160 that became effective September 1, 1989.
602. Heldenfels, 832 S.W.2d at 42. The current version of article 5160 became effective
September 1, 1991 and addresses the inequity created under facts similar to those in
Heldenfels, by adding a provision that provides that if a governmental authority fails to obtain
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Although the legislature has resolved the inequity posed by Heldenfels,6 ° 3
additional inequities may be experienced because of a subcontractor's inabil-
ity to file a lien against a public project. For example, in City of LaPorte v.
Taylor,6° 4 a subcontractor was engaged by a general contractor to perform
work on a city-owned swimming pool, and the general contractor provided
the city with the statutory payment bond required by article 5160. The gen-
eral contractor ultimately defaulted and went into bankruptcy without pay-
ing the subcontractor any amounts due him. The subcontractor provided
notice to the city and the surety who had issued the required statutory pay-
ment bond, and the city withheld funds from the general contractor suffi-
cient to pay the subcontractor's claim. A number of months passed, during
which the subcontractor received only a small partial payment from the
surety. Apparently feeling ignored, the subcontractor filed suit against the
city and the surety. However, several months after the filing of the suit, the
surety was placed into receivership, leaving the subcontractor without its
most likely source of payment and the city with an uncompleted project and
without sufficient funds (including the retained funds) to complete the pro-
ject. Thereafter, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the subcon-
tractor, holding the city, the surety and the general contractor jointly and
severally liable to the subcontractor for the amount of its lien and attorneys'
fees. 6° 5 The city and surety appealed.
According to a majority of the court, the subcontractor's claim against the
city was based on an equitable lien against the project funds in an amount
necessary to pay the subcontractor's lien claim. 6° 6 The subcontractor
claimed it had a better right to the retained funds than did the city, since it
had placed its claim on the funds prior to the time the surety went bankrupt.
Although an interesting argument, the court totally rejected the subcontrac-
tor's theory, relying on Heldenfels.6° 7 The court reasoned that if the city
could not be sued for failing to obtain the required bond from the general
contractor, it surely could not be liable merely because the surety became
insolvent. 6o8
XII. TITLE INSURANCE
The world of title insurance and escrow responsibilities covers a broad
range of law that is beyond the scope of this article. However, we note that
several cases were decided during the Survey period dealing with scope of
from the contractor the required bond on projects in excess of $25,000, then the authority is
liable to the same extent as the surety would have been under a properly issued bond and the
claimant is entitled to a lien on the contract funds in the manner as if the contract was a public
works contract under $25,000 as described in Subchapter J of § 53.231 of the Texas Property
Code.
603. See supra note 602.
604. 836 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1992, no writ).
605. Id. at 831.
606. Id. at 832. One concurring justice disagreed with the court's statement of the subcon-
tractor's theory of liability. Id. at 832-33 (Wilson, J., concurring).




coverage, 6" liability of the title insurance underwriter for the acts of the title
insurance agent, 6 10 and the responsibilities of a title insurance agent gener-
ally and as an escrow agent.6 1'
XIII. EMINENT DOMAIN
There were many decisions during the Survey period concerning a broad
range of topics in the area of eminent domain, including (i) the provisions of
Section 21.002 of the Texas Property Code, 612 which require a condemna-
tion proceeding pending in a county court to be transferred to a district
court if an issue of title is raised,613 (ii) the admissibility of factors bearing on
the valuation decision in a condemnation proceeding, 614 (iii) the period of
609. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Adams, 829 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992,
writ denied) (whether an easement that had been granted affected the insured land); Daca, Inc.
v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 822 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1992,
writ denied) (whether the title insurance coverage required the title insurer to defend a particu-
lar defendant).
610. Cameron County Say. Ass'n v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 819 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
611. Id.; Bell v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 830 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ de-
nied). See also Pack v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Tyler, 828 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1991, no writ) (discussing general responsibility of an escrow agent).
612. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.002 (Vernon 1984).
613. Christian v. City of Ennis, 830 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no writ) (under
Section 21.002 of the Texas Property Code, if an issue of title is raised in a condemnation
proceeding pending in county court, then that proceeding must be transferred to district court;
therefore, where an intervening party claimed ownership of an interest in an air easement
above land being condemned and county court did not transfer the proceeding to district
court, county court committed reversible error).
614. E.g., Wegner v. State, 829 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied) (a jury,
though not bound by testimony of expert witnesses, may not leap entirely outside of the evi-
dence presented to them; therefore, court reversed jury award of $30,000 when the two testify-
ing expert witnesses opined values of $97,894 and $99,000, respectively); State v. Tigner, 827
S.W.2d 611 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (notwithstanding existence
of restrictive covenants that limited use of condemned property for residential purposes, con-
demnee's valuation expert was allowed to give his opinion that there existed a reasonable
probability that the current residential use of the condemned property would be allowed to
change to commercial use in the near future); State v. Resolution Trust Corp., 827 S.W.2d 106
(Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied) (condemnee's expert opinion as to value of whole prop-
erty and value of remainder based partially on unaccepted offer to purchase the whole property
was admissible, even though unaccepted offer would not have been admissible as separately
presented evidence); State v. Munday Enters., 824 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ
requested) (in condemnation case involving raising of traffic lanes of highway abutting land-
owner's business, landowner permitted to show reduction of market value of remainder by
evidence that [1] access would become more difficult to remainder, [2] visibility of remainder
from the road would be substantially decreased and [3] duration of construction activities on
the highway project would be a period of years and would interfere with the use of the remain-
der); Stinson v. Arkla Energy Resources, 823 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no
writ) (in a proceeding involving the condemnation of a natural gas pipeline right-of-way and
the diminution as to the remainder, [1] condemnee not permitted to introduce evidence of 200
pipeline failures because condemnee failed to show fear in the minds of buying public and [2]
condemnee not permitted to introduce evidence of any pipeline failure unless the failures con-
cerned pipelines having characteristics similar to the characteristics of the pipeline to be in-
stalled in the condemned right-of-way); All Am. Pipeline Co. v. Ammerman, 814 S.W.2d 249
(Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ) (in a proceeding involving crude oil pipeline right-of-way,
evidence that 27 oil spills could be expected along the pipeline to be installed across the con-
demnee's property and other properties was admissible because it showed either an actual
danger that forms the basis of fear or a type of fear that is reasonable).
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time within which a condemnee must object to a special commissioner's
award under Section 21.018(a) of the Texas Property Code,615 (iv) the re-
quirement under Section 21.012(a) of the Texas Property Code616 that a con-
demning authority may file a condemnation proceeding only if it is unable to
agree with the owner of the property on the amount of damages,617 and (v)
the distinction between actions of a governmental entity that constitute a
taking versus negligence. 618 The Texas Supreme Court was especially busy,
615. John v. State, 826 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1992) (the time within which a condemnee must
object under § 21.018(b) of the Texas Property Code is tolled until the clerk of the commis-
sioner's court sends the notice required by § 21.049 of the Texas Property Code); TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 21.018 (Vernon 1984).
616. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.012(a) (Vernon 1984).
617. State v. Hipp, 832 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied) ([1] trial judge
should determine as a threshold matter, and regardless of whether the determination includes
an issue of fact, whether the condemnor has satisfied the pre-requisite to bringing a suit that
the parties were unable to agree, [2] in showing that it was unable to agree with the property
owner, condemnor is not required to show that it bargained with the owner, but only that the
condemnor made a bona fide, good faith attempt to agree with the owner, which standard is
satisfied if the condemnor makes a single bona-fide offer to the property owner setting forth the
condemnor's good faith belief of the compensation due the property owner, and which stan-
dard does not require the condemnor to divulge the basis of its offer, [3] where evidence
showed that condemnor instructed appraiser to disregard any diminution in value in direct
contravention of condemnor's internal guidelines, the evidence was sufficient to support a find-
ing that condemnor's offer was not a bona-fide offer of its good faith belief of the compensation
due the owner), and [4] where evidence showed that the condemnor made a single offer of
compensation to property owners, the value determined by the condemnor's appraiser was
based on the property being residential and not commercial, the property was zoned residen-
tial, several attempts to rezone the property as commercial had failed, and that other residen-
tial property owners vigorously protested rezoning the area as commercial, the condemnor's
offer was a bona fide offer setting forth the condemnor's good faith belief of the compensation
due the property owners); Texas-New Mexico Power Co. v. Hogan, 824 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1992, writ denied) (when several persons own interests in the condemned prop-
erty, the unable to agree requirement is satisfied if the condemnor is unable to agree with any
one of the property owners). °
618. County of Burleson v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 831 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (where taxing authority seized a mobile home pursu-
ant to §§ 33.21-33.25 of the Texas Tax Code and conducted a summary sale without making
an attempt to notify the mortgagee holding a perfected and recorded lien, such action consti-
tuted a taking of the mortgagee's interest without compensation, and not negligence); Smith v.
Harrison County, 824 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ) (deed fraudulently
obtained from an owner by governmental authority could constitute inverse condemnation);
Hale v. Colorado River Mun. Water Dist., 818 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ)
(where governmental authority made conscious decision to release quantities of chloride-laden
water into a river from which property owner obtained water to irrigate fields, and the prop-
erty owner was no longer able to use the river water to irrigate its crops because it had become
chloride-ladened, an issue of material fact existed as to whether the governmental authority's
action constituted a taking, without compensation, of the property owner's riparian right to
irrigate its fields with the river water); Shade v. City of Dallas, 819 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1991, no writ) (where evidence showed that [1] property owner's home was significantly
damaged due to sewer backups, [2] city found a significant level of grease in the city sewer line,
and [3] city did not contend in its motion that any damage caused by the city arose out of its
negligence or that the act which was claimed to constitute a taking was not an intentional
taking of property for public use, property owner pled facts sufficient to support a cause of
action for inverse condemnation and city's motion for summary judgment was improperly
granted); Hues v. Warren Petroleum Co., 814 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, writ denied) (a decrease in fair market value of owner's property allegedly resulting from
gas leaks and disposal of brine on or nearby the owner's property could not constitute an
inverse condemnation of the property).
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issuing five opinions, one of which is noted below 619 and three of which are
discussed in this section.
Under the Texas Constitution, a landowner is entitled to just compensa-
tion for a taking of his property. 620 Generally, just compensation for a par-
tial condemnation is the sum of the value of the condemned portion of the
property (including the improvements constructed thereon) and the damage
to the remainder caused by the partial condemnation. 62' The Texas
Supreme Court has refined these rules by holding that a landowner can agree
to waive his claim for damage to the remainder and proceed to trial seeking
the value of only the portion taken. 622 In such a case, the trial court should
exclude from evidence any enhancement of value to the remainder623 and, if
the property taken has a higher value than the remainder at the time of
condemnation, the fair market value of the property taken may not be calcu-
lated by averaging the unit value of the entire tract.624 An appellate court
decision recognizes that the market value of the portion taken may be deter-
mined without reference to the remainder if the portion taken constitutes a
separate economic unit.625
Using the foregoing rules and perhaps going beyond them, the Texas
Supreme Court decided State v. Windham.626 In Windham, a state govern-
mental agency condemned an approximately 110 foot strip of land lying im-
mediately adjacent to a state highway. The strip constituted approximately
two acres out of a nineteen acre tract. The special panel of commissioners
appointed pursuant to Section 21.014 of the Texas Property Code627 made
an award with which the property owner was displeased. The property
owner appealed to the county court, and prior to the trial filed a motion in
limine that stipulated to the state's right to condemn the two acre tract,
waived his right for damages to the remainder, unilaterally designated a
larger strip of land as the economic unit upon which he contended that the
value should be based, and sought to exclude evidence of the value of the
nineteen acre tract as a whole and the value of the taken portion as a per-
centage of the whole. The property owner claimed a right to designate the
larger tract as an economic unit and the right to exclude the averaging
method of determining the market value because the tract condemned by the
state was not an economic unit, while the larger designated tract was an
economic unit with a highest and best use for commercial development. The
619. City of San Antonio v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 820 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1991). This
case primarily addresses the sufficiency of a condemnation notice under the notice provisions
of the Open Meetings Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3A (Vernon Supp.
1993).
620. TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 17.
621. State v. Carpenter, 89 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1936).
622. State v. Meyer, 403 S.W.2d 366, 374 (Tex. 1966).
623. Id. at 374.
624. Id. at 375.
625. See City of Tyler v. Brogan, 437 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, no
writ). This case and the rule stated in the accompanying text was cited favorably by the Texas
Supreme Court in State v. Windham, 837 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. 1992).
626. 837 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. 1992).
627. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.014 (Vernon 1984).
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trial court granted the landowner's motion and excluded any evidence by the
state to support its contention that the economic unit should consist of the
entire nineteen acre tract, which, in the state's judgment, had a highest and
best use for investment purposes.628 The trial court entered judgment in
accordance with the jury verdict in favor of the property owner and the state
appealed.629 The appellate court affirmed the trial court and the state then
appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. 630
On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, the state argued that the appellate
court erred in holding that the property owner had the unilateral right to
designate the appropriate economic unit and that the trial court improperly
excluded the state's evidence as to the highest and best use of the nineteen
acre tract. In agreeing with the state, the court stated that the jury, in mak-
ing their determination of market value,631 should be able to consider all
uses to which the property is reasonably adaptable and to which the prop-
erty is or will, in reasonable probability, be put. 632 In keeping with the defi-
nition of fair market value, the court concluded that the jury should be able
to consider those uses argued by the condemnor as well as the condemnee,
and then accept or reject those positions in making the market value deter-
mination. 633 The property owner argued that the state's position was con-
trary to Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Ramsey,634 wherein the court
held that the trial court did not err by permitting the condemnee to desig-
nate a larger tract than that which was condemned (but not the entire re-
mainder) for the purpose of obtaining remainder damages.635 The supreme
court distinguished Ramsey, however, on the basis that the property owner
before it sought to limit the jury's consideration to what he believed to be the
economic unit and thereby gain the right to cause the market value of the
economic unit to be determined without reference to the remainder, while
the property owner in Ramsey did not seek to unilaterally designate an eco-
nomic unit, but rather sought damages for the condemned portion and re-
mainder damages for less than all of the remainder. 636 Without expressly so
stating, the Texas Supreme Court appears to be saying that a landowner
cannot unilaterally add adjacent land to the condemned portion to create an
independent economic unit and thereby take advantage of the rule that per-
mits the value of a condemned portion that is an independent economic unit
628. Windham, 837 S.W.2d at 74.
629. Id. at 75.
630. Id.
631. The court recognized that market value "is the price which the property would bring
when it is offered for sale by one who desires, but is not obligated to sell, and is bought by one
who is under no necessity of buying it." Id. (citing State v. Carpenter, 89 S.W.2d 194, 202
(Tex. 1936)).
632. Id. at 77.
633. Id.
634. 542 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
635. Id. at 472.
636. Windham, 837 S.W.2d at 77-78. Justice Mauzy dissented, arguing that the method
chosen by the landowner in this case was essentially the same as that chosen in the Ramsey
case. Id. at 79.
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to be determined without regard to the remainder.637
The Ramsey case was again at issue in State v. Oak Hill Joint Venture.638
In Oak Hill, the state condemned a strip of the owner's land for the purpose
of expanding a state highway that abutted the condemned property. The
owner disputed the award made by the special commissioners and appealed
to the probate court in which the condemnation proceeding had been insti-
tuted. For the purpose of determining damages to the remainder, the owner
sought to designate only a portion of the remaining property and exclude all
evidence of its ownership of property abutting the designated remainder.
The trial court excluded the owner's ownership of the property abutting the
designated remainder from the evidence and entered judgment in favor of
the owner. The state appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly ex-
cluded this evidence.
The appeals court agreed with the state, concluding that evidence of the
existence of the non-designated remainder may not be excluded when its
existence and potential use are probative of the damages sustained by the
designated remainder.639 The property owner argued that the state's posi-
tion was contrary to Ramsey, wherein the owner was permitted to designate
a remainder less than the whole and exclude evidence relating to the portion
of the remainder not included in the designated remainder.64° The court,
however, distinguished Ramsey, pointing out that the remainder designated
by the owner in that case had a higher and best use different from the undes-
ignated portion of the remainder, thereby making any evidence pertaining to
the undesignated portion irrelevant as to the designated portion.64 On the
other hand, under the facts before the Oak Hill court, the highest and best
use for the designated remainder was no different than the undesignated por-
tion of the remainder. In such a case, according to the Oak Hill court, the
existence of the non-designated remainder could be highly relevant to the
damages suffered by the designated remainder. 64 2
In Brown v. United States,643 a condemnation case resulting from the
637. See supra notes 622-25, 636 and accompanying text.
638. 815 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
639. Id. at 832.
640. Ramsey, 542 S.W.2d at 472.
641. Oak Hill, 815 S.W.2d at 831. The court appears to limit the scope of the Ramsey
holding by interpreting the case to permit a landowner who designates a remainder less than
the whole to exclude evidence relating to the landowner's ownership and the potential uses of
the undesignated remainder if the undesignated remainder "lacks any probative value as to the
amount of damages sustained by the designated remainder." See id.
642. Id. The court in Oak Hill also reached a determination that the use to which the
remainder is ultimately put has no bearing on the pre-condemnation market value of the part
taken. Id. at 832. This holding appears somewhat contradictory to several statements made
by the Windham court. First, the Windham court stated that the uses to which the "property
is reasonably adaptable and for which it is, or in all reasonable probability will become, avail-
able in the foreseeable future" are relevant to the issue of market value. Windham, 837 S.W.2d
at 77. Secondly, the Windham court concluded that the condemnor should be allowed to
present evidence of the highest and best use as to the entire property if the condemnee seeks to
present evidence of market value by using the highest and best use of a tract larger than that
taken. Id.
643. 263 U.S. 78 (1923).
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flooding of a town caused by the construction of a reservoir, the United
States Supreme Court reached a holding that is generally known as the sub-
stitute facilities doctrine. Specifically, the Court held that because of the
peculiar circumstances before it, a "method of compensation by substitution
would seem to be the best means of making the parties whole." 644 In two
subsequent cases, United States v. 564.54 Acres64 5 and United States v. 50
Acres of Land,646 however, the Court either obliterated or substantially re-
duced the availability of the substitute facilities doctrine, at least in federal
condemnation cases. In 564.54 Acres, the Court concluded that there was no
reason to treat the condemnees, three non-profit summer camps whose prop-
erty was being condemned, any "differently from the many private home-
owners and other noncommercial property owners who neither derive
earnings from their property nor hold it for investment purposes. ' ' 647 In 50
Acres, the Court held that "[n]othing in Brown implies that the Federal Gov-
ernment has a duty to provide the city with anything more than the fair
market value of the condemned property."'648
Notwithstanding 564.54 Acres and 50 Acres, a private catholic school for
girls recently attempted to breath life into the dying substitute facilities doc-
trine by requesting the Texas Supreme Court to continue recognizing the
doctrine in Texas. In Religious of the Sacred Heart of Texas v. City of Hous-
ton, 649 the City of Houston commenced condemnation proceedings on ap-
proximately 1.5 acres of land owned by a private school for girls for the
purpose of extending a public street. The condemned 1.5 acres included a
parking lot, playground, and building. The condemnation also separated an
approximately .7 acre tract from the remaining acreage of approximately
12.7 acres. The school contended that at least one other building would be
perilously close to the road and that the remainder of the campus would
suffer other damages including noise and air pollution. Following the award
of the special commissioners, 650 both the school and the city appealed to the
county court. At trial, the city argued that the campus could achieve pre-
condemnation utility by the relocation and reconstruction of the buildings
on the remaining land within the campus. 61 Arguing that the court should
follow the substitute facilities doctrine, the school claimed that, in addition
to the award of the special commissioners, the city should be required to pay
the school an amount necessary to acquire an adjacent 7.9 acre tract because
the remaining land within the campus was not sufficient to achieve pre-con-
demnation utility.652 The court followed the school's theory and the jury
644. Id. at 82-83.
645. 441 U.S. 506 (1979).
646. 469 U.S. 24 (1984).
647. 564.54 Acres, 441 U.S. at 514.
648. 50 Acres, 469 U.S. at 33.
649. 836 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1992).
650. Id. at 607. The award was a substantial amount, $7,250,000.
651. The city claimed that the cost to perform the relocation and reconstruction would be
$4,400,000.
652. The adjoining tract included an apartment complex that would have to be torn down
in order to accommodate the relocation of the school facilities. The cost to acquire the apart-
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awarded the school nearly the amount the school sought to recover.653 The
city appealed, arguing that the trial court should not have permitted the use
of the substitute facilities doctrine. The court of appeals agreed with the
city, holding that the substitute facilities doctrine does not apply to private
schools. 654 The school, hoping to maintain the utility of its pre-condemna-
tion campus, appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.
On appeal, the school presented two main arguments: first, that the limi-
tations placed on Brown in 564.54 Acres and 50 Acres were not applicable
because in each of those cases there was evidence that the remainder had
market value; second, that the court should apply the substitute facilities
doctrine as required by the City of San Antonio v. Congregation of Sisters of
Charity,65 5 where the Eastland court of appeals stated that if special dam-
ages are suffered by a private school as a result of a condemnation (i.e., fair
market value would not be fair and adequate compensation under the ex-
isting circumstances), the private school is entitled to the same measure of
damages as a public school.656 The court summarily rejected the school's
first argument, stating that it was simply incorrect 657 and that there was no
language in either 564.54 Acres or 50 Acres that supported such an applica-
tion of the substitute facilities doctrine. 658 The court further stated that lan-
guage quoted from the 50 Acres case "sounds the death knell for the
application of the substitute facilities doctrine to private property. '659
As to the school's argument that Sisters of Charity should be followed by
the court, the court opined that the case "floats alone in a sea of contrary
authority. '660 The court simply was not prepared to apply a doctrine that,
by the dictates of the United States Supreme Court, has little vitality. 66 1
In Westgate, Ltd. v. State of Texas,662 the majority, according to a dissent-
ment complex was approximately $12,000,000, bringing the cost to comply with the school's
proposal to nearly $20,000,000.
653. Religious of the Sacred Heart, 836 S.W.2d at 607.
654. Id. at 608.
655. 404 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966, no writ).
656. Id. at 337.
657. Religious of the Sacred Heart, 836 S.W.2d at 609. The court cited language from
564.54 Acres that reflected that there were 11 recent sales of comparable facilities to establish
market value. Id. at 610 (citing 564.54 Acres, 441 U.S. at 513). The court also noted language
from 50 Acres reflecting that there was testimony of comparable sales. Id. (citing 50 Acres, 469
U.S. at 30).
658. Id. at 609.
659. Id. at 610.
660. Id. at 611. The court further noted that the case was decided without citation to
authority and had not been affirmatively relied on by any other court. Id.
661. A concurring opinion was delivered by Justice Cornyn, who was not prepared to say
that there could be no instance where the substitute facilities doctrine should be applied to the
taking of private property. Id. at 618. Justice Gonzalez wrote a lengthy, critical dissent in
which Justice Cook joined. Id at 619. Justice Gonzalez thought the case was a simple con-
demnation case made complex and confusing by the majority. Id. The dissent is well reasoned
and argued and brings up points that suggest that the majority may have read too narrowly the
564.54 Acres and 50 Acres cases. See id. at 624-26.
662. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1042 (July 4, 1992). Since the writing of this article, the Texas
Supreme Court withdrew its original opinion and substituted a new opinion. 843 S.W.2d 448
(Tex. 1992). The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals on the
statutory condemnation claim and inverse condemnation claim, but remanded the case on the
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ing justice, warmly embraces bureaucratic bungling that causes millions of
dollars of damages to Texas landowners.663 In Westgate, a developer gained
city and highway department approval to construct a shopping center. The
developer completed construction in the spring of 1985, at which time the
developer was made aware that the state and the City of Austin intended to
construct a highway extension, a portion of which would cross the shopping
center. The general partner of the developer contacted the state highway
department, seeking to have this worrisome rumor confirmed or denied.
The highway department promptly responded to the developer, confirming
that not only would the highway extension pass over a part of the shopping
center, but that it would also go through one of the newly constructed build-
ings. After being overwhelmed by this shocking revelation, the general part-
ner nearly had cardiac arrest when he was also advised that the highway
department and the city were both aware of the proposed highway extension
and its location when each had approved the detailed plans for the shopping
center. Notwithstanding the fact that the shopping center tenants would
have the benefit of extremely close access to a newly constructed highway
extension, the developer was not deluged with potential tenants for the shop-
ping center, who, it seemed, were concerned about the possible adverse effect
that could be created by the construction of the extremely convenient high-
way extension and the potential loss of their newly leased space to accommo-
date the highway extension.
By July 1986, the developer had become concerned about the highway
department delaying the condemnation process for a considerable length of
time and, accordingly, requested an expedited condemnation process be-
cause of the financial hardship being caused by the lack of tenants. Acting
with the speed of a 500 pound tortoise, the government approved the devel-
oper's application for the expedited process in November of 1986 and made
its first offer to the developer in June of 1987. The developer rejected the
offer and the government continued its break-neck pace with reckless aban-
don, commencing condemnation proceedings in September 1988. The spe-
cial commissioners issued their award and the developer appealed to the trial
court, claiming inverse condemnation and seeking lost profits for the period
from the announcement of the highway extension until the date of acquisi-
tion, which was January of 1989. The developer argued and the jury agreed
that the government was negligent for failing to warn the developer of the
proposed highway when the government approved the developer's plans and
that the government unreasonably delayed the acquisition of the property. 664
The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's award, which
issue of damages because of the trial court's failure to submit the damages question to the jury
in broad form. This decision will be discussed more fully in next year's Survey Article.
663. Id. at 1048. Justice Mauzy, in one of two dissenting opinions, states that the govern-
ment should be expected to act reasonably, which, in his opinion, it did not do in this case in
light of the delay between the announcement of the condemnation and the actual condemna-
tion. Id. In Justice Mauzy's opinion, the government's conduct should be reviewed under an
objective reasonableness standard, as opposed to the subjective bad faith standard that the
majority opinion imposed. Id. at 1049. See infra note 674 and accompanying text.
664. Westgate, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1043.
1798 [Vol. 46
REAL PROPERTY
set damages in the amount of $633,000 for inverse condemnation and
$2,734,000 on the developer's statutory claim for condemnation. 665 The
government appealed and the court of appeals reversed the trial court on the
inverse condemnation claim, concluding that the failure to notify and undue
delay did not rise to a level of interference with access to and use of the
developer's property to warrant an inverse condemnation award. 666 In addi-
tion, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court's submission of two
separate questions regarding the measure of damages for the developer's
statutory claim was not proper, 667 and that the trial court should have sub-
mitted one issue requesting the difference in value between the value of the
entire tract without considering the highway project and the value of the
developer's remaining property following the condemnation. 668 The devel-
oper appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.
The supreme court recognized that an inverse condemnation may occur
where the government, without paying adequate compensation, takes or in-
vades property for public use or when it unreasonably interferes with the use
or access to the owner's property.669 The supreme court identified the issue
before it as whether an owner could recover for inverse condemnation if "the
government has not directly restricted use of the landowner's property. 670
The court defined direct restriction as "an actual physical or legal restriction
on the property's use, such as a blocking of access or denial of a permit for
development."' 67 1 The supreme court analyzed various Texas appellate
court cases and concluded that the appellate courts had never held that a
landowner may collect economic damages, such as a reduction in fair market
value, where the government has not imposed a direct restriction on the use
of the property. 672 The court elected not to deviate from the appellate court
cases, and although the supreme court's holding is less than clear, it appears
665. Id.
666. Id. Curiously, the court of appeals did not reject the inverse condemnation award on
the basis that the government was negligent in not informing the property owner of the con-
demnation. Instead, the court noted that even if the charges of negligence and undue delay
were true, there was no inverse condemnation because the city did not physically restrict ac-
cess or impose any barriers to the property. In addition, although the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the negligence issue, the court did not deny the inverse condemnation claim on the
basis of negligence, but instead concluded that "the failure to warn, absent any showing of bad
faith, was not a taking or damaging of property, since it resulted in no restriction on the
property's use." Id. at 1047.
667. Id. at 1043; see infra note 677.
668. Westgate, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1047.
669. Id. at 1043 (citing, e.g., City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978)).
670. Id. at 1043-44.
671. Id.
672. Id. (analyzing, e.g., Allen v. City of Texas City, 775 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.-Houston
[lIst Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (where city constructed levee that made owner's property more
susceptible to flooding and existence of levy caused market value of owner's property to de-
crease by 50%, owner was not entitled to damages for inverse condemnation because owner
failed to show present interference with the use of the property); City of Houston v. Biggers,
380 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962
(1965) (mere passage of ordinance authorizing construction of civic center on owner's property
did not constitute a taking because the ordinance did not restrict the owner's use of the prop-
erty); State v. Vaughan, 319 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1958, no writ) (mere fact
that tenant vacated leased premises after becoming aware that leased property was slated for
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that by affirmatively answering the issue identified by the supreme court, the
court held that if the government has not directly restricted the use of the
landowner's property, the landowner cannot maintain an action. 673
The developer argued that even if most of the government's pre-condem-
nation actions did not constitute a taking, the government's unreasonable
delay in actually acquiring the condemned parcel should constitute a taking.
The supreme court disagreed, holding that in the absence of clear constitu-
tional or statutory authority, the court would not interfere with the govern-
ment's ability to make prudent and well thought out decisions by imposing
time constraints on the government. 674 The court reasoned that if the gov-
ernment was subject to liability for unreasonable delay, the government
might hasten its review and thereby skew the review process. 675 The court
did, however, leave one small opening by reserving the issue of whether a
landowner could claim inverse condemnation where the government's bad
faith results in economic damage to the landowner, even though the govern-
ment did not directly restrict the use of the owner's property.676
As to the issue regarding the submission of the measure of damages to the
jury, the supreme court held that both the trial court and the appellate court
erred. 677 The court referred the trial court and the appellate court to the
supreme court's decisions in State v. Carpenter678 and Callejo v. Brazos Elec-
tric Power Cooperative, Inc. 679 In Carpenter, the supreme court suggested
that three questions regarding market value should be submitted to the jury:
(i) the market value of the condemned portion, (ii) the market value of the
remainder before the partial taking, and (iii) the market value of the remain-
der after the partial taking.680 The court then interpreted its later opinion in
Callejo, for the proposition that "in the interest of broad-form submission",
the three questions raised in Carpenter should be reduced to two issues: (i)
the market value of the condemned portion, and (ii) the damage to the re-
condemnation did not constitute taking since the state had not taken nor physically invaded
the owner's property)).
673. Westgate, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1043-46. See also Bell v. City of Waco, 835 S.W.2d
211 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no writ) (decrease in market value of land caused by potential
restrictive neighborhood conservation did not constitute a present taking and merely consti-
tuted noncompensable damages, the risk of which is born by every owner of land).
674. Westgate, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1045.
675. Id.
676. Id. at 1046. Justice Doggett wrote a dissent arguing that the developer had pled bad
faith and even if it had not pled bad faith, the court should remand to the trial court to permit
the developer to amend its pleadings. Id. at 1050-52. The majority concluded that the devel-
oper had not pled bad faith and that the court did not elect to exercise its remand authority to
permit the developer to amend its pleadings. Id. at 1046-47.
677. Id. at 1047; see supra note 667 and accompanying text. The trial court submitted two
questions to the jury, one of which inquired into the pre-taking market value of the entire tract
of land, and the other of which inquired into the post-taking market value of the entire tract of
land, without any distinction between the condemned portion and the remainder. The court of
appeals, on the other hand, held that only one question as to the damages should have been
submitted to the jury.
678. 89 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1936).
679. 755 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. 1988).




mainder portion, accompanied by a jury instruction that the damage to the
remainder is to be determined by the difference in the pre-taking market
value of the remainder tract and its post-taking market value.61 The court
stated that Callejo did not change the measure of damages in partial-taking
cases. 682 In effect, Callejo combined the second and third issues of the Car-
penter measure of damages to the remainder into a single broad form ques-
tion to the jury, with an instruction to the jury that it could consider the pre-
taking and post-taking market values of the remainder.683 In the present
case, the trial court committed reversible error by not only failing to submit
the jury question in broad form by presenting specific questions as to the pre-
taking and post-taking market value of the land, but also by failing to iden-
tify the correct measure of damages.684 The court of appeals, on the other
hand, incorrectly concluded that only a single question should have been
submitted to the jury.68 5
681. Id. at 1048.
682. Id.
683. Id.
684. Id.; see supra notes 667-73, 677. The trial court's questions failed to separately deter-
mine the damages to the condemned tract and the remainder tract, thus resulting in an incor-
rect measure of damages according to the supreme court's holdings in Carpenter and Callejo.
685. Westgate, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1048; see supra notes 667-73, 677. The court of ap-
peals held that a single question as to the difference in the pre-taking market value and post-
taking market value of the entire tract should have been submitted. This question, like that of
the trial court's, did not separately identify the damages to the condemned tract and the re-
mainder tract.
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